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Arnold, Pvt. William L.

arnold

Pvt. William Leland Arnold was born on May 4, 1917, in Fishtail, Montana, to William C. Arnold and Margaret B. Haugan-Arnold. He was the oldest of the couple’s six sons and four daughters and grew up on Rosebud River Ranch. There is conflicting information on his education. Some sources state he could not afford the cost of getting to school, so he dropped out of high school during his first year to help support his family by working on the family’s farm. Other sources show he graduated from Absarokee High School in 1937. He registered for the draft on October 16, 1940, and named his father as his contact person and employer. He also indicated he was a high school graduate. He was one of the first Montana men to have his name selected to be drafted and was inducted into the Army on March 25, 1941. He was sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky, for basic training.

After completing basic training, he was assigned to the 753rd GHQ Tank Battalion at Camp Polk, Louisiana. The battalion was activated on June 1, 1941, at Camp Polk. Many of its original members were sent to the base from Ft. Benning, Georgia, but on June 3rd, 492 men from Selective Service were assigned to the battalion. Most of these men left Ft. Knox and joined the battalion, on June 5th. Arnold attended radio operator school and qualified as a radio operator and most likely remained at Ft. Knox to complete his training. To qualify the man had to be able to send and receive 20 words a minute. The school was so intensive that the students had fewer weekends off duty. 

While the 753rd was still training at Camp Polk, the Louisana maneuvers started in September 1941. The battalion did not take part in the maneuvers. At the end of September, the 192nd Tank Battalion – which took part in the maneuvers and was made up of National Guard tank companies – was ordered to Camp Polk. It was on the side of a hill that the battalion was informed it was going overseas.

The members of the 192nd who were married with dependents, with other dependents, 29 years old or older, or whose National Guard enlistments would end while the battalion was overseas, were allowed to resign from federal service. The battalion’s commander, because of his age, was replaced by Major. Theodore Wickord his executive officer. Replacements for the men came from the 753rd Tank Battalion. One of those replacements was William. It is not known if he volunteered to join the battalion or if he became a member of the battalion after his name was drawn from a hat. After joining the battalion, he was assigned to D Company and went from living in a barracks to living in a tent with the other members of the company. This was made worse by the fact that it seemed to rain every day while they were at Camp Polk. It was said that men went a week without showering since they were always wet.

Many of the original members of the 192nd believed they were selected to be sent overseas because they had performed well on the Louisiana maneuvers. The story was that they were personally selected by General George S. Patton – who had commanded their tanks as part of the Blue Army under Patton’s command during the maneuvers – to go overseas. Although Patton praised the 192nd and the 191st Tank Battalion who participated in the maneuvers as the First Tank Group, there is no evidence that Patton had anything to do with the 192nd being sent to the Philippines.

There was also the story that early in 1941 a squadron of American planes was flying over the Lingayen Gulf. One of the pilots, who was flying at a lower altitude, noticed something odd in the water. He took his plane down identified a flagged buoy in the water and saw another in the distance. The planes came upon more buoys that lined up – in a straight line for 30 miles to the northwest – in the direction of Formosa which had a large radio transmitter used by the Japanese military. The squadron continued its flight plan south to Mariveles and returned to Clark Field. When the planes landed, what they saw was reported, but it was too late to do anything that day.

The next day, another squadron was sent to the area and found that the buoys had been picked up by a fishing boat – with a tarp on its deck covering the buoys – which was seen making its way to shore. Since communication between the Air Corps and the Navy was difficult, the boat escaped. According to this story, it was at that time the decision was made to build up the American military presence in the Philippines since it was a daily or almost daily occurrence for Japanese planes to fly over the area.

The reality was that the 192nd was part of the First Tank Group which was headquartered at Ft. Knox and operational by June 1941. Besides the 192nd, the group was made up of the 70th and 191st Tank Battalions – the 191st had been a medium National Guard tank battalion, while the 70th was a Regular Army tank battalion– at Ft. Meade, Maryland. The tank group also contained the 193rd Tank Battalion at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and the 194th Tank Battalion at Ft. Lewis, Washington. The 192nd, 193rd, and 194th had been National Guard light tank battalions. It is known that the military presence in the Philippines was being built up at the time, and documents show the entire tank group had been scheduled to be sent to the Philippines well before June 1941.

On August 13, 1941, Congress voted to extend federalized National Guard units’ time in the regular Army by 18 months, and on August 14th, the 194th received its orders to go overseas. The buoys being spotted by the pilot may have sped up the transfer of the tank battalions to the Philippines with only the 194th and 192nd reaching the islands, but it was not the reason for the battalions going to the Philippines. It is also known that the 193rd Tank Battalion was on its way to Hawaii – during its trip to the Philippines – when Pearl Harbor was attacked. When it arrived in Hawaii the battalion was held there. One of the two medium tank battalions – most likely the 191st – was on 48-hour standby orders for the Philippines but the orders were canceled on December 10th because the war with Japan had started.

Many of the old and new members of the battalion were given furloughs home so that they could say goodbye to family and friends but they had to be back at Camp Polk by the morning of October 14th. At the base, the men lived in tents, and it was stated that it seemed to rain every day they were there. Some men said they didn’t take showers for days because they were always wet.

The battalion was scheduled to receive new M3 tanks, but none were available for some long-forgotten reason. A large number of the battalion’s new tanks came from the 753rd Tank Battalion and the 3rd Armor Division. The tanks were only new to the 192nd, and in many cases, the tanks were within 5 hours of their 100-hour required maintenance. The battalion also received peeps (later known as jeeps) and half-tracks to replace their staff cars and scout cars.

HQ Company left for San Francisco a few days earlier than the rest of the battalion. At 8:30 A.M. on October 20th, over different train routes, the letter companies were sent to San Francisco, California. A Company took the southern route along the Mexican border through Needles, California, and north through Los Angeles to San Francisco. B Company went west through Denver and the Rocky Mountains, C Company went a little further north through the center of the country, and D Company went north and then west along the Canadian border and then south along the west coast.

Most of the soldiers of each company rode on one train that was followed by a second train that carried the company’s tanks. At the end of the second train was a boxcar followed by a passenger car that carried some soldiers. When they arrived in San Francisco, they were ferried, by the U.S.A.T. General Frank M. Coxe, to Ft. McDowell on Angel Island. On the island, they were given physicals and inoculated by the battalion’s medical detachment. Men found to have minor health issues were held back and scheduled to rejoin the battalion at a later date, while other men were simply replaced by men sent to the island as replacements that may have come from the 757th Tank Battalion which was at Ft. Ord, California. To maintain secrecy, the soldiers were not allowed off the island. It was also at this time that Col. James R. N. Weaver joined the 192nd as its commanding officer.

The 192nd boarded the U.S.A.T. Gen. Hugh L. Scott and sailed on Monday, October 27th. The sea was rough during this part of the trip, so many tankers had seasickness and also had a hard time walking on deck until they got their “sea legs.”  It was stated that about one-tenth of the battalion showed up for inspection the first morning on the ship. Once they recovered they spent much of the time training in breaking down machine guns, cleaning weapons, and doing KP.

During this part of the trip, one of the soldiers had an appendectomy. A day or two before the ships arrived in Hawaii, the ships ran into a school of flying fish. Since the sea was calm, that night they noticed the water was a phosphorous green. The sailors told them that it was St. Elmo’s Fire. The ship arrived at Honolulu, Hawaii, on Sunday, November 2nd, and had a four-day layover. As the ship docked, men threw coins in the water and watched native boys dive into the water after them. They saw two Japanese tankers anchored in the harbor that arrived to pick up oil but had been denied permission to dock.

The morning they arrived in Hawaii was said to be a beautiful sunny day. Most of the soldiers were given shore leave so they could see the island. During this time they visited pineapple ranches, coconut groves, and Waikiki Beach which some said was nothing but stones since it was man-made. They also noticed that the island residents were more aware of the impending war with Japan. Posters were posted everywhere. Most warned sailors to watch what they said because their spies and saboteurs on the island. Other posters in store windows sought volunteers for fire-fighting brigades. Before they left Hawaii, an attempt was made to secure two 37-millimeter guns and ammunition so that the guns could be set up on the ship’s deck and the tank crews could learn how to load them and fire them, but they were unable to acquire the guns.

On Thursday, November 6th, the ship sailed for Guam but took a southerly route away from the main shipping lanes. It was at this time it was joined by, the heavy cruiser, the U.S.S. Louisville, and, another transport, the U.S.A.T. President Calvin Coolidge. The ships headed west in a zig-zag pattern. Since the Scott had been a passenger ship, they ate in large dining rooms, and it was stated the food was better than average Army food. As the ships got closer to the equator the hold they slept in got hotter and hotter, so many of the men began sleeping on the ship’s deck. They learned quickly to get up each morning or get soaked by the ship’s crew cleaning the decks. Sunday night, November 9th, the soldiers went to bed and when they awoke the next morning, it was Tuesday, November 11th. During the night, while they slept, the ships crossed the International Dateline. Two members of the battalion stated the ship made a quick stop at Wake Island to drop off a radar crew and equipment.

During this part of the voyage that lasted 16 days, fire drills were held every two days, the soldiers spent their time attending lectures, playing craps and cards, reading, writing letters, and sunning themselves on deck. Other men did the required work like turning over the tanks’ engines by hand and the clerks caught up on their paperwork. The soldiers were also given other jobs to do, such as painting the ship. Each day 500 men reported to the officers and needle-chipped paint off the lifeboats and then painted the boats. By the time they arrived in Manila, every boat had been painted. Other men not assigned to the paint detail for that day attended classes. In addition, there was always KP.

Two men stated that the ship made a stop at Wake Island, but this has not been verified. It is known that around this time, radar equipment and its operators arrived on the island. On Saturday, November 15th, smoke from an unknown ship was seen on the horizon. The Louisville revved up its engines, its bow came out of the water, and it took off in the direction of the smoke. It turned out that the unknown ship was from a friendly country. Two other intercepted ships were Japanese freighters hauling scrap metal to Japan.

Albert Dubois, A Co., stated that they were in a room on the ship and listening to the radio. Recalling the event, he said, “We were playing cards one day at sea.  President Roosevelt’s speech to America was being piped into the room we were in.  I still hear his voice that evening in November 1941.  ‘I hate war, Eleanor hates war.  We all hate war.  Your sons will not and shall not go overseas!’  We were already halfway to the Philippines.”

When they arrived at Guam on Sunday, November 16th, the ships took on water, bananas, coconuts, and vegetables. Although they were not allowed off the ship, the soldiers were able to mail letters home before sailing for Manila the next day. At one point, the ships passed an island at night and did so in total blackout. This for many of the soldiers was a sign that they were being sent into harm’s way. The blackout was strictly enforced and men caught smoking on deck after dark spent time in the ship’s brig. Three days after leaving Guam the men spotted the first islands of the Philippines. The ships sailed around the south end of Luzon and then north up the west coast of Luzon toward Manila Bay.

The ships entered Manila Bay, at 8:00 A.M., on Thursday, November 20th, and docked at Pier 7 later that morning. One thing that was different about their arrival was that instead of a band and a welcoming committee waiting at the pier to tell them to enjoy their stay in the Philippines and see as much of the island as they could, a party came aboard the ship – carrying guns – and told the soldiers, “Draw your firearms immediately; we’re under alert. We expect a war with Japan at any moment. Your destination is Fort Stotsenburg, Clark Field.” At 3:00 P.M., as the enlisted men left the ship, a Marine was checking off their names. When an enlisted man said his name, the Marine responded with, “Hello sucker.” Those who drove trucks drove them to the fort, while the maintenance section remained behind at the pier to unload the tanks. Some men stated they rode a train to Ft. Stotsenberg while other men stated they rode busses to the base.

At the fort, the tankers were met by Gen. Edward P. King Jr. who welcomed them and made sure that they had what they needed. He also was apologetic that there were no barracks for the tankers and that they had to live in tents. The fact was he had not learned of their arrival until days before they arrived. He made sure that they had dinner – which was a stew thrown into their mess kits – before he left to have his dinner. D Company was scheduled to be transferred to the 194th Tank Battalion so when they arrived at the fort, they most likely moved into their finished barracks instead of tents that the rest of the 192nd. The 194th had arrived in the Philippines in September and its barracks were finished about a week earlier. The company also received a new commanding officer, Capt. Jack Altman while the company’s original officers were put in other 194th companies.

The 192nd arrived in the Philippines with a great deal of radio equipment to set up a radio school to train radiomen for the Philippine Army. The battalion also had many ham radio operators after arriving at Ft. Stotsenburg, the battalion set up a communications tent that was in contact with ham radio operators in the United States within hours. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When they were informed it was the 192nd, they gave the 192nd frequencies to use. Men sent messages home to their families that they had arrived safely. 

With the arrival of the 192nd, the Provisional Tank Group was activated on November 27th. Besides the 192nd, the tank group contained the 194th Tank Battalion with the 17th Ordnance Company joining the tank group on the 29th. Both units had arrived in the Philippines in September 1941. Military documents written after the war show the tank group was scheduled to be composed of three light tank battalions and two medium tank battalions. Col. Weaver left the 192nd, was appointed head of the tank group, and was promoted to brigadier general. Major Theodore Wickord permanently became the commanding officer of the 192nd.

The day started at 5:15 with reveille and anyone who washed near a faucet with running water was considered lucky. At 6:00 A.M. they ate breakfast followed by work – on their tanks and other equipment – from 7:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. Lunch was from 11:30 A.M. to 1:30 P.M. when the soldiers returned to work until 2:30 P.M. The shorter afternoon work period was based on the belief that it was too hot to work in the climate. The term “recreation in the motor pool,”  meant they worked until 4:30 in the afternoon.

During this time, the battalion members spent much of their time getting the cosmoline out of the barrels of the tanks’ guns. Since they only had one reamer to clean the tank barrels, many of the main guns were cleaned with a burlap rag attached to a pole and soaked in aviation fuel. It was stated that they probably only got one reamer because Army ordnance didn’t believe they would ever use their main guns in combat. The tank crews never fired their tanks’ main guns until after the war had started, and not one man knew how to adjust the sights on the tanks. The battalion also lost four of its peeps, later called jeeps, used for reconnaissance to the command of the United States Armed Forces Far East also known as USAFFE. 

Before they went into the nearest barrio which was two or three miles away, all the newly arrived troops were assembled for a lecture by the post’s senior chaplain. It was said that he put the fear of God and gonorrhea into them.

It is known that during this time the tank battalions went on at least two practice reconnaissance missions under the guidance of the 194th. They traveled to Baguio on one maneuver and to the Lingayen Gulf on the other maneuver. Gen. Weaver, the tank group commander, was able to get ammunition from the post’s ordnance department on the 30th, but the tank group could not get time at one of the firing ranges.

At Ft. Stotsenburg, the soldiers were expected to wear their dress uniforms. Since working on the tanks was a dirty job, the battalion members wore coveralls to work on the tanks. The 194th Tank wore coveralls in their barracks area to do work on their tanks, but if the soldiers left the battalion’s area, they wore dress uniforms – which were a heavy material and uncomfortable to wear in the heat – everywhere; including going to the PX. Their tropical uniforms had been ordered but had not arrived.

For recreation, the soldiers spent their free time bowling or going to the movies on the base. They also played horseshoes, softball, and badminton, or threw footballs around during their free time. On Wednesday afternoons, they went swimming. Passes were given out and men were allowed to go to Manila in small groups. 

When the general warning of a possible Japanese attack was sent to overseas commands on November 27th, the Philippine command did not receive it. The reason why this happened is not known and several reasons for this can be given. It is known that the tanks took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night would be a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position was among drums of 100-octane gas, and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield and the bombs were haphazardly placed. On December 1st, the tankers were ordered to the perimeter of Clark Field to guard against Japanese paratroopers. From this time on, two tank crew members remained with each tank at all times and were fed from food trucks.

Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, 192nd, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks and would have thrown them away in battle. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th. The next day Weaver visited every tank company of the tank group.

Although official reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were sent to the military command in the Philippines at 2:30 am, For the tankers, it was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th at 7:00 a.m. Gen. Weaver, Maj. Miller, Major Wickord, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance, read the messages of the attack. Miller left the tent and informed the officers of the 194th about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the members of the tank crews were ordered to their tanks which were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions at Clark Field.

The 194th was in its new positions on the north and east sides of Clark Field. Sgt. Byron Veillete ran through their positions shouting that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Many of the tankers did not believe that the war had started. They were expecting to take part in maneuvers and some believed this was just the start of them. From the battalion’s positions, they watched as the P-40 fighters took to the air. It was said that no matter what direction a man looked, American planes could be seen. The tankers got most of their news about the attack from listening to radio dispatches being received on a big radio on what was the command half-track.

After hearing the news about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Capt. Altman called his company together and ordered the remaining members of the tank crews to their tanks. The half-tracks were also ordered to tank up positions next to the tanks. The members of the company not assigned to a tank or a half-track remained in the battalion’s bivouac.

News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 a.m. All morning the sky above the airfield was filled with American planes. Men said no matter what direction they looked they saw planes. At 11:45 the American planes landed and were parked in a straight line – to make it easier for the ground crews to service them – outside the pilots’ mess hall. The men assigned to the tanks and half-tracks were receiving their lunches at food trucks. Gen. King put out a written order telling the unit commanders that the threat of being bombed was over and they could allow their men to return to the main base, in rotations, for rest, baths, and hot meals. It was lunchtime and members of the tank battalion not assigned to tanks were allowed to go to the mess hall to eat. Col. Miller ordered the men under his command to remain with their tanks and half-tracks.

It was reported that only two of the seven radar sets in the Philippines were operational and the dispatches the operators sent to Manila of approaching planes took an hour to reach Manila. One 194th half-track crew tuned into a Manila radio station and heard a news flash that Clark Field was being bombed. At about 12:45 p.m. an amphibious plane landed on a runway near the tankers and after it came to a stop, its passengers and crew got and and ran to the opposite side of the airfield.

Around 8:00 A.M., the planes of the Army Air Corps took off and filled the sky. At noon, the planes landed and were lined up – near the pilots’ mess hall – in a straight line to be refueled. While the planes were being serviced, the pilots went to lunch. The members of the tank crews received their lunches from the battalion’s food trucks. At 12:45 in the afternoon on December 8, 1941, just ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the company lived through the Japanese attack on Clark Field. The tankers were eating lunch when planes approached the airfield from the north. At first, they thought the planes were American and counted 54 planes in formation. They then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. It was only when bombs began exploding on the runways that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers.

The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One tanker stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield.

After the attack, the soldiers watched as the dead, the dying, and the wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, trucks, and anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. When the hospital filled, they watched the medics place the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing.

The tankers were receiving lunch from their food trucks and as they stood in line to be fed they watched as 54 planes approached the airfield from the northwest. Men commented that the planes must be American Navy planes. That was until someone saw Red Dots on the wings and then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. Maj. Miller shouted at his men to take cover and then bombs began exploding on the runways. It was then that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers. One member of the 192nd, Robert Brooks, D Co., was killed during the attack and several tankers were wounded.

The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One member of the 192nd stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down.

The Coast Artillery had trained with the latest anti-aircraft guns while in the States, but the decision was made to send them to the Philippines with older guns. They also had proximity fuses for the shells and had to use an obsolete method to cut the fuses since the unit’s fuse cutter was in Manila being repaired at the time of the attack. Many of the shells they fired fell to the ground without exploding.

The Zeros strafed the airfield and headed toward and turned around behind Mount Arayat and returned to strafe again. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. It was stated that the bodies of the dead lay on the runways since many were Air Corps ground crew members. It also appeared that everything was on fire from airplane hangers, automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. The runways of the airfield were pot-marked with craters from the bombs. The entire attack lasted about 45 minutes.

The soldiers watched as the dead, dying, and wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, on trucks, and in and on cars. Anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. Within an hour the hospital had reached its capacity. As the tankers watched the medics placed the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing. The battalion members set up cots under mango trees for the wounded and even the dentist gave medical aid to the wounded. The battalion’s medics gave first aid to the wounded.

After the attack, the tank crews spent much of the time loading bullets by hand from rifle cartridges into machine gun belts since they had gone through most of their ordnance during the attack. That night, since they did not have any foxholes, the men used an old latrine pit for cover since it was safer in the pit than in their barracks. The entire night they were bitten by mosquitoes. Without knowing it, they had slept their last night on a cot or bed, and from this point on, the men slept in blankets on the ground. One result of the attack was D Company was never transferred to the 194th and remained part of the 192nd throughout the Battle of Bataan.

The next day, those men not assigned to a tank or half-track walked around Clark Field to look at the damage. As they walked, they saw there were hundreds of dead. Some were pilots who had been caught asleep, because they had flown night missions, in their tents during the first attack. Others were pilots who had been killed attempting to get to their planes.

The men from both tank battalions recovered the 50 caliber machine guns from the planes that had been destroyed on the ground and got most of them to work. They propped up the wings of the damaged planes so they looked like the planes were operational hoping this would fool the Japanese to come over to destroy them. When the Japanese fighters returned, the tankers shot two planes down. After this, the planes never returned. It was at this time every man was issued Springfield and Infield rifles. Some worked some didn’t so they cannibalized the rifles to get one good rifle from two bad ones. As they worked they heard Tokyo Rose say that the Japanese planes had destroyed both tank battalions.

After the attack 194th was sent to a bivouac three kilometers north of Clark Field at Mabalacat. They spent their time loading ammunition belts because they had fired so much during the attack on Clark Field. The tankers were issued Infield and Springfield rifles. Since the rifles were from World War I, one out of every two rifles worked. The tankers cannibalized two of the same type of rifles to get one working rifle.

On the night of the 12th, the battalion was ordered to bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. Attempting to move the battalion at night was a nightmare and one tank overturned when it went off the road. They finally arrived at their new bivouac at 6:00 A.M. on December 13th and spent the rest of the day and the next night there. The tanks were in an area of few trees surrounded by rice paddies which meant the furthest they could go off the road was a few feet. Because of this, the battalion was scattered in three locations. Japanese planes flew over but did not bomb or strafe them.

The tanks headed south of Manila and it was also stated the battalion was sent to Batangas in southern Luzon for about two weeks. During this time, little happened, but the tankers were strafed a few times by Japanese planes. The tanks spent much of their time doing reconnaissance and hunting down fifth columnists who used flares at night and mirrors during the day to show Japanese planes where ammunition dumps were located. On the 15th, the battalion received 15 Bren gun carriers but turned some over to the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. These were manned by grounded Air Corps men and used to test the ground to see if it could support the weight of tanks.  

On December 22nd, A Company and D Company, 192nd, were ordered to the Agno River near Carmen. C Company remained behind at Batangas. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. started the more than 150-mile movement north to meet the Japanese at an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. They soon discovered that without air cover it was unsafe to move during the day, so the tanks were moved at night to prevent them from being attacked by Japanese planes. It was stated that driving a tank at night was never safe, but something that a tank driver learned to do. One reason this was unsafe was that the tank crews never knew what lay ahead. George Chumley D Co., 192nd, stated that anyone who said he wasn’t afraid was lying and that they were always afraid. What happened is that the men became used to being afraid.

One of the tankers stated that as they went through Manila, on the balcony of his hotel suite, they saw Gen. MacArthur handing out medals to his staff officers. None of these officers had seen any combat. While going through Manila, one tank was going fast enough that when the driver had to make a turn, it slid on the pavement and took out a fountain.

When they got close to their objective, to protect the battalion from strafing, most of the battalion went to the left on Route 3 toward Tarlec and the river while A Company was sent down Route 5 toward Cabanatuan and San Jose and then along the river until it rejoined the rest of the battalion. When the tanks passed through the barrio of San Jose, they saw the dead bodies of Filipino men, women, and children who had mistaken Japanese Zeros for American planes. When they came out to wave at the planes, they were strafed.

When the battalion arrived at its destination near Lingayen Gulf, D Company’s tanks were near a ridge, so many of the tankers climbed to the top, where they found defending troops, ammunition, and guns. The soldiers were just sitting there watching the Japanese ships in the Gulf since they had received orders not to fire. The tankers walked down the ridge and waited until they received orders to drop back and let the Japanese occupy the ridge. They watched as the Japanese brought their equipment to the top of the ridge. The Americans finally received orders to launch a counterattack which failed.

The tank battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. The tanks were about five yards apart. It was on the 26th that the Japanese artillery fire began landing near the tanks. The Self-propelled mounts of the Filipino Scout would take positions between the tanks fire several rounds and move to another position. Shells began landing around the tanks, so the crews buttoned themselves in their tanks. The tanks did not have anti-personnel shells to use against infantry, but the tankers used the tanks’ 37-millimeter guns against armored vehicles and their machine guns against infantry. The fire stopped the Japanese advance for a while but the Japanese brought up more artillery and resumed the attack. It was at this time that Sgt. Herbert Stobel – who was standing in the turret of his tank – was killed when a shell exploded above his tank.

The 192nd received the order to withdraw and forwarded the order to the 194th. Only one tank had a long-range radio. It was said the commander acknowledged receiving the order, but he never forwarded the order to the rest of his battalion. The 192nd withdrew believing the 194th was doing the same.

That day, the tank battalions were also given the job of holding the line against enemy armor and major thrusts until 5:00 A.M. on December 27th. Col. Ernest Miller – being the senior officer – was given authority to withdraw both tank battalions before 5:00 A.M. if he felt it was necessary. The tanks held the line but withdrew at 7:30 P.M. before the bridges they needed to cross were blown up at 11:30 P.M. that night.

Two volunteers were needed to set up machine guns at the far end of the bridge to harass the Japanese. Pvt. Gerald Bell and Pvt. August Bender, who were assistant tank drivers, volunteered to take two antiaircraft machine guns from the tanks to the far end of the bridge and set up machine gun nests. It was stated that Bell and Bender held their position and died after being surrounded. The Japanese attempted to cross the river in several places. The tankers fired on them with their machine guns killing as many as 500 enemy troops and knocking out three tanks with the support of two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible.

The 192nd and part of the 194th fell back to form a new defensive line the night of December 27th. Arrangements had been made for the tanks to pick up their rations at Tarlac Depot. From there they fell back to the south bank of the BamBan River which they were supposed to hold for as long as possible. The tankers found their tanks being used as “mobile pillboxes.” The tanks were at Santo Tomas near Cabanatuan on December 28th and 29th serving as a rear guard against the Japanese.

The two Filipino Army Divisions withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. The tankers held up the Japanese as long as possible before withdrawing. The 192nd received the order to withdraw and radioed the 194th, but for some unknown reason, the 194th tank commander whose tank had the long-wave radio did not forward the order to the other tanks of his battalion. The battalion finally was ordered to withdraw and 1st Lt. Harold Costigan informed the members of A Company, and D Company, 192nd, that they would have to fight their way out. The tanks fought their way through Carmen losing two tanks but saving the crews except for Capt. Edward Burke who had been hit by enemy fire. He was presumed dead but had been captured by the Japanese.

The tank battalions, on the 31st, were holding open two bridges at Calumpit so that the Southern Luzon forces could withdraw toward Bataan. It was noted that convoys of trucks would pass the tanks carrying absolutely nothing. It was then that Lt. Col. Miller sent out detachments of trucks to warehouses and had the men load them with ammunition, food, and high-octane fuel that was used by the tanks. It was stated that one detachment went all the way to Ft. Stotsenburg. The trucks returned carrying 6 tons of canned food and 12,000 gallons of fuel. 

The 194th, at 2:00 am the morning of January 1st, crossed a bridge over the San Fernando River which was destroyed since all Filipino and American units had already crossed. They were now on the main road into Bataan. A defensive line was set up from Guagua to Porac to the swamps along Pampanga Bay. The bridge on a side road that ran from Guagua to Sexmoan and back onto Route 7 was destroyed. At 4:00 am, the battalion dug into new positions. They listened to Japanese troop movements and heard the sound of tanks. They watched 5 Japanese 89A medium tanks come into view in an open field. The tanks stopped because no reconnaissance had been done in the area. Within minutes, there were 5 destroyed Japanese tanks

That same day, conflicting orders were received by the defenders who were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5. Doing this would allow the Southern Luzon Forces to withdraw toward Bataan. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge, over the Pampanga River, about withdrawing from the bridge and half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a frenzied attack by the 192nd, the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon forces escaped. This included C Co., 194th, which rejoined the rest of the 194th.

From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Co. 192nd, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having lost half of their troops.

The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. The tanks were stopped and the crews were sleeping when the tanks came under small arms fire. The crews returned fire. Next came mortar fire. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance.

That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.

A composite tank company was formed on the 8th under the command of Capt. Donald Hanes, B Co., 192nd. Its job was to protect the East Coast Road north of Hermosa open and to stop Japanese tanks attempting to use it to overrun the next defensive line that was forming. While in this position, the tanks were under constant enemy artillery fire. The rest of the tanks were ordered to bivouac south of the Abucay-Hacienda Road.

The remainder of the tanks were ordered to bivouac south of Aubucay Hacienda Road. While there, the tank crews had their first break from action in nearly a month. The tanks, which were long overdue for maintenance, were serviced by 17th Ordnance. It was also at this time that tank companies were reduced to ten tanks, with three tanks in each platoon. This was done so that D Company would have tanks. It was on January 9th that the Japanese launched a major offensive on what was called the Aubucay Hacienda line that stretched from Aubucay on the east coast of Bataan to the China Sea on the west. 

The Japanese attacked through the Aubucay Hacienda Plantation which was the location of most of the fighting took place. The defenders stated that the bodies of the dead Japanese piled up in front of them and made it more difficult for the next Japanese troops to advance against the line. One tanker from B Co., 192nd, said that when they walked among the Japanese dead, they found hypodermic needles on them. To him, this explained why they kept coming at the tanks even after they had been hit by machine gun fire. The defenders’ artillery was so accurate that the Japanese later stated the defenders were using artillery pieces like they were rifles. The biggest problem was that the defenders had no air cover so they were bombed and stated constantly and were constantly harassed by snipers.

The tank companies also were given the job of protecting the artillery. The guns were mobile and hooked onto the tanks with a special carriage which allowed them to be moved. According to the tankers, it took a lot of preparation to set them up and a lot of preparation to take them down. The tankers didn’t like doing this job because minutes after the guns began firing, the Japanese sent up reconnaissance planes to find the guns. When they did find the guns, Zeros would appear and strafe the area. The gun crews quickly learned to “shoot and scoot.” After firing a few rounds the guns were quickly broken down and moved out of the area.

On January 12th, Co. D, 192nd, and Co. C, 194th, were sent to Cadre Road in a forward position with little alert time. Land mines were planted on January 13th by ordnance to prevent the Japanese from reaching Cadre Road. C Co., 194th, was sent to Bagac to reopen the Moron Highway which had been cut by the Japanese on January 16th. At the junction of Trail 162 and the Moron Highway, the tanks were fired on by an anti-tank gun which was knocked out by the tanks. They cleared the roadblock with the support of infantry.

General Weaver also issued the following orders to the tank battalions around this time: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”

During this time, the tanks often found themselves dealing with officers who claimed they were the ranking officers in the area and that they could change the tank company’s orders. Most wanted the tanks to kill snipers or do some other job the infantry had not succeeded at doing. This situation continued until Gen Weaver gave a written order to every tank commander that if an officer attempted to change their orders, they should hand the officer the order. When the officer looked up at the tank commander, the tank commander had his handgun aimed at the officer. Gen Weeaver had ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer attempting to change their orders. This ended the problem. 

On January 20th, A Company was sent to save the command post of the 31st Infantry. On the 24th, they supported the troops along the Hacienda Road, but they could not reach the objective because of landmines that had been planted by ordnance. The battalion held a position a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road with four self-propelled mounts. At 9:45 A.M., a Filipino warned the tankers that a large force of Japanese was on their way. When they appeared the battalion and self-propelled mounts opened up with everything they had. The Japanese broke off the attack, at 10:30 A.M., after losing 500 of their 1200 men. It was also at this time that the Japanese ended the assault and waited for fresh troops to arrive.

The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks covered the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.

The tank battalions, on January 28th, were given the job of protecting the beaches. The Japanese later admitted that the tanks guarding the beaches prevented them from attempting landings. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.

One night, the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach guarded by B Co., 192nd. There was a tremendous firefight, but the next morning not one Japanese soldier landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that the tanks were the reason why they attempted no other landings. While doing this job, the B Co. also noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast of Bataan they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be at a certain place off the beach at a certain time and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when they arrived, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes. 

On January 20th, A Company was sent to save the command post of the 31st Infantry. On the 24th, they supported the troops along the Hacienda Road, but they could not reach the objective because of landmines that had been planted by ordnance. The battalion held a position a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road with four self-propelled mounts. At 9:45 A.M., a Filipino warned the tankers that a large force of Japanese was on their way. When they appeared the battalion and self-propelled mounts opened up with everything they had. The Japanese broke off the attack, at 10:30 A.M., after losing 500 of their 1200 men. It was also at this time that the Japanese ended the assault and waited for fresh troops to arrive.

The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks covered the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.

The tank battalions, on January 28th, were given the job of protecting the beaches. The Japanese later admitted that the tanks guarding the beaches prevented them from attempting landings. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.

One night, the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach guarded by B Co., 192nd. There was a tremendous firefight, but the next morning not one Japanese soldier landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that the tanks were the reason why they attempted no other landings. While doing this job, the member of B Co. also noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast of Bataan they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be at a certain place off the beach at a certain time and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when they arrived, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes. 

The tanks were at the Abucay-Hacienda Line which on the east went from Manila Bay to the mountains in the center of Bataan and held by the 1st Corps. It then extended, on the west, from the mountains to the South China Sea and was held by the 2nd Corps. The mountains had no fortifications since it was believed they were impenetrable. The Japanese occupied them and were able to get the defenders to fire at their own men by setting off firecrackers between the units. Snipers were the biggest problem and the tanks often found themselves being ordered by an officer – who claimed to be the “immediate commander” because he was the highest-ranking officer in the area – to exterminate the problem. This situation got so bad that Gen Weaver gave each tank commander a written order that he handed to the officer. After reading it, the officer would look up at the tank commander who had his .45 pointed at the officer. Weaver’s order, ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer who attempted to change their orders.

Because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since the guns could not be aimed at the ground. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position.

Both battalions were sent to cover the junctions of the Back Road and East Road with the Abucay-Hacienda Road on January 25th. The defenders dropped back to the Pilar-Bagac Line which was a solid line from one side of Bataan to the other. To do this, the tanks held the old line and attempted to give the impression that a counter-attack was taking shape while the other troops withdrew. While holding the position, the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, fought its way to the position at 3:00 A.M. One platoon was sent to the front of the column of trucks that were loading the troops. The tanks provided heavy fire so that the infantry could withdraw and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. Later in the day, both the 192nd and 194th held a defensive line on the Balanga-Cardre-BaniBani Roads until the withdrawal was completed at midnight. They held the position until the night of January 26th, when they dropped back to a new defensive line roughly along the Pilar-Bagac Roads.

It was in the jungle that the tankers found out how inappropriate the M3 tanks were for use in the Philippines. Off the road, they had to travel with their turrets backward. If the tankers did not do this, the guns would get stuck in the jungle growth. The tanks were also restricted to the roads since they would get stuck in the mud of the rice fields. The high silhouettes and straight sides of the M3 also made the tanks easy targets for the Japanese.

The 194th’s tanks were ordered to withdraw. During the withdrawal, one of A Company’s platoon, under the command of 2nd Lt. Carroll Guin, had fallen behind another platoon and took the wrong turn where the roads came together as a “Y.” The road they went down went back to the front lines. The platoon was stopped by 1st Lt. Ted Spaulding who had seen them gone down the road, chased them down with his half-track, and then ran on foot to the lead tank stopping it about two miles from the front.

The tankers also found the engineers were ready to blow a bridge before the battalion had crossed it. Spaulding and 1st Lt. Charles Fleming ordered them to wait. Not long after this, the 194th under Lt. Col. Miller arrived and crossed. When it was believed all the vehicles had crossed, the engineers lit the fuses. Just then a half-track arrived carrying Capt. Fred Moffet began to cross the bridge when about halfway across he saw smoke. Moffet ordered his driver to back the half-track off the bridge which went up in an explosion seconds later. A board from the explosion hit Moffet and injured his leg.

That day, the tank battalions were also given the job of holding the line against enemy armor and major thrusts until 5:00 A.M. on December 27th. Col. Ernest Miller – being the senior officer – was given authority to withdraw both tank battalions before 5:00 A.M. if he felt it was necessary. The tanks held the line but withdrew at 7:30 P.M. before the bridges they needed to cross were blown up at 11:30 P.M. that night.

Two volunteers were needed to set up machine guns at the far end of the bridge to harass the Japanese. Pvt. Gerald Bell and Pvt. August Bender, who were assistant tank drivers, volunteered to take two antiaircraft machine guns from the tanks to the far end of the bridge and set up machine gun nests. It was stated that Bell and Bender held their position and died after being surrounded. The Japanese attempted to cross the river in several places. The tankers fired on them with their machine guns killing as many as 500 enemy troops and knocking out three tanks with the support of two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible.

The 192nd and part of the 194th fell back to form a new defensive line the night of December 27th. Arrangements had been made for the tanks to pick up their rations at Tarlac Depot. From there they fell back to the south bank of the BamBan River which they were supposed to hold for as long as possible. The tankers found their tanks being used as “mobile pillboxes.” The tanks were at Santo Tomas near Cabanatuan on December 28th and 29th serving as a rear guard against the Japanese.

The two Filipino Army Divisions withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. The tankers held up the Japanese as long as possible before withdrawing. The 192nd received the order to withdraw and radioed the 194th, but for some unknown reason, the 194th tank commander whose tank had the long-wave radio did not forward the order to the other tanks of his battalion. The battalion finally was ordered to withdraw and 1st Lt. Harold Costigan informed the members of A Company, and D Company, 192nd, that they would have to fight their way out. The tanks fought their way through Carmen losing two tanks but saving the crews except for Capt. Edward Burke who had been hit by enemy fire. He was presumed dead but had been captured by the Japanese.

The tank battalions, on the 31st, were holding open two bridges at Calumpit so that the Southern Luzon forces could withdraw toward Bataan. It was noted that convoys of trucks would pass the tanks carrying absolutely nothing. It was then that Lt. Col. Miller sent out detachments of trucks to warehouses and had the men load them with ammunition, food, and high-octane fuel that was used by the tanks. It was stated that one detachment went all the way to Ft. Stotsenburg. The trucks returned carrying 6 tons of canned food and 12,000 gallons of fuel. 

The 194th, at 2:00 am the morning of January 1st, crossed a bridge over the San Fernando River which was destroyed since all Filipino and American units had already crossed. They were now on the main road into Bataan. A defensive line was set up from Guagua to Porac to the swamps along Pampanga Bay. The bridge on a side road that ran from Guagua to Sexmoan and back onto Route 7 was destroyed. At 4:00 am, the battalion dug into new positions. They listened to Japanese troop movements and heard the sound of tanks. They watched 5 Japanese 89A medium tanks come into view in an open field. The tanks stopped because no reconnaissance had been done in the area. Within minutes, there were 5 destroyed Japanese tanks

That same day, conflicting orders were received by the defenders who were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5. Doing this would allow the Southern Luzon Forces to withdraw toward Bataan. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge, over the Pampanga River, about withdrawing from the bridge and half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a frenzied attack by the 192nd, the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon forces escaped. This included C Co., 194th, which rejoined the rest of the 194th.

From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Co. 192nd, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having lost half of their troops.

The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. The tanks were stopped and the crews were sleeping when the tanks came under small arms fire. The crews returned fire. Next came mortar fire. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance.

That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.

The 194th set up its bivouac in a Mango grove. It was said that the trees made it impossible for the Japanese planes to see the tanks. A stream also ran through the grove which provided the tankers with the opportunity to bathe. For most of their time in the grove, things were quiet. They heard that the 192nd had been involved in two battles with the Japanese, the first involved Japanese Marines landing on points of Bataan, and the second was to eliminate two pockets of Japanese troops trapped behind the main defensive line when the attack was pushed back. They also heard that the 192nd had suffered several casualties.

The 17th Ordnance Company did work on the tanks to keep them running. In some cases, they cut down the barrels of the main guns so they could be used. They also reported that the rivets in the hauls popped when the tanks were hit by enemy fire, and the rivets injured the crews. The tank group command reported that the tanks’ suspension systems were failing. It was determined that the volute springs were freezing up because of their exposure to salt water. This information was sent to Washington D.C. which ordered that every vehicle using the volute spring suspension system be given new suspension systems. It also resulted in the M3 being redesigned. The front of the tanks was sloped removing the right angle, the hauls were welded, the doors in front of the driver and assistant driver were removed, and an escape hatch in the belly of the tanks was added.

The battalion was given beach duty to defend one of the two beaches on the east side of Bataan where the Japanese could land troops. The tank crews were also assigned guard duty. Their job was to prevent Japanese infiltrators. The tankers set up roadblocks along gravel roads and stopped and searched everyone coming down the road. The tankers ordered anyone coming down the road to halt and if the person didn’t they opened fire. The tanks also became a favorite target of the Japanese receiving fire on trails and while hidden in the jungle and could not fight back. The situation was so bad that other troops avoided being near the tanks. In one case, the 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company’s offer of assistance in a counter-attack. They were also involved in skirmishes with the Japanese, but the battalion was not involved in either the Battle of the Points or the Battle of the Pockets.

The reality was that the same illnesses that were taking their toll on the Bataan defenders were also taking their toll on the Japanese. American newspapers wrote about the lull in the fighting and the building of defenses against the expected assault that most likely would take place. The soldiers on Bataan also knew that an assault was coming, they just didn’t know when it would take place. The Japanese dropped surrender leaflets on the defenders that were printed on tissue paper. Most showed a scantily clad blond on them. Men stated that if the picture had been a hamburger and milkshake the Japanese may have had the results they wanted. The one good thing about the leaflets is that they made good toilet paper.

It may have been the day before Bataan was surrendered but William was hospitalized at Hospital #2 at Cabcaben, Bataan with malaria and dysentery. The hospital – which was created in December 1941 – was staffed by 8 doctors, 4 dentists, 3 pharmacists, and 2 MAC or administration officers who handled the paperwork. The hospital is known to have outdoor wards for the sick and wounded but shelter halves were used to provide cover for the patients. The hospital also had an operating room, a water plant, and an operating room which was a tent with a wooden floor that could hold the weight of the surgical equipment. A second surgical room – that held four operating tables – was built with wooden walls since casualties were expected to increase. The original operating room was replaced with another operating room because it was too close to the road and dust was everywhere. There was also a dental laboratory which it was said did excellent work. The hospital was near the bank of the Real River so a channel was dug that diverted about half of the river’s water to the water filtration plant supplying the hospital with an abundant chlorinated water supply. Electricity was supplied by a generator. About the hospital, he said, “It was just a bunch of beds set up in the jungle.”

The reality was that the same illnesses that were taking their toll on the Bataan defenders were also taking their toll on the Japanese. American newspapers wrote about the lull in the fighting and the building of defenses against the expected assault that most likely would take place. The soldiers on Bataan also knew that an assault was coming, they just didn’t know when it would take place. Having brought in combat-harden troops from Singapore, the Japanese launched a major offensive on April 3rd supported by artillery and aircraft. The artillery barrage started at 10 a.m. and lasted until noon. Each shell seemed to be followed by another that exploded on top of the previous shell. At the same time, wave after wave of Japanese bombers hit the same area dropping incendiary bombs that set the jungle on fire. The defenders had to choose between staying in their foxholes and being burned to death or seeking safety somewhere else. As the fire approached their foxholes those men who chose to attempt to flee were torn to pieces by shrapnel. It was said that arms, legs, and other body parts hung from tree branches. A large section of the defensive line at Mount Samat was wiped out.

The next day a large force of Japanese troops came over Mt. Samat and descended down the south face of the volcano. This attack wiped out two divisions of defenders and left a large area of the defensive line open to the Japanese. A Company was on beach duty that night and the Japanese brought up barges with artillery set up on them that began shelling the beach. The company returned fire which resulted in the barges withdrawing.

It was the evening of April 8th that Gen. King decided that further resistance was futile, since approximately 25% of his men were healthy enough to fight, and he estimated they would last one more day. In addition, he had over 6,000 troops who were sick or wounded and 40,000 civilians who he feared would be massacred. His troops were on one-quarter rations, and even at that ration, he had two days of food left. He also believed his troops could fight for one more day. Companies B and D, 192nd, and A Company, 194th, were preparing for a suicide attack on the Japanese in an attempt to stop the advance. At 6:00 P.M. tank battalion commanders received this order: “You will make plans, to be communicated to company commanders only, and be prepared to destroy within one hour after receipt by radio, or other means, of the word ‘CRASH’, all tanks and combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, gas, and radios: reserving sufficient trucks to close to rear echelons as soon as accomplished.” 

It was at 10:00 P.M. that the decision was made to send a jeep – under a white flag – behind enemy lines to negotiate terms of surrender. The problem soon became that no white cloth could be found. Phil Parish, a truck driver for A Co., 192nd, realized that he had bedding buried in the back of his truck and searched for it. The bedding became the “white flags” that were flown on the jeeps. At 11:40 P.M., the ammunition dumps were destroyed. At midnight Companies B and D, and A Company, 194th, received an order from Gen. Weaver to stand down. At 2:oo A.M. April 9, Gen. King sent a jeep under a white flag carrying Colonel Everett C. Williams, Col. James V. Collier, and Major Marshall Hurt to meet with the Japanese commander about terms of surrender.  (The driver was from the tank group.) 

Shortly after daylight Collier and Hunt returned with word of the appointment. It was at about 6:45 A.M. that tank battalion commanders received the order “crash.”  Col. Miller told his men of the surrender and the tankers were ordered to destroy their tanks. First, they fired armor-piercing shells into the engines of their trucks and then circled the tanks and did the same. They cut the gas lines and threw torches into the tanks. Within minutes, the ammunition inside the tanks began exploding. Most of the company waited in their bivouac for the Japanese to make contact, while others attempted to reach Corregidor which had not surrendered. In a bit of irony, an officer from the Army Finance Corps showed up and each man was paid 15.00 dollars for four months of fighting. That evening they ate the best meal they had in months.

According to a member of HQ Co., 194th, Gen. King spoke to the men and said, “I’m the man who surrendered you, men. It’s not your fault.” He also spoke to the members of the 17th Ordnance Company and B Company, 192nd, and told them something similar. King ordered them to surrender and threatened to court-martial anyone who didn’t. Gen. King with his two aides, Maj. Cothran and Captain Achille C. Tisdelle Jr. got into a jeep carrying a large white flag. They were followed by another jeep – also flying another large white flag – with Col. Collier and Maj. Hurt in it. As the jeeps made their way north they were strafed and small bombs were dropped by a Japanese plane. The drivers of both jeeps and the jeeps were provided by the tank group and both men managed to avoid the bullets. The strafing ended when a Japanese reconnaissance plane ordered the fighter pilot to stop strafing.

At about 10:00 a.m.the jeeps reached Lamao where they were received by a Japanese Major General who informed Gen. King that he reported his coming to negotiate a surrender and that an officer from the Japanese command would arrive to do the negotiations. The Japanese officer also told him that his troops would not attack for thirty minutes while King decided what he would do. No Japanese officer had arrived from their headquarters and the Japanese attack had resumed.

King sent Col. Collier and Maj. Hunt back to his command with instructions that any unit in the line of the Japanese advance should fly white flags. After this was done a Japanese colonel and interpreter arrived and King was told the officer was Homma’s Chief of Staff who had come to discuss King’s surrender. King attempted to get assurances from the Japanese that his men would be treated as prisoners of war, but the Japanese officer – through his interpreter – accused him of declining to surrender unconditionally. At one point King stated he had enough trucks and gasoline to carry his troops out of Bataan. He was told that the Japanese would handle the movement of the prisoners. The two men talked back and forth until the colonel said through the interpreter, “The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians.” King found no choice but to accept him at his word.

Unknown to Gen. King, an order attributed to Gen. Masaharu Homma – but in all likelihood from one of his subordinates – had been given. It stated, “Every troop which fought against our army on Bataan should be wiped out thoroughly, whether he surrendered or not, and any American captive who is unable to continue marching all the way to the concentration camp should be put to death in the area of 200 meters off the road.”

Being in the hospital prevented William from taking part in the march from Bataan. It was feared that the Japanese would send troops right through the hospital since it was along the main road, but Gen. King told the Japanese where the hospital was because this never happened. The first Japanese  – 10 to 12 men – arrived at 9 p.m. but set up a bivouac for the night and left the next morning. A Japanese medical officer arrived the next day and questions were asked and reports were asked for. He told the medical staff what they could and could not do. One thing that changed immediately, was that the patients would no longer receive fruit or milk. They were also told they could only use the water supply for drinking and any other use would result in death. The Filipino patients were told to leave the hospital, and 5,500 of its 7,000 patients left and ended up on the march. The only Filipinos left were those that were bed cases. Most of the Filipinos who left the hospital when ordered died on the march.

The Japanese occupied the area, set up artillery that surrounded the hospital, and fired on Corregidor. On April 29th, the hospital was shelled when Corregidor returned fire from Japanese artillery that was set up next to the hospital buildings. This was done to use the POWs as a human shield. Ward 14 was hit resulting in the deaths of 5 POWs and wounding 12 other patients. When Gen. Wainwright learned where the guns were firing from, he stopped his guns from returning fire. It was April 29th when they heard a terrific artillery bombardment on Corregidor. On the 3rd and 5th the bombardments were even worse. They received word that Corregidor had surrendered on the 6th.

It was known that the hospital would soon be closed although no date was known. Among the patients were mechanics who were able to get abandoned buses running. The buses were double-decked to carry as many patients unable to walk as possible. It was determined it would take two trips to do this. The patients who could walk would walk from Hospital #2 to Hospital #1. Many of the patients had recovered and wanted to leave the hospital and requested to do so. A Japanese medical officer informed them that they were better off staying in the hospital than being sent to Camp O’Donnell where 50 to 60 POWs were dying each day.

On May 12th, the hospital closed and the POWs were marched on the 12th and 13th to Hospital #1 at Little Baguio. As they marched they saw the dead still lying along the sides of the road in the ditches since the carnage had not been cleaned up. The POWs were identified as the Cabcaben Detachment on May 19, 1942. When they arrived at Hospital #1, they were held in an area north of the hospital that had been used by the Ordinance Department before the surrender. A roster of Prisoners of War from Hospital #2 who were patients was taken and William’s name was on it. The POWs remained at Little Baguio until May 26th when they were taken by a truck convoy to Bilibid Prison near Manila. In Tagalog, the word “bilibid” means prison but the Japanese now called it a hospital and turned it over to US Naval medical personnel as a hospital. The trucks carrying the men from Hospital #2 passed through a massive archway and two sets of iron gates in the cement and brick wall that surrounded the prison. Inside there was a third wall that divided the grounds. The trucks stopped in front of a three-story building that had once been the prison hospital. There was no roof over the third floor and when it rained, the rainwater seeped down to the second and first floors.

The POWs got out of the trucks and lined up to be counted. After this was done, they were sent to the second floor of the former hospital and took the floor over. The second floor was described as a big bare room, with stairs at both ends, without one cot and only a few mattresses lying on the floor. Most of the really sick lay on the concrete floor. Wherever the other POWs threw their belongings became their spot. 

The other buildings in the prison were long narrow one-story wooden structures where the patients lay with their heads against the wall and their feet toward the center aisle of the building. Some of the sick had mattresses, others lay on blankets on the floors. Many of the POWs had no real clothing. It was stated that there were six or seven of the buildings and each had a pharmacist’s mate in charge of it. Men stated that the Naval personnel kept the buildings clean and sanitary.

The POWs had rigged a long flushing latrine described as an open depression. At the end was an automatic flusher made from half a gasoline drum they rigged up that allowed for a steady stream of water from the city water main to flow through it. When the drum filled, it tipped and flushed the latrine. It then swung back into position to fill and then repeated the process.

The prison guards carried rifles with bayonets attached. The guards seemed to be everywhere. They were outside the prison, walked the grounds, and walked through the hospital wards. When they did, the POWs were expected to stand up and bow to the guards or be beaten. This was a completely different experience than Baguio where – except for the one area that they were forbidden to enter – the POWs were allowed to walk where they wanted without Japanese interference. They also had never had a “bango” but now they did it daily until their first morning in the prison. The Japanese expected all the POWs to line up. This included the sick. The senior officer checked the POWs then they stood until every POW in the prison – from every building – was counted and a comparison was made of the count to the books with the recorded number of POWs being held. Sometimes it took as many as three counts before the numbers matched.

Most of the POWs from the Bataan hospitals remained at Bilibid until May 30th when they were taken to the barrio of Cabanatuan by train. From the barrio, they marched to Cabanatuan #1 which had just opened. Medical records kept at Bilibid show that William was admitted to the hospital suffering from malaria and that he remained at Bilibid until November. 

His parents received a letter from the War Department in May 1942.

Dear Mrs. M. Arnold:

        According to War Department records, you have been designated as the emergency addressee if Private William L. Arnold, 39,601,270, who, according to the latest information available, was serving in the  Philippine Islands at the time of the final surrender. 

        I deeply regret that it is impossible for me to give you more information than is contained in this letter.  In the last days before the surrender of Bataan, there were casualties which were not reported to the War Department.  Conceivably the same is true of the surrender of Corregidor and possibly other islands of the Philippines.  The Japanese Government has indicated its intention of conforming to the terms of the Geneva Convention with respect to the interchange of information regarding prisoners of war.  At some future date, this Government will receive through Geneva a list of persons who have been taken prisoners of war.  Until that time the War Department cannot give you positive information. 

        The War Department will consider the persons serving in the Philippine Islands as “missing in action” from the date of surrender of Corregidor, May 7, 1942, until definite information to the contrary is received.  It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government will communicate a list of prisoners of war at an early date.  At that time you will be notified by this office in the event that his name is contained in the list of prisoners of war.  In the case of persons known to have been present in the Philippines and who are not reported to be prisoners of war by the Japanese Government, the War Department will continue to carry them as “missing in action” in the absence of information to the contrary, until twelve months have expired.  At the expiration of twelve months and in the absence of other information the War Department is authorized to make a final determination.

        Recent legislation makes provision to continue the pay and allowances of persons carried in a “missing” status for a period not to exceed twelve months;  to continue, for the duration of the war, the pay and allowances of persons known to have been captured by the enemy; to continue allotments made by missing personnel for a period of twelve months and allotments or increase allotments made by persons by the enemy during the time they are so held;  to make new allotments or increase allotments to certain dependents defined in Public Law 490, 77th Congress.  The latter dependents generally include the legal wife, dependent children under twenty-one years of age, and dependent mother, or such dependents as having been designated in official records.  Eligible dependents who can establish a need for financial assistance and are eligible to receive this assistance the amount allotted will be deducted from pay which would otherwise accrue to the credit of the missing individual.

                                                                                                                                                                    Very Truly yours

                                                                                                                                                                            J. A. Ulio (signed) 
                                                                                                                                                                       Major General
                                                                                                                                                                   The Adjutant General
  

On November 1, 1942, the Japanese drew 1,500 POW names of men who were being sent to Japan. It appears most of these POWs came from Cabanatuan which was the main POW camp. Bill may have replaced one of the men after it was determined the man was too ill to be sent to Bilibid. It is known that the Japanese were afraid of dysentery and removed the names of men suffering from it. Many of the POWs concluded on their own that they were being sent to Japan. Before they left the camp, each man was given his breakfast, to take with him, which was a small issue of rice and what the Japanese termed “a large piece of meat.” The large piece of meat was two inches square. The piece of meat was large next to a piece of meat they usually received at a meal.

On November 1, 1942, the Japanese drew 1,500 POW names of men who were being sent to Japan. When the names were drawn, the POWs had no idea what was happening. Many came to the conclusion on their own that they were being sent to Japan. At 3:00 A.M. on November 5th, the POWs left the camp and marched to the Barrio of Cabanatuan. Before they left the camp, each man was given his breakfast, to take with him, which was a small issue of rice and what the Japanese termed “a large piece of meat.” The large piece of meat was two inches square and large next to a piece of meat they usually received at a meal.

After they arrived at the barrio, a Japanese officer lectured the POWs before they boarded train cars around 9:00 AM. The exact number of POWs in each car appears to have been 98 men. The POWs in the crowded cars had enough room to position themselves so they could move around. The train left Cabanatuan remained on the train all day and arrived at Manila at 5:00 P.M. After they disembarked, they were marched to Pier 7 where they spent the night sleeping on a concrete floor in a building. Most of the POWs were sick and had dysentery, diarrhea, and beriberi.

The next day the POWs boarded the Nagato Maru at 5:00 P.M. The POWs were pushed into the forward hold. The hold was 40 feet wide and 50 feet long and the Japanese believed it could hold 1,000 men without a problem. In an attempt to get the POWs into the hold, the Japanese beat them. When the Japanese realized that beating them was not working, they concluded that the hold could not hold 1000 men so 200 to 300 POWs were moved to another hold. It was stated by POWs on the ship that they were put into all three of the ship’s holds. According to one member of the tank group that was on the ship, they put 800 POWs the hold.

It was at that time they lowered the number of men in the hold to somewhere between 750 and 800. This meant that nine men had to share an area that was 4 feet, nine inches, by 6 feet, 2 inches. All three holds on the ship were packed with men in the same manner. The POWs had barely enough room to sit down if their knees were drawn up under their chins. The heat was also unbelievable, so the Japanese allowed small groups of POWs up on the deck at night in shifts, but even this was not organized. Meals on the ship consisted of rice and a watery soup but the sickest POWs did not eat. The amount of water given to the POWs was almost non-existent. The ship sailed on November 7, 1942. The bodies of those who died were left in the holds for days before the Japanese allowed them to be removed. The POWs apparently called the ship the “Maggot Maru.”

During the trip, the two boards that were left off the hatch opening for ventilation were put in place at night and a tarp was put over the boards. This made the holds hotter. The Japanese had set up two latrines for the POWs. One was on each side of the ship’s deck and since so many of the POWs had dysentery and diarrhea, it soon became obvious this was not going to work. It was said by men on the ship that there were no toilet facilities and that they were infrequently allowed on deck to go to the washroom. The sick who tried to use the latrines were beaten and kicked by the Japanese for making too much noise passing through the Japanese quarters. When they reached the deck, they ended up waiting in line. For the extremely ill POWs, the Japanese sent down, into the hold, tubs for the extremely ill to use. The sick crawled, rolled, and stumbled to reach the tubs. Because the POWs were dehydrated, the POWs urinated frequently. In addition, those with dysentery and diarrhea could not make it to the tubs which resulted in the POWs standing into several inches of human waste. If they did try to reach the tubs, the men had stepped on the bodies of other POWs. If a POW died, his body was pulled from the hold with ropes and thrown into the sea.

The ship reached Takao, Formosa, on November 11th. While it was docked there, the POWs could not leave the holds. The ship sailed on November 15th and arrived at Mako, Pescadores Islands the same day. They remained in the holds with the fleas, lice, and roaches. The ship sailed again on November 18th and arrived at Keelung, Formosa the same day. The ship sailed again on the 20th and during this part of the trip, the POWs heard and felt the explosions from depth charges. They also heard a torpedo hit the haul of the ship, but it did not detonate. The trip to Japan ended on November 24th, when the ship reached Moji late in the day. At 5:00 P.M. the next day, they disembarked the ship. It is believed that 27 POWs died during the trip to Japan. As they disembarked the ship, each POW received a chip of red or black colored wood. The color of the wood determined what camp the POW was sent to. Once onshore, they were deloused, showered, issued new uniforms, and inoculated.

In Bill’s case, he was taken to Osaka 5-D which was located in the hills above Kawasaki. The POWs worked on the docks unloading materials used in shipbuilding. It appears he did not remain there long. From there, Bill was sent to Osaka #4 which was known as Tanagawa.

Osaka #4 covered an area of approximately 10,640 feet and contained ten barracks – that were 18 feet wide and 80 feet long – with paper-thin walls that went down to six inches above the dirt floors. Each barrack housed 50 men. There were two decks of bunks with a ladder going up every twenty feet to the second deck which was 8 to 10 feet off the ground. Shoes had to be taken off at the foot of the ladder. At the foot of each bunk were five synthetic blankets made out of peanut shell fiber and a rigid pillow in the shape of a small cylinder packed with rice husks. There was a room in each barracks that served as the officer quarters. In winter the barracks were warmed by drum-can stoves which burned wood or sawdust, but the barracks were always cold. Japanese guards patrolled through the barracks at regular intervals. There was also a building that served as a hospital, a camp kitchen, a shoe repair shop, and warehouses. The Japanese had their own barracks and administrative offices. The camp was surrounded by a high wooden wall with barbed wire on top. There also were two guard towers at the corners and only one gate to enter the camp.

The POWs were fed rice three times a day. Once in a while, they received a fish head, a piece of beef, or a piece of pork in the rice. The Red Cross boxes sent to the camp for the POWs were misappropriated by the Japanese. They took a great portion of the food from the boxes and were seen walking around the camp eating American chocolate and smoking American cigarettes. Empty cans of American meats, fruit, and cheese were seen by the POWs in the Japanese garbage.

Corporal punishment was common in the camp and done for the slightest reason or for no reason. One guard in the camp, Tsunesuke Tsuda, beat the POWs the most because he wanted to break their spirit and humble them. From January 5, 1943, until March 21, 1943, the POWs were made to run excessive distances. On one occasion, in March 1943, they were forced to run 4 to 5 miles in the rain without shirts. Individual beatings were also common in the camp. When a POW was beaten, he frequently had to hold a heavy object like a log or rock, or a bucket of water, over his head as he stood at attention. POWs also were slapped or hit with a rifle butt, because, during muster, they failed to bow to the guard at the right angle. Most of the beatings took place during morning muster or evening muster while the POWs were at attention. The POWs were punched, slapped, clubbed, kicked, and hit with shoes and belts, and even furniture was used on the POWs as they stood at attention. Some POWs were hit in the throat which resulted in their not being able to speak for a week. One guard beat the POWs so severely and often, that he was required to sign a statement that he would not beat the POWs under penalty of death.

Being ill was not an excuse to get out of work. The POW doctor had a sick call each morning and created a list of men who were too ill to go to work. After he created it, a Japanese medical clerk took the list and decided who was sick enough to stay in camp and who had to go to work. Those who were admitted to the hospital received little help because the POW doctor had no medicine to treat them. Like the Red Cross food, the medical supplies sent to the camp were also misappropriated by the Japanese. One POW who escaped and was recaptured was beaten black and blue. The camp doctor was ordered to inject him with drugs to kill him.

In the camp, the POWs, regardless of rank, were used to construct a dry dock for Japanese submarines in violation of the Geneva Convention. To do this, the POWs tore down the side of a mountain. The POWs worked in groups known as “sections.” When the POWs in a section did not load the expected number of train cars, the Japanese beat them. The POWs worked seven days a week from 8 to 18 hours a day and were given one day off in warm weather. It was so cold in the winter, that the water remained frozen from December 1942 until March 1943.

Of his time there, he said, “What we were doing is removing a mountain. We hauled all the rocks and dirt from the mountain and dumped it into the sea.” It was while he was a POW there that his parents received a postcard from him. This was the first word that they had that he was a POW.

The prisoners also retaliated against the Japanese by committing acts of sabotage. One of the easiest acts of sabotage to commit was to mix the concrete for the dry-dock walls to thin. The POWs would make the concrete soupy and mostly water. They did this so the walls of the dry dock would start to crumble after it was completed. The POWs worked on this detail for two years until the Japanese ended it after discovering that the dry dock was too short to be used. According to one story, while working in the office for the Japanese, one POW somehow managed to alter the blueprints for the dry dock, but in all likelihood, it was simply designed too short.

The death rate in the camp was extremely high since being ill was no excuse for getting out of work. The hospital was a wooden shack with little heat and the sick lay on the dirt floors. The POW doctors had a sick call each morning and created a list of men who were too ill to go to work. No POW could be admitted to the hospital without the approval of two American doctors. After they created it, a Japanese medical clerk took the list and decided who was sick enough to stay in camp and who had to go to work. Those who were admitted to the hospital received little help because the POW doctors had no medicine to treat them. Like the Red Cross food, the medical supplies sent to the camp were also misappropriated by the Japanese. On one occasion, a POW escaped and was recaptured. He was then beaten black and blue. The camp doctor was ordered to inject him with drugs to kill him. Even if the sick were admitted, there was very little medicine available to treat the POWs. Most of the POWs died from beatings, starvation, lack of hygiene, and pneumonia.

During this time, American planes began bombing the area, blackout exercises were conducted at the camp. The POWs were made to dig air-raid shelters in the camp. When the air-raid siren went off, the POWs were to take shelter in the dugouts but the men had to be forced to use them. The Japanese then painted P.O.W. in large letters on one of the roofs of the barracks. As the raids increased the POWs were sure that it would not be long before the war was over.

On April 25, 1945, without prior notice, the POWs were told the camp was being closed and they were being moved. Since no specifics as to where they were being sent were given, many of the POWs believed that this was just an excuse and that they were going to be killed. Many of the prisoners were transferred to Osaka #5-B – also known as Tsuruga Camp – where the POWs were used as stevedores. They were housed in a condemned two-story customs house on the docks. The building was filled with fleas, lice, rats, and other vermin. Each POW had a six-foot-long by 30-inch wide area to sleep in. The building had been condemned since it was close to the docks and could be hit during an air raid.

The POW in the camp worked on the docks. There was a graphite factory and across from the factory, there was an airfield, and behind it was an oil refinery. The camp was surrounded by 27 smokestacks. To the amazement of the POWs, the camp was never hit by one bomb during the air raids that were taking place. The day after every air raid when the POWs took their places for roll call, every POW who was number 29 in his detachment was beaten. This happened several times in the next several months.

While working, the POWs stole as much food as they could as they worked. The prisoners stole food for themselves to supplement their meager rations. An average meal for the POWs was soybean and rice. The POWs carried 100-pound burlap sacks of soybeans. To get extra food, the POWs would tear holes into the bags and drop beans into their pockets. The pockets had holes to allow the beans to fall down their legs and settle in pouches around their ankles. This prevented the Japanese from finding them when they searched the POWs when they returned to camp. Since the Japanese saw the prisoners as slaves, they attempted to get them to unload bombs. The POWs went on strike instead of doing this. In an attempt to break the strike, the Japanese made the men stand at attention for 24 hours. The POWs realized that the Japanese were not going to give in, so they decided that they would unload the bombs, but attempt to damage them. They were able to do this since the Japanese were afraid to go near the bombs. They had no idea that the bombs were not armed.

One guard, Yukinaga Kimura, would use a club, that looked like a baseball bat, to beat the POWs. He used it any time he believed a POW had disobeyed an order. Sometimes, he forced the POWs to drop their pants and beat them until they were black and blue and began to bleed. Most of the time, he beat them on the head and body and one occasion broke a prisoner’s eardrum. One civilian member of the camp medical staff slapped POWs who reported themselves as being sick and unable to work. The beatings were so common that the POWs could not recall them all. One night during evening roll call it was raining and the guard left and went into a building. When he returned the POWs had gone into their barracks believing they had been dismissed. He made them go back outside and stand in the rain at attention for a half-hour.

Once again, the Japanese misappropriated the Red Cross Boxes sent to the camp for the POWs for their personal use. Red Cross clothing and shoes were not given to the POWs. Red Cross food was seen by the POWs in the Japanese officers’ quarters. Instead, the POWs were issued Japanese summer uniforms and set fatigues to be worn while working in the mine. Some of the POWs still had their GI shoes, but most wore canvas shoes issued by the Japanese. Medicines sent to the camp were also misappropriated as well as food.

In May 1945, 48 POWs were beaten by guards with fists and clubs, while in June 70 POWs were beaten with a garrison belt for no apparent reason. In another incident in June, the Japanese paymaster entered the mess hall while the POWs were eating. He commented on the food for no apparent reason and no one said anything back to him. He took off his belt and hit the POWs sitting near where he was standing in their faces with the belt. By the time he finished, he had hit all 200 POWs in the mess hall. From there, he went to the barracks that housed Naval personnel and Marines and hit all 200 men inside with his belt. The welts from the beating could be seen on their faces for days afterward.

On one occasion, American planes bombed the camp with incendiary bombs. The reason for this was that the Japanese had identified the camp as a factory. What kept the camp from burning down was that it was raining. After the air raid, the Japanese guards left the camp to look for their families because the town near the camp was destroyed in the air raid. On April 23, 1945, the camp was closed and the POWs were moved to Tsuroga Camp.

On May 10, 1945, he was one of 200 POWs sent to Fukuoka #22 where he worked in a coal mine. He recalled, “That was even worse. I had to go underground. It was dirty. You couldn’t hardly walk upright.”

He remained in this camp until he was liberated in September 1945. He recalled, “One morning, the Japanese didn’t take us to work, and all the guards disappeared. Finally, the camp commander came over and gave a little speech and told us the war was over.”

Not too long after this, American planes flew over and dropped supplies including canned food and chocolate bars. Some of the POWs ate too much and became ill. Arnold ate a can of corned beef which was the first American food he had eaten in over three years.

On September 21st, Bill and the other POWs were taken to Dejima Docks in Nagasaki, Japan. He was declared to be in good health and boarded onto a transport and returned to the Philippines. After being declared healthy, Bill sailed to the United States, on October 9, 1945, and arrived at Seattle, Washington, on October 28, 1945, on the S.S.M.S. Klipfontein, and spent two weeks in the hospital at Ft. Lewis. He was discharged from the Army on March 25, 1946.

He returned to Montana and later moved to Billings where he worked in a wool warehouse and for a drug wholesaler. He later got a job with the state highway department and worked there until he retired in 1982. Bill married Gertrude F. Holmes, in August 1950. Gertrude passed away in 1987, and he married Sadye Rutan in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1988. His second wife passed away in 2012.

Of his time as a POW, he said, “I never did dwell on it much. I never made a career of talking about it.” On surviving his time as a POW, he said, “I had a lot of luck all the way through.”

William L. Arnold passed away on October 14, 2017, in Billings, Montana, and was buried at Terrace Gardens Cemetery in Billings, Montana, and may have been the last surviving member of the 192nd Tank Battalion.

The photo at the bottom of the page was taken while William was a POW at Osaka #5-D.

Pvt. William L. Arnold - POW Photo

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