Grui, Pvt. George - Bataan Project 4

Pvt. George Grui was born on April 25, 1919, in Saint Paul, Minnesota, to John Grui and Vasika Pascu-Grui. With his four sisters and brother, he grew up at 914 Gaultier Street in St. Paul. He attended high school for two years before going to work as a truck driver for a candy company and then worked at St. Paul Foundry in St. Paul. On October 16, 1940, he registered with Selective Service when the draft act took effect and named his mother as his contact person. He was inducted into the U.S. Army on April 14, 1941, in St. Paul and sent to Fort Lewis, Washington, for basic training and assigned to A Company, 194th Tank Battalion. The tank company had been a Minnesota National Guard tank company from Brainerd, and the Army was attempting to fill out the rosters of the 194th with men from the home states of its three tank companies to keep them “National Guard.”

The first men from Selective Service joined the battalion and lived with Headquarters Company. All of these men had been inducted into the Army at Ft. Snelling, Minnesota, and many of the men came from the home states of each company, but men from other states also joined the battalion. Basic training had been condensed down to six weeks under the direction of sergeants from the company they were assigned to. The sergeants lived with them and dealt with all their problems or directed them to someone who could help them. They supervised the selectees’ calisthenics and drill, besides holding classes in all the different subjects they needed to be trained as tank battalion members. They lived with HQ Company until they joined their assigned company. The original company members called them “Glamor Boys” and “Refugees.” The first group of draftees completed their basic training in May.

The draftees’ basic training was condensed down to six weeks under the direction of Sgts. Nelson, Hyatt, Goodrich, and Paine. The sergeants lived with them and dealt with all their problems or directed them to someone who could help them. They supervised the selectees’ calisthenics and drill, besides holding classes in all the different subjects they needed to be trained as tank battalion members.

Once the men from Selective Service completed their basic training, there were jobs in the company that needed specialized training not available at Ft. Lewis, so the men were sent to Ft. Knox, Kentucky, for the training. Jobs that required this training were radio operators, radio electricians, automotive mechanics, tank mechanics, clerks, and other jobs. The classes lasted 13 weeks and those men attending radio school were said to have the most intensive training. Many of these men returned to Ft. Lewis as the battalion was preparing to go overseas. It is not known if he received specialized training.

The battalion’s first motorcycles, which were Harley-Davidsons, also arrived in May and all battalion members had to learn to ride them. Still, more men were sent to Ft. Knox for training. Some sources state the battalion received twelve additional tanks, while other sources state that it still had only the eight M2 tanks that came with the companies to Ft. Lewis. While men were training at Ft. Knox, the battalion during June trained under what was called, “wartime conditions.” On one date, orders they received orders at 2:00 A.M. to move out as soon as possible to the attack position. They found themselves in dense woods in pitch-black conditions. For the tanks to move, a soldier guided them with a small green flashlight. The soldiers were expected to have their gas masks with them and had to use them if ordered to do so.

At the end of the month, there was a notification that attempts would be made to sabotage plants producing war materials. The 194th was put on standby to guard the Boeing factory in Seattle, Washington, over Memorial Day weekend. The tanks were issued live ammunition and the crews slept alongside their tanks. Memorial Day was on Friday, May 30th, the following Monday the orders were cancelled.

Since the tank force had only been organized in July 1940, little organized training was available for the men who were tank crew members. The tank commanders - since they also served as the tank's gunner - were sent to Ft. Knox and received an overview of the different options on the use of the tank's main gun but no standard method was taught. Although they had M-2 tanks at Ft. Lewis, the men learned to load, maintain, and operate the M-3's gun. It was stated that the tank commanders had a basic knowledge of the tank's main gun when they finished their training and were taught to fire the 37 millimeter cannon on an M-3 tank from a stationary position. If they fired the gun in the direction of the enemy, it was considered an accomplishment. Even though they had received training, the tank battalion's still taught gunnery skills because the official training was not consistent. For men who were tank crew members, there was no formal training. The tank drivers learned how to drive the tanks by driving them. Each tank battalion did its own training and submitted written reports to the Armed Forces headquarters. and what was considered the best training practices submitted, by tank battalions, was later used to train tank crews when organized training started in 1941. The entire training period, including basic training, was also extended to 11 weeks and then to 17 weeks.

On August 13, 1941, Congress voted to extend federalized National Guard units’ time in the regular Army by 18 months. Major Ernest Miller was ordered to Ft. Knox by plane arriving the next day August 14th. That afternoon he received the battalion’s overseas orders. During the meeting, one of General Jacob L. Dever’s staff officers – Dever was the commanding officer of Ft. Knox – let it slip that the battalion was being sent to the Philippines. On August 18th, Miller stopped in Brainerd to see his family after receiving the battalion’s orders. When asked, he informed the Brainerd Daily Dispatch that the battalion was being sent overseas, but he did not disclose where they were being sent. Miller later flew to Minneapolis and then flew to Ft. Lewis. Different newspapers speculated that the battalion was being sent to the Philippines. The fact there were only three “overseas” locations where the tanks could be sent which were Alaska, Hawaii, or the Philippines, and Alaska was already eliminated because B Company was being sent there. Ironically, a week before this, the wife of a 194th officer, from St. Joseph, Missouri, wrote him a letter and asked her husband, “Is it true that your unit is going to the Philippines?”

At the same time, a sergeant from the 192nd Tank Battalion, stationed at Ft. Knox, wrote a letter to his parents the second week in August. In the letter, he told his parents that the 192nd had heard a rumor that they were being sent to the Philippines but that the orders were changed. Instead, the 194th Tank Battalion was being sent. The man stated he knew men from the 194th since they attended school at Ft. Knox and were in the same classes with 192nd men. He mailed the letter home before Miller received his "secret" orders.

The story that Col. Ernest Miller, in his book Bataan Uncensored, told was that the decision to send the battalion overseas was made on August 15, 1941, which was two days after National Guard units' federal service was extended. He believed the decision resulted from an event in the summer of 1941. In the story, a squadron of American fighters was flying over Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines when one of the pilots, who was flying at a lower altitude, noticed something odd. He took his plane down, identified a flagged buoy in the water, and saw another in the distance. He came upon more buoys that lined up in a straight line for 30 miles to the northwest - in the direction of Formosa. The island had a large radio transmitter used by the Japanese military. The squadron continued its flight plan south to Mariveles and returned to Clark Field. When the planes landed, it was too late to do anything that day. The next day, when another squadron was sent to the area, the buoys had been picked up by a fishing boat – with buoys on its deck covered by a tarp – which was seen making its way to shore. Since communication between the Air Corps and the Navy was difficult, the boat escaped. Miller believed that it was at that time the decision was made to send the 194th to the Philippines. From a statement made by a member of the 194th, the battalion was scheduled to remain in the Philippines for two years.

Different newspapers speculated that the battalion was being sent to the Philippines. The reality was there were only three places where the tanks could be sent. They were Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Alaska was already eliminated since B Company was being sent there. That left two places. The fact was the 194th was part of the First Tank Group headquartered at Ft. Knox and operational long before June 1941. Available information suggests that the tank group had been selected to be sent to the Philippines early in 1941. Besides the 194th at Ft. Lewis, the group was made up of the 70th and 191st Tank Battalions – the 191st was a National Guard medium tank battalion while the 70th was a regular army medium tank battalion – at Ft. Meade, Maryland, the 193rd Tank Battalion was at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and the 192nd Tank Battalion was at Ft. Knox, Kentucky. The 192nd, 193rd, and 194th had been National Guard light tank battalions. The 192nd and 191st took part in the Louisiana maneuvers in September 1941 under the name of the First Tank Group.

The 193rd Tank Battalion had sailed for Hawaii – on its way to the Philippines – when Pearl Harbor was attacked. After it arrived in Hawaii, the battalion was held there. One of the two medium tank battalions – most likely the 191st – was on standby orders for the Philippines, but the orders were canceled on December 10th after the Pacific War had started. Some military documents from the time show the tank group in the Philippines was scheduled to be made up of three light tank battalions and two medium tank battalions. Documents show the Provisional Tank Group in the Philippines was also called the First Provisional Tank Group. At the same time, the men in the Philippines referred to the tank group as the First Tank Group. Miller's story of buoys being spotted by the pilot in the Lingayen Gulf during the summer of 1941 may have sped up the transfer of the tank battalions to the Philippines, with only the 194th and 192nd reaching the islands, but it was not the reason for the battalions going to the Philippines.

The remaining members and new members of the battalion – on September 4th – traveled south from Ft. Lewis, by train, to Ft. Mason, north of San Francisco, arriving at 7:30 am on the 5th. From there, they were ferried, on the USAT General Frank M. Cox to Ft. MacDowell on Angel Island where they were inoculated and given physicals by the battalion’s medical detachment. Those men with medical conditions were replaced. These replacements appear to have come from units stationed at Ft. Ord, California. It is known that the 757th Tank Battalion was at Ft. Ord.

The battalion’s new tanks were sent west from Ft. Knox, Kentucky, where they had been requisitioned by an officer of the 192nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Lt. William Gentry, for the battalion. Gentry was given written orders, from the War Department, giving him authority to take tanks from any unit so the 194th had its full complement of tanks. In some cases, the tanks he took had just arrived at the fort and were on flatcars and about to be unloaded when he and his detachment arrived and took the tanks from soldiers waiting to unload them. In other cases, Gentry went to other tank battalions and requisitioned the tanks which in some cases were within five hours of their require maintenance. From Ft. Knox, the tanks were sent west, by train, and were waiting for the 194th at Ft. Mason, California. It is possible that the men who travelled west with the tanks served as replacements for men who failed their final physicals on Angel Island.

The tanks fit fine in the ship’s first and second hold, but the deckhead in the ship’s third hold was low, so 19 tanks had to have their turrets removed to fit them in the hold. So that the turrets went on the tanks they came off of, the tanks’ serial numbers were painted, by hand, on the turrets. The ship’s captain also ordered that all ammunition, fuel, and batteries be removed from the tanks. He stated they would be sent later, but it appears he had a change of mind and the batteries were sent with the tanks.

The soldiers boarded the USAT President Calvin Coolidge which sailed at 9 PM. The enlisted men found themselves assigned to bunks in the ship’s holds with the tanks. Those men with lower bunks found them unbearable to sleep in because of the heat and humidity. Soon, most men were sleeping on deck but learned quickly to get up early because the crew hosed down the deck each morning. Many of the men had seasickness during this part of the voyage. The soldiers spent their time attending lectures, playing craps and cards, reading, writing letters, and sunning themselves on deck. Other men did the required work like turning over the tanks’ engines by hand and the clerks caught up on their paperwork. The ship arrived at 7:00 A.M. on September 13th in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the soldiers were given four-hour passes ashore. At 5:00 PM that evening the ship sailed.

The next morning, the members of the battalion were called together and they were informed the battalion was going to the Philippines. On the next leg of the voyage, the ship was joined by the USS Guadalupe, a replenishment oiler. The heavy cruiser, USS Houston, and an unknown destroyer were the ships’ escorts. During rough weather, the destroyer approached the Coolidge for a personnel transfer. The soldiers recalled that the destroyer bobbed up and down and from side to side in the water with waves breaking over its deck as it attempted to make the transfer. When it became apparent that a small boat would be crushed if it attempted to transfer someone from one ship to the other, a bosun’s chair was rigged and the man was sent from the Coolidge to the destroyer. A few of the tanks in the hold broke loose from their moorings and rolled back and forth slamming into the ship’s hull. They did this until the tankers secured them.

The ships crossed the International Dateline the night of Tuesday, September 16th, and the date became Thursday, September 18th. A few days past Guam, the soldiers saw the first islands of the Philippines. The ships sailed south along the east coast of Luzon, around the southern end of the island, and up the west coast. On Friday, September 26th, the ships entered Manila Bay at about 7:00 in the morning. The soldiers remained on board and disembarked at 3:00 P.M. and were bused to Fort Stotsenburg. The battalion’s maintenance section, remained behind at the pier, with the 17th Ordnance Company, to unload the tanks and reattach the tanks’ turrets.

The maintenance section and 17th Ordnance reinstalled the batteries, but they needed aviation fuel for the tanks’ engines to get them off the docks. 2nd Lt. Russell Swearingen went to the quartermaster and asked him for the fuel. He was told that they did not have any at the port so he would have to go to the Army Air Corps to get it. When he arrived at the Air Corps command, he was informed that they couldn’t give him the aviation fuel without a written order. It took two weeks to get the last tanks off the docks. While all this was going on, the battalion’s half-tracks arrived as well as motorcycles. The battalion’s reconnaissance detachment had Harley-Davidsons at Ft. Lewis but the new motorcycles were Indian Motorcycles with all the controls on the opposite side of the bikes. The reconnaissance section also had peeps (later known as jeeps), but many of these were taken by high-ranking officers for their own use since they were new to the Army.

Upon arriving at the fort, they were greeted by General Edward P. King Jr. who apologized that they had to live in tents and receive their meals from food trucks until their barracks were completed. He informed the battalion he had learned of their arrival just days before they arrived. After he was satisfied that they were settled in, he left them. It rained the first night in the tents flooding many of the tents. They also quickly learned to clean their shoes daily and not to leave their shoes on the ground or they became moldy. At night, it was still humid which resulted in the men feeling cold even with two blankets on them.

After spending three weeks in tents, they moved into their barracks on October 18th, the barracks were described as being on stilts with walls that from the floor were five feet of a weaved matting called sawali They no longer had a mold problem with their shoes. This allowed the men to dress. Above five feet the walls were open and allowed for breezes to blow through the barracks making them more comfortable than the tents. There were no doors or windows. The wood that was used for the support beams was the best mahogany available. For personal hygiene, a man was lucky if he was near a faucet with running water.

The days were described as hot and humid, but if a man was able to find shade it was always cooler in the shade. The Filipino winter had started when they arrived, and although it was warm when they went to sleep by morning the soldiers needed a blanket. They turned in all their wool uniforms and were issued cotton shirts and trousers which were the regular uniform in the Philippines. They were also scheduled to receive sun helmets.

Sometime in early October, aviation fuel was made available to the 194th, so the battalion began training on their M3A1 tanks. It also allowed the battalion to bring any remaining tanks from the Port Area of Manila to the fort. The tank has a 37 mm main gun, two 30 caliber machine guns, and one 50 caliber machine gun. To train the crews about the tanks, each company commander gave tank manuals to each sergeant who commanded a tank, and the sergeant studied it and then taught his crew about the tank. A typical workday was from 7:00 to 11:30 A.M. with an hour and a half lunch. The afternoon work time was from 1:30 to 2:30 P.M. At that time, it was considered too hot to work, but the battalion continued working and called it, “recreation in the motor pool.” The crews spent four hours each day dismantling the machine guns and putting them back together until they could do it blindfolded. The tankers never fired the guns because Gen. Weaver could not get Gen. MacArthur to release ammunition for them. They also got reprimanded because since the tank maintenance work was dirty they wore fatigues instead of dress uniforms. After the men had been warned a few times about this, they wore their fatigues while working on their tanks but dress uniforms anywhere else they went on the base.

At the end of the workday, the men had free time. The fort had a bowling alley and movie theaters. The men also played softball, horseshoes, and badminton. Men would also throw footballs around. On Wednesday afternoons, the men went swimming. Once a month, men put their names for the chance to go into Manila. The number of men allowed on these trips was limited. Other men were allowed to go to Aarayat National Park where there was a swimming pool that was filled with mountain water. Other men went canoeing at the Pagsanjan Falls and stated the scenery was beautiful.

For the next several weeks, the tankers spent their time removing the cosmoline from their weapons and loading ammunition belts for their machine guns. They also had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their M3 tanks. None of them had ever trained in one during their time at Ft. Lewis. To train, the tank's used the largest open area on the base. That area just happened to be the polo field. Being an old cavalry man, Gen. Johnathan Wainwright was not fond of the tanks to begin with, but as a polo player, the polo field being torn up by them made him dislike them even more. In October, the battalion was allowed to travel to Lingayen Gulf. This was done under simulated conditions that enemy troops had landed there. The maps they used during the move were by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, which were the same maps held by the base's G2 and considered to be top secret. The maps that the 194th used had been bought at a small book store in Manila. Two months later, enemy troops would land there. It is known that they were paid at least once after arriving which was confusing since they were paid in pesos and centavos. Many men at first had to learn how much things cost in a new currency.

The battalion made one trip to the Lingayen Gulf near the end of November. Things went well until they turned on a narrow gravel road in the barrio of Lingayen that had a lot of traffic. A bus driver parked his bus in the middle of the road and did not move it even after the tanks turned on their sirens and blew whistles. As they passed the bus, the tanks tore off all of one side of it. The tankers bivouacked about a half-mile from the barrio on a hard sandy beach with beautiful palm trees. The tankers had a swim and got in line for chow at the food trucks. It was then that the battalion's two doctors told them that they needed to wear earplugs when they swam because the warm water contained bacteria and they could get ear infections that were hard to cure. No one came down with an ear infection. The soldiers went to sleep on the beach in their sleeping bags when they began to hear humming and scratching. When they turned on a flashlight they found their sleeping bags were covered with beetles and other bugs. They quickly moved to another area that wasn't infested.

On November 26th, the 192nd arrived in the Philippines. The battalion brought with it a great deal of radio equipment to set up a radio school to train radiomen for the Philippine Army. The battalion also had many ham radio operators. Within hours after arriving at Ft. Stotsenburg, the battalion set up a communications tent that was in contact with ham radio operators in the United States. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When they were informed it was the 192nd, they gave the 192nd frequencies to use. Men sent messages home to their families right after arriving.

With the arrival of the 192nd, the Provisional Tank Group was activated on November 27th. Besides the 194th, the tank group contained the 192nd. The 17th Ordnance Company joined the tank group on the 29th. Military documents written after the war show the tank group was scheduled to be composed of three light tank battalions and two medium tank battalions. The exact makeup of the First Tank Group in the US. Col. James R. N. Weaver who had been put in charge of the 192nd in San Francisco, was appointed head of the tank group and promoted to brigadier general. Major Theodore Wickord permanently became the commanding officer of the 192nd. It was at this time, men from both tank battalions and the 17th Ordnance Company were assigned to the tank group. The process was begun to transfer D Company from the 192nd to the 194th to replace its B Company and giving each battalion three tank companies. The process of transferring the company from the 192nd to the 194th was begun but never completed, so the company fought with the 194th but remained part of the 192nd.

With D Company being attached to the 194th, each of the tank battalions 45 tanks. The six tank companies had three platoons of 5 tanks, and each tank company commanding officer had his own tank which counted for another 6 tanks. In addition, 3 tanks were known to be assigned to each battalion's HQ Company, but there may have been 4 tanks assigned to the companies. Each battalion's commanding officer also had his own tank. Depending on how many tanks the HQ Companies had, the tank group had either 2 or 4 tanks assigned to it. In all there was a total of 108 tanks in the Philippine Islands.

It is known that during this time the battalions went on at least two practice reconnaissance missions under the guidance of the 194th. They traveled to Baguio on one maneuver and to the Lingayen Gulf on the other maneuver. Gen. Weaver, the tank group commander, was able to get ammunition from the post’s ordnance department on the 30th, but the tank group could not get time at one of the firings ranges at the base.

The 192nd arrived in the Philippines with a great deal of radio equipment to set up a radio school to train radiomen for the Philippine Army, and the battalion also had many ham radio operators after arriving at Ft. Stotsenburg. The battalion set up a communications tent that was in contact with ham radio operators in the United States within hours. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When they were informed it was the 192nd, they gave the 192nd frequencies to use. Men sent messages home to their families that they had arrived safely. After this happened, Lt. William Gentry, who had overseen the the operation, was offered the chance to take command of radio communications for the army.

The tanks also took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night was a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position below Watch Hill was among drums of 100-octane fuel and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield. The next day the tanks were ordered back to the airfield to guard against Japanese paratroopers after reconnaissance planes reported Japanese transports milling about in a large circle in the South China Sea. The 194th’s position was moved to an area between the two runways below Watch Hill. From this time on, two tank crew members remained with each tank at all times and were fed from food trucks. On December 1st, the two tank battalions were put on full alert and ordered to their positions at Clark Field. The 194th had the job to protect the northern half of the airfield from paratroopers while the 192nd guarded the southern half. Two crewmen remained with the tanks at all times and received their meals from food trucks. The airfield's two runways were shaped like a "V" and the Army Air Corps' hangers and headquarters were at the point of the "V". The tankers slept in sleeping bags on the ground under their tanks or palm trees.

On December 7th, the tank battalions were issued ammunition for the tanks and the men received side arms. The tank crews spent that afternoon loading 30 millimeter high explosive armor piercing shells into their tanks. No anti-personnel shells had been sent to the Philippines for the tanks. They also received 30 caliber billets for the tanks' machine guns and men were assigned to loading ammunition belts for the machine guns. They did this job the remainder of the day. The next morning they continued with this work. If the Japanese attacked, their job was to protect Clark Field and each tank battalion was assigned a position to do this.

The battalion's reconnaissance section was ordered to a rice paddy which was about a half-mile from the airfield. This was its assigned position in case the Japanese attempted to land troops or use paratroopers to capture the airfield.

Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, 192nd, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks and would have thrown them away in battle. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th. The next day Weaver visited every tank company of the tank group.

Although official reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were sent to the military command in the Philippines at 2:30 am, For the tankers, it was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th at 7:00 a.m. Gen. Weaver, Maj. Miller, Major Wickord, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance, read the messages of the attack. Miller left the tent and informed the officers of the 194th about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the members of the tank crews were ordered to their tanks which were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions at Clark Field.

Major Miller called his officers together and told them of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He then ordered the tank company officers to take their tanks to their assigned position at Clark Field. Those officers and men not assigned to tanks or half-tracks performed their assigned duties. Capt. John Riley went to HQ Company and told them that they were at war. The members of the company's three tanks who were not with their tanks were ordered to them. The battalion's half-tracks took up positions next to the tanks. The battalion's reconnaissance detachment went to the rice paddy, while the rest of HQ Co. remained in the battalion's bivouac and carried out their duties.

Around 8:00 A.M., the planes of the Army Air Corps took off and filled the sky. At noon, the planes landed and were lined up – near the pilots’ mess hall – in a straight line to be refueled. While the planes were being serviced, the pilots went to lunch. The members of the tank crews received their lunches from the battalion’s food trucks. It was reported that only two of the seven radar sets in the Philippines were operational and the dispatches the operators sent to Manila of approaching planes took an hour to reach Manila. One 194th half-track crew tuned into a Manila radio station and heard a news flash that Clark Field was being bombed. At about 12:45 p.m. an amphibious plane landed on a runway near the tankers and after it came to a stop, its passengers and crew got and and ran to the opposite side of the airfield. About 11 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the company lived through the Japanese attack on Clark Field. (It should be noted that the attack on Pearl Harbor happened at 1:55 A.M. on December 8th in the Philippines, so the attack on Clark Field was almost 11 hours later.)

News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 am All morning the sky above the airfield was filled with American planes. Men said no matter what direction they looked they saw planes. At 11:45 am the American planes landed and were parked in a straight line - to make it easier for the ground crews to service them - outside the pilots' mess hall. The men assigned to the tanks and half-tracks were receiving their lunches at food trucks. Gen. King put out a written order telling the unit commanders that the threat of being bombed was over and they could allow their men to return to the main base, in rotations, for rest, baths, and hot meals. It was lunchtime and members of the tank battalion not assigned to tanks were allowed to go to the mess hall to eat. Col. Miller ordered the men under his command to remain with their tanks and half-tracks.

The tankers were eating lunch when planes approached the airfield from the north. At first, they thought the planes were American and counted 54 planes in formation. They then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. It was only when bombs began exploding on the runways that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers.

The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One tanker stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield.

After the attack, the soldiers watched as the dead, the dying, and the wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, trucks, and anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. When the hospital filled, they watched the medics place the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing.

The morning of December 8th, the tankers were loading ammunition belts with 30 caliber bullets. S/Sgt. Byron Veillette, A Co., ran through the 194th's command area shouting that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Many tankers didn't believe the war had started since they expected to participate in maneuvers. Having heard the news of the bombing of Pearl Harbor from Maj. Miller, Capt. Ed Burke went to A Company and told them that they were at war. The tanks crew members not with their tanks were ordered to them and the tanks were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions around the runways at Clark Field. The half-tracks took up positions next to the tanks while the reconnaissance detachment returned to the rice paddy. Those men not assigned to a tank or half-track did their jobs in the battalion’s bivouac. From their tanks' positions at the airfield, the tankers watched P-40 fighters take to the air. It was said that in any direction a man looked, American planes could be seen in the sky. During this time, the tankers got most of their news, about Pearl Harbor, from listening to radio dispatches received by a large radio on what was the command half-track.

SInce the tanks had moved to their positions around the airfield, meals were sent to them by food trucks. The tankers were receiving lunch and as they stood in line to be fed they watched as 54 planes approached the airfield from the northwest. Men commented that the planes must be American Navy planes. That was until someone saw Red Dots on the wings and then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. Maj. Miller shouted at his men to take cover and then bombs began exploding on the runways. It was then that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers. One member of the D Company, 192nd, Robert Brooks, was killed during the attack and several tankers were wounded; one severely. The men were taken to the battalion's medical detachment.

Another wave of bombers followed and bombed the B-17s sitting along the perimeters of the runways. They also bombed the runways making them of little use to planes. The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield for about 15 to 20 minutes. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One member of the 192nd stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. The men on the tanks opened fire on the planes as they flew over. One new lieutenant chastised them for giving away their position even though the tanks were plainly visible from the air.

The Coast Artillery had trained with the latest anti-aircraft guns while in the States, but the decision was made to send them to the Philippines with older guns. They also had proximity fuses for the shells and had to use an obsolete method to cut the fuses since the unit's fuse cutter was in Manila being repaired at the time of the attack. Many of the shells they fired fell to the ground without exploding.

The Zeros strafed the airfield and headed toward and turned around behind Mount Arayat and returned to strafe again. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. It was stated that the bodies of the dead lay on the runways since many were Air Corps ground crew members. It also appeared that everything was on fire from airplane hangers, automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. The runways of the airfield were pot-marked with craters from the bombs. The entire attack lasted about 45 minutes.

When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. The tankers watched as the dead, dying, and wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, on trucks, and in and on cars. Anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. Within an hour the hospital had reached its capacity. As the tankers watched the medics placed the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing. The battalion members set up cots under mango trees for the wounded and even the dentist gave medical aid to the wounded. The battalion's medics gave first aid to the wounded. The 194th was ordered to move to a nearby road not far from the airport which had tall trees that would provide cover for the tanks.

After the attack on the 8th, the 194th was sent to a bivouac three kilometers north of Clark Field at Mabalacat. They spent their time loading ammunition belts with bullets because they had fired so many rounds during the attack on Clark Field. The tankers were issued Infield and Springfield rifles. Since the rifles were from World War I, one out of every two worked. The tankers cannibalized two of the same type of rifles to get one working rifle. That night, since they did not have any foxholes, the men used an old latrine pit for cover since it was safer in the pit than in their barracks. The entire night they were bitten by mosquitoes. Without knowing it, they had slept their last night on a cot or bed, and from this point on, the men slept in blankets on the ground. One result of the attack was D Company was never transferred to the 194th and remained part of the 192nd throughout the Battle of Bataan.

On the 10th, the battalion was sent to an area along a highway to Manila with dry rice paddies. That battalion's job was to precent Japanese paratroopers from using the area as a drop zone. The tanks were parked along a dirt road that went to Calumpit, that had native houses, on stilts, every 50 to 100 feet. The Filipinos in the area were pro-Japanese and lit fires in the shape of an "X." The tankers put them out, but when they turned around, the found the fires had been relit. The night of the 12th, the battalion was ordered to bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. Attempting the 40-mile move, without lights, at night was a nightmare and one tank overturned when it went off the road. They finally arrived at their new bivouac at 6:00 A.M. on December 13th and spent the rest of the day and the next night there. The tanks were in an area of few trees surrounded by rice paddies, meaning the furthest they could go off the road was a few feet. Because of this, the battalion was scattered in three locations. Japanese planes flew over but did not bomb or strafe them.

The tankers bivouacked near the barrio of Muntinlupa in a Mango grove. There they had the job of attempting to defend against any invading troops. The battalion's six reconnaissance half-tracks with 40 men were supposed to defend against any landings at Batangas Bay, Tayabas Bay, and Balayan Bay. The battalion remained there from December 14th to December 24th. During this time the tankers spent much of their time on reconnaissance patrols hunting down Fifth Columnists who used flares at night and mirrors during the day near ammunition dumps. An order had been issued that no lights could be used at night. On one occasion, they saw someone signaling with a flashlight from a building. The tanks opened fire on the building. When they entered the building, there was no one in it, but they also had no additional problems with fifth columnists.

The tanks spent the night at Tagatay Ridge. The tankers slept on the ground in sleeping bags. During the night they were awakened when the gasoline truck sent to fuel the tanks exploded and lit the area like it was day. Someone had placed gasoline cans on the batteries and one battery sparked and the can exploded. The next day they continued their trip south and had to cross bridges with ten-ton limits. The tanks were fourteen tons but the bridges held. It was also stated the battalion was sent to Batangas in southern Luzon. On the 15th, the battalion received 15 Bren gun carriers but turned some over to the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. These were manned by grounded Air Corps men and used to test the ground to see if it could support the weight of tanks.

On December 22nd, A Company and D Company, 192nd, were ordered to the Agno River near Carmen. C Company remained behind at Batangas. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. started the more than 150-mile movement north to meet the Japanese at an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. They soon discovered that without air cover it was unsafe to move during the day, so the tanks were moved at night to prevent them from being attacked by Japanese planes. It was stated that driving a tank at night was never safe, but something that a tank driver learned to do. One reason this was unsafe was that the tank crews never knew what lay ahead. George Chumley D Co., 192nd, stated that, "anyone who said he wasn't afraid was lying," and that they were always afraid. What happened is that the men became used to being afraid. While going through Manila, at a square the tanks had to make a sharp turn in front of a water fountain. One of the tanks skid on the cobble stones as the driver attempted to turn it, and skid into the fountain destroying it.

Once the tanks were out of Manila, they could go 50 miles an hour. The problem was that driving the tanks was not an easy job. Because it was such a stressful job, the entire tank crews, including the officers, took turns driving the tanks for an hour. During the movement north, a Japanese spotter plane flew over the tanks but made no attempt to attack them. The trip to the river took 15 hours and when they got close to their objective, to protect the battalion from strafing, most of the battalion went to the left on Route 3 toward Tarlac and the river, while A Company was sent down Route 5 toward Cabanatuan and San Jose and then along the river until it rejoined the rest of the battalion. When the tanks passed through the barrio of San Jose, they saw the dead bodies of Filipino men, women, and children who had mistaken Japanese Zeros for American planes. When they came out to wave at the planes, they were strafed.

The 194th was supported by two divisions of the Philippine Army.. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible. Men stated that the US had asked them to hold out for six months. Later on the 24th, the battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. A Company went upstream of the bridge along the river bank and D Company went downstream along the river bank. D Company's position was close to Lingayen Gulf and near a ridge. Many of the tankers climbed to the top of the ridge, where they found defending troops, ammunition, and guns. The soldiers were just sitting there watching the Japanese ships in the Gulf since they had received orders not to fire. The tankers walked down the ridge and waited until they watched the defenders drop back and let the Japanese occupy the ridge. bringing up their equipment to the top of the ridge. The Americans finally received orders to launch a counterattack which failed. It was on December 24th, that Maj. Miller was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. One platoon from A Co. had taken positions west of Carmen. When they began taking fire from a strong Japanese force, Miller ordered the tanks to open fire with their machine guns. It was at 3:00 P.M. on December 25th that the tankers engaged the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions fighting with the tanks withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. Realizing that they had a very good chance of being cut off, the platoon's commanding officer ordered his tanks to withdraw through Carmen the evening of December 26th.

It was the 26th when the engineers mined the bridges to destroy them. The tanks were told they would receive a warning before the road bridge was destroyed. There was no warning before the bridge was destroyed. Pieces of metal flew through the air hitting the A Company tank nearest to the bridge. Pvt. Wesley Kerrigan was sleeping on top of his tank and was hit in his leg by a piece of girder while another piece of rail flew between two tanks and bent around a palm tree. Kerrigan was treated by the other tankers and evacuated to the battalion's HQ. There, the medical staff treated him and then sent him to a hospital in Manila. He would leave the Philippines on the USS Mactan which the Japanese allowed to sail to Australia on the 31st. While this was going on HQ Company had been under attack by the Japanese almost all night.

The first Japanese troops were spotted at about 10:30 am. The tanks, the half-tracks, and Filipino Scouts' self-propelled mounts opened fire. Shells began landing around the tanks, so the crews buttoned themselves in their tanks. The tanks did not have anti-personnel shells to use against infantry, but the tankers used the tanks’ 37-millimeter guns against armored vehicles and their machine guns against infantry. The fire stopped the Japanese advance for a while but the Japanese brought up more artillery and resumed the attack around noon. It was at this time that Sgt. Herbert Stobel - who was standing in the turret of his tank - was killed when a shell exploded above his tank. When the artillery fire became dangerous, the tanks fell back toward Bamban and then skirmished with the Japanese at Plaridel. At Calumpit, the tanks were involved in a full blown battle.

That day, the tank battalions were also given the job of holding the line against enemy armor and major thrusts until 5:00 A.M. on December 27th. Col. Ernest Miller – being the senior officer – was given authority to withdraw both tank battalions before 5:00 A.M. if he felt it was necessary. The tanks held the line but withdrew at 7:30 P.M. before the bridges they needed to cross were blown up at 11:30 P.M. that night.

Two volunteers were needed, on the 28th, to set up machine guns at the far end of the bridge to harass the Japanese. Pvt. Gerald Bell and Pvt. August Bender, who were assistant tank drivers, volunteered to take two antiaircraft machine guns from the tanks to the far end of the bridge and set up machine gun nests. It was stated that Bell and Bender held their position and died after being surrounded. The Japanese attempted to cross the river in several places. The tankers fired on them with their machine guns killing as many as 500 enemy troops and knocking out three tanks with the support of two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible.

The 192nd and part of the 194th fell back to form a new defensive line the night of December 27th. Arrangements had been made for the tanks to pick up their rations at Tarlac Depot. From there they fell back to the south bank of the BanBan River which they were supposed to hold for as long as possible. The tankers found their tanks being used as “mobile pillboxes.” The tanks were at Santo Tomas near Cabanatuan on December 28th and 29th serving as a rear guard against the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. The tankers held up the Japanese as long as possible before withdrawing. The 192nd received the order to withdraw and radioed the 194th, but for some unknown reason, the 194th tank commander whose tank had the long-wave radio did not forward the order to the other tanks of his battalion. The battalion finally was ordered to withdraw and 1st Lt. Harold Costigan informed the members of A Company, and D Company, 192nd, that they would have to fight their way out. The tanks fought their way through Carmen losing two tanks but saving the crews except for Capt. Edward Burke who had been hit by enemy fire. He was presumed dead but had been captured by the Japanese.

D Company came under fire from a Japanese machine gun in a napa hut. A half-track returned fire until its gun jammed. It also was hit in it's radiator and was towed back to battalion's headquarters. The rest of the company made its way to its assigned bridge only to find that it has already been destroyed by the engineers. It is not known why no attempt was made to find a place to ford the river. Instead, Capt. Jack Altman ordered his crews to disable the tanks - hoping they could be recovered - and crossed the bridge. 2nd Lt. John Hummel and Sgt. Isaac Causey were carried across the river because they had been wounded. The Japanese recovered the tanks and used them.

The tank battalions, on the 31st, were holding open two bridges at Calumpit so that the Southern Luzon forces could withdraw toward Bataan. It was noted that convoys of trucks would pass the tanks carrying absolutely nothing. It was then that Lt. Col. Miller sent out detachments of trucks to warehouses and had the men load them with ammunition, food, and high-octane fuel that was used by the tanks. It was stated that one detachment went all the way to Ft. Stotsenburg. The trucks returned carrying 6 tons of canned food and 12,000 gallons of fuel.

The 194th, at 2:00 am the morning of January 1st, crossed a bridge over the San Fernando River which was destroyed since all Filipino and American units had already crossed. They were now on the main road into Bataan. A defensive line was set up from Guagua to Porac to the swamps along Pampanga Bay. The bridge on a side road that ran from Guagua to Sexmoan and back onto Route 7 was destroyed. At 4:00 am, the battalion dug into new positions. They listened to Japanese troop movements and heard the sound of tanks. They watched five Japanese 89A medium tanks come into view in an open field. The tanks stopped because no reconnaissance had been done in the area. Within minutes, there were five destroyed Japanese tanks

That same day, conflicting orders were received by the defenders who were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5. Doing this would allow the Southern Luzon Forces, including the battalion's C Company, to withdraw toward Bataan. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge, over the Pampanga River, about withdrawing from the bridge and half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a frenzied attack by the 192nd, the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon forces escaped. C Co., 194th, rejoined the rest of the 194th.

From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Co. 192nd, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having lost half of their troops.

The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. The tanks were stopped and the crews were sleeping when the tanks came under small arms fire. The crews returned fire. Next came mortar fire. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance.

That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.

The tank companies also were given the job of protecting the artillery. The guns were mobile and hooked onto the tanks with a special carriage which allowed them to be moved. According to the tankers, it took a lot of preparation to set them up and a lot of preparation to take them down. The tankers didn’t like doing this job because minutes after the guns began firing, the Japanese sent up reconnaissance planes to find the guns. When they did find the guns, Zeros would appear and strafe the area. The gun crews quickly learned to “shoot and scoot.” After firing a few rounds the guns were quickly broken down and moved out of the area.

On January 12th, Co. D, 192nd, and Co. C, 194th, were sent to Cadre Road in a forward position with little alert time. Land mines were planted on January 13th by ordnance to prevent the Japanese from reaching Cadre Road. C Co., 194th, was sent to Bagac to reopen the Moron Highway which had been cut by the Japanese on January 16th. At the junction of Trail 162 and the Moron Highway, the tanks were fired on by an anti-tank gun which was knocked out by the tanks. They cleared the roadblock with the support of infantry.

General Weaver also issued the following orders to the tank battalions around this time: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”

During this time, the tanks often found themselves dealing with officers who claimed they were the ranking officers in the area and that they could change the tank company’s orders. Most wanted the tanks to kill snipers or do some other job the infantry had not succeeded at doing. This situation continued until Gen Weaver gave a written order to every tank commander that if an officer attempted to change their orders, they should hand the officer the order. When the officer looked up at the tank commander, the tank commander had his handgun aimed at the officer. Gen Weaver had ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer attempting to change their orders. This ended the problem.

On January 20th, A Company was sent to save the command post of the 31st Infantry. On the 24th, they supported the troops along the Hacienda Road, but they could not reach the objective because of landmines that had been planted by ordnance. The battalion held a position a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road with four self-propelled mounts. At 9:45 A.M., a Filipino warned the tankers that a large force of Japanese was on their way. When they appeared the battalion and self-propelled mounts opened up with everything they had. The Japanese broke off the attack, at 10:30 A.M., after losing 500 of their 1200 men. It was also at this time that the Japanese ended the assault and waited for fresh troops to arrive.

The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks covered the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.

The tank battalions, on January 28th, were given the job of protecting the beaches. The Japanese later admitted that the tanks guarding the beaches prevented them from attempting landings. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.

One night, the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach guarded by B Co., 192nd. There was a tremendous firefight, but the next morning not one Japanese soldier landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that the tanks were the reason why they attempted no other landings. While doing this job, the member of B Co. also noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast of Bataan they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be at a certain place off the beach at a certain time and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when they arrived, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes.

The tanks were at the Abucay-Hacienda Line which on the east went from Manila Bay to the mountains in the center of Bataan and held by the 1st Corps. It then extended, on the west, from the mountains to the South China Sea and was held by the 2nd Corps. The mountains had no fortifications since it was believed they were impenetrable. The Japanese occupied them and were able to get the defenders to fire at their own men by setting off firecrackers between the units. Snipers were the biggest problem and the tanks often found themselves being ordered by an officer - who claimed to be the "immediate commander" because he was the highest-ranking officer in the area - to exterminate the problem. This situation got so bad that Gen Weaver gave each tank commander a written order that he handed to the officer. After reading it, the officer would look up at the tank commander who had his .45 pointed at the officer. Weaver's order, ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer who attempted to change their orders.

Because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since the guns could not be aimed at the ground. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position.

Both battalions were sent to cover the junctions of the Back Road and East Road with the Abucay-Hacienda Road on January 25th. The defenders dropped back to the Pilar-Bagac Line which was a solid line from one side of Bataan to the other. To do this, the tanks held the old line and attempted to give the impression that a counter-attack was taking shape while the other troops withdrew. While holding the position, the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, fought its way to the position at 3:00 A.M. One platoon was sent to the front of the column of trucks that were loading the troops. The tanks provided heavy fire so that the infantry could withdraw and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. Later in the day, both the 192nd and 194th held a defensive line on the Balanga-Cardre-BaniBani Roads until the withdrawal was completed at midnight. They held the position until the night of January 26th, when they dropped back to a new defensive line roughly along the Pilar-Bagac Roads.

It was in the jungle that the tankers found out how inappropriate the M3 tanks were for use in the Philippines. Off the road, they had to travel with their turrets backward. If the tankers did not do this, the guns would get stuck in the jungle growth. The tanks were also restricted to the roads since they would get stuck in the mud of the rice fields. The high silhouettes and straight sides of the M3 also made the tanks easy targets for the Japanese.

The 194th's tanks were ordered to withdraw. During the withdrawal, one of A Company's platoon, under the command of 2nd Lt. Carroll Guin, had fallen behind another platoon and took the wrong turn where the roads came together as a "Y." The road they went down went back to the front lines. The platoon was stopped by 1st Lt. Ted Spaulding who had seen them gone down the road, chased them down with his half-track, and then ran on foot to the lead tank stopping it about two miles from the front.

The tankers also found the engineers were ready to blow a bridge before the battalion had crossed it. Spaulding and 1st Lt. Charles Fleming ordered them to wait. Not long after this, the 194th under Lt. Col. Miller arrived and crossed. When it was believed all the vehicles had crossed, the engineers lit the fuses. Just then a half-track arrived carrying Capt. Fred Moffet began to cross the bridge when about halfway across he saw smoke. Moffet ordered his driver to back the half-track off the bridge which went up in an explosion seconds later. A board from the explosion hit Moffet and injured his leg.

From records kept at Hospital #1 at Limay, Bataan, it is known that George was wounded and admitted to the hospital on February 16th. It appears that his wound was considered to be a severe wound possibly from Japanese artillery. Two other members of his company, Pvt Melvin Ahlgrim and Pvt. Burl Harris were also admitted. It appears George may have remained in the hospital until Bataan was surrendered since no discharge information has been found.

As the fall of Bataan got nearer it was said that Japanese planes intentionally ignored the fact the hospital was clearly marked with Red Crosses. It was stated that on April 4, 7, 8, and 9, the Japanese intentionally bombed the hospital. The men in the hospital stated that the Japanese planes flew low enough that they could see the Red Crosses and the Red Cross flag. Fifty-four patients were killed and many were wounded during one bombing when a ward took a direct it. A doctor was killed and two nurses and six medics were wounded.

According to one nurse, 1st. Lt. William T. Cummings, a Catholic chaplain, who had once said, "There are not atheists in foxholes," stepped into the ward after it had been hit and said, "Boys, that was tough, but let's pray to God they don't come back." He told the wounded to stay in their beds. The priest stood praying with his hands in the air and prayed for about five minutes. When another wave of planes came over and bombed, one fell within a few yards of Cummings and exploded. He was hit by shrapnel which broke his arm and cut him on the shoulder, but he never stopped praying. He stopped after the last bomb fell. He then looked at another chaplain standing right next to him and said, "All right, partner, take over. I'm wounded." It was said that if the wounded had not been in their beds they would have been killed because Japanese Zeros strafed anyone that was running.

After the surrender, the POWs remained at Little Baguio until May 26th when they were taken by a truck convoy to Bilibid Prison near Manila. In Tagalog, the word “bilibid” means prison but the Japanese now called it a hospital and turned it over to US Naval medical personnel as a hospital. The trucks carrying the men from Hospital 2 passed through a massive archway and two sets of iron gates in the cement and brick wall that surrounded the prison. Inside there was a third wall that divided the grounds. The trucks stopped in front of a three-story building that had once been the prison hospital. There was no roof over the third floor and when it rained, the rainwater seeped down to the second and first floors.

The POWs got out of the trucks and lined up to be counted. After this was done, they were sent to the second floor of the former hospital and took the floor over. The second floor was described as a big bare room, with stairs at both ends, without one cot and only a few mattresses lying on the floor. Most of the really sick lay on the concrete floor. Wherever the other POWs threw their belongings became their spot.

The other buildings in the prison were long narrow one-story wooden structures where the patients lay with their heads against the wall and their feet toward the center aisle of the building. Some of the sick had mattresses, others lay on blankets on the floors. Many of the POWs had no real clothing. It was stated that there were six or seven of the buildings and each had a pharmacist’s mate in charge of it. Men stated that the Naval personnel kept the buildings clean and sanitary.

The POWs had rigged a long flushing latrine described as an open depression. At the end was an automatic flusher made from half a gasoline drum they rigged up that allowed for a steady stream of water from the city water main to flow through it. When the drum filled, it tipped and flushed the latrine. It then swung back into position to fill and then repeated the process.

The prison guards carried rifles with bayonets attached. The guards seemed to be everywhere. They were outside the prison, walked the grounds, and walked through the hospital wards. When they did, the POWs were expected to stand up and bow to the guards or be beaten. This was a completely different experience than Baguio where – except for the one area that they were forbidden to enter – the POWs were allowed to walk where they wanted without Japanese interference. They also had never had a “bango” but now they did it daily until their first morning in the prison. The Japanese expected all the POWs to line up. This included the sick. The senior officer checked the POWs then they stood until every POW in the prison – from every building – was counted and a comparison was made of the count to the books with the recorded number of POWs being held. Sometimes it took as many as three counts before the numbers matched.

Most of the POWs from the Bataan hospitals remained at Bilibid until May 30th when they were taken to the barrio of Cabanatuan by train. Only the extremely ill remained at Bilibid. From the barrio, they marched past Cabanatuan 1 which had just opened and would house most of the POWs who had taken part in the march. They marched to Cabanatuan 2, and those men who fell were not killed but beaten until they got up. It was stated that if they did not get up, they were put on a truck and driven to the camp. When they arrived there was no water supply, so men dug holes in the ground and sucked on the moist soil. That night it rained which probably saved many lives.

On June 1, 1942, the POWs were herded onto the road and retraced their route back 5 kilometers to Cabanatuan #1. When they arrived, it was said that the water supply was inadequate and the POWs stood in line for as long as two to three hours to get a canteen of water. They were given small quantities of rice in bulk for a group of men organized by their units and cooked by the unit. Later that same day, the first POWs who had been on the march out of Bataan began to arrive in the camp from Camp O’Donnell. The POW transfer from Camp O’Donnell ended on June 4th.

George appears to have been still in the hospital when Bataan surrendered. When Corregidor surrendered on May 6th, his parents received a message from the War Department.

Dear Mrs. V. Grui

According to War Department records, you have been designated as the emergency addressee of Private George Grui, 20, 700, 275, who, according to the latest information available, was serving in the Philippine Islands at the time of the final surrender.

I deeply regret that it is impossible for me to give you more information than is contained in this letter. In the last days before the surrender of Bataan, there were casualties which were not reported to the War Department. Conceivably the same is true of the surrender of Corregidor and possibly other islands of the Philippines. The Japanese Government has indicated its intention of conforming to the terms of the Geneva Convention with respect to the interchange of information regarding prisoners of war. At some future date, this Government will receive through Geneva a list of persons who have been taken prisoners of war. Until that time the War Department cannot give you positive information.

The War Department will consider the persons serving in the Philippine Islands as “missing in action” from the date of surrender of Corregidor, May 7, 1942, until definite information to the contrary is received. It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government will communicate a list of prisoners of war at an early date. At that time you will be notified by this office in the event that his name is contained in the list of prisoners of war. In the case of persons known to have been present in the Philippines and who are not reported to be prisoners of war by the Japanese Government, the War Department will continue to carry them as “missing in action” in the absence of information to the contrary, until twelve months have expired. At the expiration of twelve months and in the absence of other information the War Department is authorized to make a final determination.

Recent legislation makes provision to continue the pay and allowances of persons carried in a “missing” status for a period not to exceed twelve months; to continue, for the duration of the war, the pay and allowances of persons known to have been captured by the enemy; to continue allotments made by missing personnel for a period of twelve months and allotments or increase allotments made by persons by the enemy during the time they are so held; to make new allotments or increase allotments to certain dependents defined in Public Law 490, 77th Congress. The latter dependents generally include the legal wife, dependent children under twenty-one years of age, and dependent mother, or such dependents as having been designated in official records. Eligible dependents who can establish a need for financial assistance and are eligible to receive this assistance the amount allotted will be deducted from pay which would otherwise accrue to the credit of the missing individual.

Very Truly yours
(signed)
J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General

The POWs remained at Little Baguio until May 26th when they were taken by a truck convoy to Bilibid Prison near Manila. In Tagalog, the word “bilibid” means prison but the Japanese now called it a hospital and turned it over to US Naval medical personnel as a hospital. The trucks carrying the men from Hospital 2 passed through a massive archway and two sets of iron gates in the cement and brick wall that surrounded the prison. Inside there was a third wall that divided the grounds. The trucks stopped in front of a three-story building that had once been the prison hospital. There was no roof over the third floor and when it rained, the rainwater seeped down to the second and first floors.

The POWs spent the night at Bilibid Prison in what was called the Outer Compound. Those POWs being held in Bilibid were held in the Inner compound. From May 26th to 28th, the Japanese marched 2,000 POWs a day from Bilibid to the train station in Manila where they boarded freight cars. Each car held 75 to 80 men. In the cars, the POWs were taken to the barrio of Cabanatuan where they lived in an old schoolhouse for the night. The next morning, the POWs formed 100 men detachments and then ordered them to march. The march to the camp was 15 to 20 miles, and the POWs were warned that anyone who fell would be killed. When the first POW fell a guard ran up to him and aimed his rifle at him, but the man got up and ran back into the column. This happened several times until a POW fell and could not get up. The guard aimed his gun at the man, but when he still didn't get up, the guard raised his arm, and in his hand was a red flag. A truck pulled up and the POW was put into it. When the prisoners saw this, it wasn’t very long until many of them were falling out and were not able to get up so they could get a ride to the camp.

The POWs walked almost six miles and passed Cabanatuan #1 - which had not opened - where the men who were captured on Bataan and took part in the death march were held. They next passed Cabanatuan #2 which was about four miles past Camp #1. The camp did not have an adequate water supply and was closed, but it later reopened and housed Naval POWs. They continued to Cabanatuan 3 which was about seven miles from Camp #1 and was where those men captured on Corregidor were taken. The POWs arrived at Camp #3 from May 26th to May 29th in detachments of 1500 to 2,000 men which meant the total number of POWs in the camp was about 6,000 men.

Four POWs walked away from the camp on May 30th. After they escaped, the men realized that they had no place to go, so they attempted to surrender themselves to the Japanese. The Japanese tied them to posts and left them to hang in the sun. They also beat the POWs with boards. The Japanese also showed the men water but would not give them any to drink. The next day, while the POWs were eating dinner, the Japanese marched the men to where the prisoners were eating. They had the men dig their own graves and gave each man a cigarette and water. They also offered blindfolds to the men. All the men took a blindfold except one. That man spat at the Japanese before they shot him. After they were shot, the men fell backward into the graves. When one man who had survived the execution attempted to crawl out of the grave, a Japanese officer shot him with his pistol. He next shot each man to make sure they were dead.

Meals at first consisted of an onion soup without any onions in it. Later, the meals consisted of 16 ounces of rice for each man each day, and 4 ounces of top greens (similar to spinach) were issued. Once a week, one ounce of carabao meat was issued. Two ounces of coconut were issued and this was used with cornstarch and sugar to make a pudding. Also, once per week for one month, one small banana was issued and this was also used for pudding. It appears that during the first month in the camp, the POWs also received 15 limes.

Since the fence around the camp wasn't completed, three POWs walked away from the camp. When they realized they had no place to go they returned. When they did they were beaten and tortured. The next day, while the POWs were eating dinner, the Japanese marched the men to where the prisoners were eating. They had the men dig their own graves and gave each man a cigarette and water. They also offered blindfolds to the men. All the men took a blindfold except one. That man spat at the Japanese before they shot him. After they were shot, the men fell backward into the graves. When one man who had survived the execution attempted to crawl out of the grave, a Japanese officer shot him with his pistol. He next shot each man to make sure they were dead.

The first meal the POWs received was an onion soup that had no onions on it or carrots in it. After the initial meal, the daily meal for the POWs was squash, mongo beans, and greens (which were the tops of native sweet potatoes) for soup, and rice. They also received Carabao meat about once a week. Other sources state a whistle weed soup with rice in it was the main meal. Men in the camp reported that most meals were 1½ cups of rice and a watery soup.

The American officers convinced the Japanese, on June 8th, to allow them to hand out punishments for minor offenses. The POWs organized themselves into administration groups on June 14th. Since the Army had the largest number of POWs, it was divided into Groups I and II while Group III was Naval personnel. An Army major was the adjutant for both Groups I and II and some officers did various jobs under him. Each group had several officers who dealt with the enlisted men.

Filipino guerrillas ambushed a convoy that had POWs in it on June 16th. Four POWs were wounded and one died the next day. The “Blood Brother Rule” was put into effect on June 21st. If one POW escaped, the other nine men in his group would be executed. The Japanese allowed the first church services on June 28th. The next day, the POWs organized a morale program. The POWs played volleyball, basketball, softball, ping pong, and created singing groups, and a band.

The first church services were held in the camp on June 28th. To improve morale among the POWs, on June 29th, the officers organized activities for the men. Softball teams, basketball teams, volleyball teams, and ping-pong teams were formed as well as singalong groups to provide entertainment. The POWs were joined by 151 civilians in the camp on July 6th. The Japanese handed out a limited number of shoes, shirts, trousers, and blankets on July 17th. It is not known how it was determined who would receive any of the clothing.

POWs during this time were sent out on details and returned to the camp. On July 14th, 100 POWs were sent to Manila. Twenty-six sick POWs were transferred to Camp 1 on July 20th. Three Hundred Sixty POWs left the camp, on July 24th, for Palawan Island. Another group of 150 men was sent there on July 30th. Dysentery was a real problem in the camp and to slow the spread of dysentery, a program was started to catch flies on August 17th. Any POW who turned in a full milk can of flies received two biscuits and a few cigarettes. They also dug deep latrines, which were 18 feet deep, to slow the spread of disease.

On September 1st, 198 POWs were transferred to the Manila detail which was followed by another 120 men on September 8th. Also on that date, 120 returned to the camp from the Field Labor Detail. Another detachment of 198 men on September 1st was sent to Manila. One hundred POWs left the camp on an unnamed work detail on September 23rd, followed by another 100 POWs the next day. Another 32 men were sent to the detail at Manila on September 28th followed by 119 POWs the next day.

On October 4th, the Japanese gave physicals to 374 POWs whom they referred to as “producers” and were to be sent to another part of the empire. (The term producer meant the POWs had training in areas that the Japanese wanted to exploit.) Many of these POWs were experienced machinists. On October 5, 1942, another 676 POWs were transferred to Manila. They marched to Camp 1 and were joined by 123 men from that camp. From available information, it appears that a total of 1700 POWs were sent to Manila. The Japanese intended to give each man 2 bananas, 2 egg sandwiches, 5 biscuits, 2 rice balls, and 1 roll. The only problem was they did not have enough to go around. The POWs were taken to Manila to be sent to Japan.

The POWs remaining in the camp reorganized the POWs still there and created Group I made up of Army personnel and Group II made up of Navy personnel. It was at this time that the Japanese began the transfer of sick POWs to Camp 1 with 20 men being sent to the hospital there on October 14th and another 10 men being transferred there the next day. On October 21st, 322 POWs, from Group I, were sent to Camp 1 followed by another 15 sick POWs on October 23rd. Another 297 POWs were sent to Manila to the work detail there on October 26th. The POWs still at Camp 3 on October 27th received word that they were all going to be sent to Camp 1. The 74 sick POWs in the camp were sent to the hospital at Camp 1 on October 28th. On October 29th, 1,126 POWs boarded trucks and rode to Camp 1. The next day, the remaining 775 POWs were taken by truck to the camp. Camp 3 officially went out of existence on October 30, 1942.

With the closure of Cabanatuan #3, the POWs found themselves in Cabanatuan #1 which originally opened for the POWs who had been captured on Bataan. Cabanatuan #2 was reopened because the Naval officers did not want to be under the command of the Army.

The POWs were allowed to run the camp since they were afraid of the diseases spreading in the camp. The Japanese only entered if they had an issue they wanted to deal with. To prevent escapes, the POWs set up a detail that patrolled the fence of the camp. The reason this was done was that those who did escape and were caught were tortured before being executed, while the other POWs were made to watch. It is believed that no POW successfully escaped from the camp.

The barracks in the camp were built to house 50 POWs, but most had between 60 to 120 POWs in them. The POWs slept on double-deck bamboo shelves nine feet wide and eight feet long, without mattresses, bedding, or mosquito netting. Many developed sores and became ill. The POWs were assigned to barracks which meant that the members of their group lived together and went out on work details together since the Japanese had instituted the “Blood Brothers” rule. If one man escaped the other nine men in his group would be executed. POWs caught trying to escape were beaten. Those who did escape and were caught were tortured before being executed. It is not known if any POW successfully escaped from the camp. He was assigned to Barracks 5, Group 2. It was said that the Japanese guards would attempt to get the POWs assigned to guard the inside of the fence to come outside the perimeter of the fence. If the man did, he was shot and the guards told their commanding officer that the POWs were “trying to escape.”

Rice was the main food given to the POWs fed to them as “lugow” which meant “wet rice.” The rice smelled and appeared to have been swept up off the floor. The other problem was that the men assigned to be cooks had no idea of how to prepare the rice since they had no experience in cooking it. During their time in the camp, they received few vegetables and almost no fruit. Once in a while, the POWs received corn to serve to the prisoners. From the corn, the cooks would make hominy. The prisoners were so hungry that some men would eat the corn cobs. This resulted in many men being taken to the hospital to have the cobs removed because they would not pass through the men’s bowels. Sometimes they received bread, and if they received fish it was rotten and covered with maggots.

To supplement their diets, the men would search for grasshoppers, rats, and dogs to eat. The POWs assigned to handing out the food used a sardine can to ensure that each man received the same amount. They were closely watched by their fellow prisoners who wanted to make sure that everyone received the same portion and that no one received extra rice.

In the camp, the prisoners continued to die, but at a slower rate. The camp hospital consisted of 30 wards that could hold 40 men each, but it was more common for them to have 100 men in them. Each man had approximately an area of 2 feet by 6 feet to lie in. The sickest POWs were put in “Zero Ward,” which was called this because it was missed by the Japanese when they counted barracks. There were two rolls of wooden platforms around the perimeter of the building. The sickest POWs were put on the lower platform which had holes cut into it so they could relieve themselves. The platform was covered in feces which was made worse by the excrement from the higher platform dripping down onto it. Most of those who entered the ward died. When a POW died, the POWs stripped him of his clothing, and the man was buried naked. The dead man’s clothing was washed in boiling water and given to a prisoner in need of clothing. The Japanese put a fence up around the building to protect themselves and would not go into the area.

From records kept by the POW medical staff, George was admitted to the hospital side of the camp on November 3, with beriberi, diphtheria, and malaria. During his time in the hospital, PFC Harold Kurvers, 194th Medical Detachment, would visit him. According to Kurvers, one of the last things that George ever said to him was, “Snuff, if you make it back, be sure to tell my parents that I tried and I didn’t give up.” George died not too long after saying this.

Medical records at Cabanatuan show that Pvt. George W. Gui died on Saturday, November 21, 1942, from diphtheria, beriberi, and malaria, at approximately 11:00 PM and was the 2,337 POW to die in the camp. He was buried in grave 809.

A telegram was sent to his parents on February 17, 1943, and a letter was mailed to them on the same date.

J GRUI
914 GALTIER ST
SAINT PAUL MN

REPORT JUST RECEIVED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS STATES THAT YOUR SON PRIVATE GEORGE GRUI IS A PRISONER OF WAR OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS LETTER OF INFORMATION FOLLOWS FROM THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL=
ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL=

Within days of receiving the first message, they received a second message:

Mr. John Grui
914 Galtier Street
Saint Paul, Minnesota

Report has been received that your son, Private George Grui, 37,026,117, infantry, is now a prisoner of war of the Japanese Government in the Philippine Islands. This will confirm my telegram of February 17, 1943.

The Provost Marshal General, Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Washington, D. C. the address to which the mail may be sent. Any future correspondence in connection with his status as a prisoner of war should be addressed to that office.

Very Truly yours
(signed)
J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General

This letter was followed by another letter.

Mr. John Grui
914 Galtier Street
Saint Paul, Minnesota

The Provost Marshal General directs me to inform you that you may communicate with your son, postage free, by following the inclosed instructions:

It is suggested that you address him as follows:

Pvt. George Grui, U.S. Army
Interned in the Philippine Islands
C/O Japanese Red Cross, Tokyo, Japan
Via New York, New York

Packages cannot be sent to the Orient at this time. When transportation facilities are available a package permit will be issued you.

Further information will be forwarded you as soon as it is received.

Sincerely
(signed)
Howard F. Bresee
Colonel, CMP
Chief Information Bureau

The War Department received a report of his death from the Japanese Government through the International Red Cross on July 17, 1943. The Japanese did not report his actual date of death and took the stance that the date a man was reported dead to the Red Cross was the man’s date of death, so it was the date used by the War Department.

J GRUI
914 GALTIER ST
SAINT PAUL MN

=I AM DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO INFORM YOU REPORT JUST RECEIVED STATES THAT YOUR SON CORPORAL GEORGE GRUI WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN REPORTED A PRISONER OF WAR DIED SEVENTEETH JULY NINETEEN FORTY THREE AS A RESULT OF BERBERI DIPHTHERIA MALARIA PERIOD THE SECRETARY OF WAR ASKS THAT I EXPRESS HIS DEEP SYMPATHY IN YOUR LOSS AND HIS REGRET THAT THE UNAVOIDABLE CIRCUMSTANCES MADE NECESSARY THE UNUSUAL LAPSE OF TIME IN REPORTING YOUR SONS DEATH TO CONFIRMING LETTER FOLLOWS=

ULIO THE ADJUTANT

A confirmation letter followed the telegram.

Dear Mr. Grui:

It is with deep regret that you were notified by telegram on 17 July, 1943, of the death of your son, Corporal George Grui, 37,026,117, Infantry.

The casualty report in his case shows he died at a Prisoner of War camp, Philippines, as a result of beriberi, diphtheria and malaria but fails to give the exact date date of death. Efforts to obtain the information have not been successful. From the meager information obtainable from the Japanese Government regards him from being dead from the date of the dispatch of the reporting message. The reporting message was dated 17 July, 1943, and therefore, this date has been entered on the records of the War Department as the date of his death.

May the thought that he gave his life heroically in the service of his country be the sustaining comfort for you.

I extend to you my deepest sympathy.

Sincerely yours,
(signed)
J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General

When the POWs at Cabanatuan and Bilibid Prison were liberated in January and February 1945, respectively, the death records kept in Camp O’Donnell, Cabanatuan, Bilibid Prison, and from work details were recovered. It was from those records that the actual dates of death for men were learned. It was after George’s actual date of death was learned that his father received a letter from the War Department.

Dear Mr. Grui:

Permit me to extend to you my heartfelt sympathy for the loss of your son, Corporal George Grui, 37,026,117, who died on the twenty first of November, 1942, from beriberi, diphtheria and malaria at Cabanatuan Camp, Philippine Islands, while a prisoner of war of the Japanese.

The casualty reports received contain few details. They were of necessity meager, due to the inability of the persons confined by the Japanese to prepare and keep the necessary records. We do know, however, that he is buried on Luzon, Philippine Islands.

Anything I can say is scant consolation to you in your grief. It is my fervent hope that later, the knowledge that his courage and sacrifices contributed to the final victory may be of sustaining comfort to you.

Very truly yours
(signed)
C. W. MacELLVEN
Major, AGD
Ass’t Adj Gen

In early 1945, the American Graves Registration Service began the process of recovering the dead at the various camps and other sites in the Philippines. George’s remains and those of the other POWs buried in Plot 4, Row 0, Grave 409 were exhumed from the Cabanatuan Camp Cemetery. It was noted one of his government issued identification tags was on the grave marker – with the tags of the 31 other men buried in the grave – and his other ID tag was found with his remains in the grave. He was buried at the United States Armed Forces Cemetery #2, Manila, in Plot 3, Row 10, in multiple graves. The cemetery was viewed as a holding area for the dead until an attempt at identifying the remains was made. When dental records arrived, it was determined that his identification could not be confirmed.

During this time, the QMC contacted him in a letter dated August 2, 1946, and stated it had a broken rosary, some personal papers of George’s, and photos. His father requested that they be returned to him.

After the QMC failed to identify George’s remains, his father was sent a letter dated May 13, 1949. was asked for George’s civilian dental records. On Sept. 22, 1952, another change was made to George’s records. He was reduced in rank from corporal to private. Apparently, there was no evidence that he was ever officially promoted to corporal. In fact, the records indicated he had never been promoted.

Pvt. George Grui was buried as an unknown at the new American Military Cemetery in Manila, and his name was placed on the Walls of the Missing at the cemetery. In a series of letters between Remains Recovery and his family, it was stated that his father wished that if George’s remains are ever identified that he be buried where he died.

Dear Mr. Grui:

More than six years have lapsed since the cessation of hostilities of World War II, which cost the life of your son, the late Private George Grui.

The unfortunate circumstances surrounding the death of your son have been thoroughly reviewed and, based upon information presently available, the Department of the Army has been forced to determine that his remains are not recoverable. I wish to assure you that, should any additional evidence come to our attention indicating that his remains are in our possession, you will be informed immediately.

Realizing the extent of your grief and anxiety, it is not easy to express condolence to you who gave your loved one under circumstances so difficult that there is no grave at which to pay homage. May the knowledge of your son’s honorable service to his country be a source of sustaining comfort to you.

Sincerely yours,
(signed)
W. E. CAMPBELL
Lt. Colonel, QMC
Memorial Division

The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency is looking for relatives of Pvt. George Grui so it can get a DNA sample to identify his remains. His case is considered active.

Continue A Co.

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