Pvt. Robert Edward Doerck was born on December 18, 1913, in Lincoln, Nebraska, to Grace Belle Rife-Doerck and Henry A. Doerck and has a sister and two brothers. His family resided at 2042 South 15th Street in Lincoln, Nebraska. He left school after his junior year of high school. During the 1930s the family moved to 3790 32nd Street, San Diego, California. It is known he worked as a clerk in a grocery store. He registered with Selective Service when the draft act became law on October 16, 1940, and named his mother as his contact person. He was drafted into the Army on April 1, 1941, but it is not known where he did his basic training.
In August 1941, the 194th Tank Battalion was taking part in maneuvers when the battalion was ordered to return to Ft. Lewis. The story that Col. Ernest Miller, in his book Bataan Uncensored, told was that the decision to send the battalion overseas was made on August 15, 1941, and was the result of an event that took place in the summer of 1941. The reality was the decision to send tank battalions to the Philippines had been made weeks, if not months earlier, in the attempt to buildup the military forces there.
In Miller’s story, a squadron of American fighters was flying over Lingayen Gulf, in the Philippines, when one of the pilots, who was flying at a lower altitude, noticed something odd. He took his plane down and identified a flagged buoy in the water and saw another in the distance. He came upon more buoys that lined up, in a straight line for 30 miles to the northwest, in the direction of Formosa (Taiwan) which had a large radio transmitter used by the Japanese military. The squadron continued its flight plan south to Mariveles and returned to Clark Field. When the planes landed, it was too late to do anything that day. The next day, when another squadron was sent to the area, the buoys had been picked up by a fishing boat – with buoys covered on its deck covered by a tarp – which was seen making its way to shore. Since communication between the Air Corps and the Navy was difficult, the boat escaped. It was at that time the decision was made to build up the American military presence in the Philippines.
On August 13, 1941, Congress extended the federalization of National Guard units. The next day, Maj. Miller was ordered to Ft. Knox and received the battalion’s overseas orders. A sergeant, in the 192nd Tank Battalion at Ft. Knox, wrote a letter home on August 19, 1941, and told his parents the 192nd was scheduled to go the Philippines, but the battalion’s orders had been canceled and that the 194th Tank Battalion – which was stationed at Ft. Lewis, Washington – was being sent to the Philippines. It appeared they were being sent first because they were already on the West Coast.
The 194th had been informed on August 1, 1941, its B Company was detached from the battalion and received orders for Alaska. The rest of the battalion was participating in the Pacific maneuvers and was ordered back to Ft. Lewis where its members learned the battalion was being sent overseas. The fact was there were only three places they could be sent that were large enough for tanks. They were Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one of the three places had been eliminated. After receiving their orders, men who were 29 years old or older, married with dependents, who had other dependents, or whose enlistments in the National Guard ended while the battalion was overseas, were allowed to transfer out of the battalion. Replacements of these men, on September 3rd, came from other units at Ft. Lewis including the 114th Field Artillery and the 41st Infantry Division. It was at this time that he joined the battalion.
After the 194th received its orders to report to Ft. Mason, California, men with dependents, men 29 years old or older, or whose enlistments were going to end while the battalion was overseas were replaced. Many of the replacements, but not all, came from other units at Ft. Lewis and had absolutely no training in tanks. It was during this time that Robert transferred to the 194th, but it is not known what training he had received before joining the battalion.
The remaining members and new members of the battalion – on September 4th – traveled south from Ft. Lewis, by train, to Ft. Mason north of San Francisco arriving at 7:30 A.M. on the 5th. From there, they were ferried, on the USAT General Frank M. Coxe to Ft. MacDowell on Angel Island where they were inoculated and given physicals by the battalion’s medical detachment. Those men with medical conditions were replaced. These replacements appear to have come from units stationed at Ft. Ord, California.
The battalion’s new tanks were sent west from Ft. Knox, Kentucky, where they had been requisitioned by an officer of the 192nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Lt. William Gentry, for the battalion. Gentry was given written orders from the War Department giving him authority to take tanks from any unit so the 194th had its full complement of tanks. In some cases, the tanks he took had just arrived at the fort on flatcars and were about to be unloaded when he and his detachment arrived and took the tanks from soldiers waiting to unload them. From Ft. Knox, the tanks were sent west by train and were waiting for the battalion at Ft. Mason.
The tanks fit fine in the ship’s first and second hold, but the deckhead in the ship’s third hold was low, so 19 tanks had to have their turrets removed to fit them in the hold. So that the turrets went on the tanks they came off of, the tanks’ serial numbers were painted, by hand, on the turrets. The ship’s captain also ordered that all ammunition, fuel, and batteries be removed from the tanks. He stated they would be sent later, but it appears he had a change of mind and the batteries were sent with the tanks.
The soldiers boarded the USAT President Calvin Coolidge which sailed at 9 PM. The enlisted men found themselves assigned to bunks in the ship’s holds with the tanks. Those men with lower bunks found them unbearable to sleep in because of the heat and humidity. Soon, most men were sleeping on deck but learned quickly to get up early because the crew hosed down the deck each morning. Many of the men had seasickness during this part of the voyage. The soldiers spent their time attending lectures, playing craps and cards, reading, writing letters, and sunning themselves on deck. Other men did the required work like turning over the tanks’ engines by hand and the clerks caught up on their paperwork. The ship arrived at 7:00 A.M. on September 13th in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the soldiers were given four-hour passes ashore. At 5:00 PM that evening the ship sailed.
The next morning, the members of the battalion were called together and they were informed the battalion was going to the Philippines. On the next leg of the voyage, the ship was joined by the USS Guadalupe, a replenishment oiler. The heavy cruiser, USS Astoria, and an unknown destroyer were the ships’ escorts. During rough weather, the destroyer approached the Coolidge for a personnel transfer. The soldiers recalled that the destroyer bobbed up and down and from side to side in the water with waves breaking over its deck as it attempted to make the transfer. When it became apparent that a small boat would be crushed if it attempted to transfer someone from one ship to the other, a bosun’s chair was rigged and the man was sent from the Coolidge to the destroyer. A few of the tanks in the hold broke loose from their moorings and rolled back and forth slamming into the ship’s hull. They did this until the tankers secured them.
The ships crossed the International Dateline the night of Tuesday, September 16th, and the date became Thursday, September 18th. A few days past Guam, the soldiers saw the first islands of the Philippines. The ships sailed south along the east coast of Luzon, around the southern end of the island, and up the west coast. On Friday, September 26th, the ships entered Manila Bay at about 7:00 in the morning. The soldiers remained on board and disembarked at 3:00 P.M. and were bused to Fort Stotsenburg. The battalion’s maintenance section, remained behind at the pier, with the 17th Ordnance Company, to unload the tanks and reattach the tanks’ turrets.
The maintenance section and 17th Ordnance reinstalled the batteries, but they needed aviation fuel for the tanks’ engines to get them off the docks. 2nd Lt. Russell Swearingen went to the quartermaster and asked him for the fuel. He was told that they did not have any at the port so he would have to go to the Army Air Corps to get it. When he arrived at the Air Corps command, he was informed that they couldn’t give him the aviation fuel without a written order. It took two weeks to get the last tanks off the docks. While all this was going on, the battalion’s half-tracks arrived as well as motorcycles. The battalion’s reconnaissance detachment had Harley-Davidsons at Ft. Lewis but the new motorcycles were Indian Motorcycles with all the controls on the opposite side of the bikes. The reconnaissance section also had peeps (later known as jeeps), but many of these were taken by high-ranking officers for their own use since they were new to the Army.
Upon arriving at the fort, they were greeted by General Edward P. King Jr. who apologized that they had to live in tents and receive their meals from food trucks until their barracks were completed. He informed the battalion he had learned of their arrival just days before they arrived. After he was satisfied that they were settled in, he left them. It rained the first night in the tents flooding many of the tents. They also quickly learned not to leave their shoes on the ground or they became moldy.
After spending three weeks in tents, they moved into their barracks on October 18th, the barracks were described as being on stilts with walls that from the floor were five feet of a weaved matting called sawali This allowed the men to dress. Above five feet the walls were open and allowed for breezes to blow through the barracks making them more comfortable than the tents. There were no doors or windows. The wood that was used for the support beams was the best mahogany available. For personal hygiene, a man was lucky if he was near a faucet with running water.
The days were described as hot and humid, but if a man was able to find shade it was always cooler in the shade. The Filipino winter had started when they arrived, and although it was warm when they went to sleep by morning the soldiers needed a blanket. They turned in all their wool uniforms and were issued cotton shirts and trousers which were the regular uniform in the Philippines. They were also scheduled to receive sun helmets.
A typical workday was from 7:00 to 11:30 A.M. with an hour and a half lunch. The afternoon work time was from 1:30 to 2:30 P.M. At that time, it was considered too hot to work, but the battalion continued working and called it, “recreation in the motor pool.” Tank commanders studied books on their tanks and instructed their crews on the 30 and 50-caliber machine guns. The tankers learned to dismantle the guns and put them together. They did it so often that many men could take the guns apart and assemble them while wearing blindfolds. They never fired the guns because Gen. King could not get Gen. MacArthur to release ammunition for them.
For the next several weeks, the tankers spent their time removing the cosmoline from their weapons and loading ammunition belts for their machine guns. They also had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their M3 tanks. None of them had ever trained in one during their time at Ft. Lewis. In October, the battalion was allowed to travel to Lingayen Gulf. This was done under simulated conditions that enemy troops had landed there. Two months later, enemy troops would land there. It is known that they were paid at least once after arriving which was confusing since they were paid in pesos and centavos. Many men at first had to learn how much things cost in a new currency.
At the end of the workday, the men had free time. The fort had a bowling alley and movie theaters. The men also played softball, horseshoes, and badminton. Men would also throw footballs around. On Wednesday afternoons, the men went swimming. Once a month, men put their names for the chance to go into Manila. The number of men allowed on these trips was limited. Other men were allowed to go to Aarayat National Park where there was a swimming pool that was filled with mountain water. Other men went canoeing at the Pagsanjan Falls and stated the scenery was beautiful.
The battalion made one trip to the Lingayen Gulf. Things went well until they turned on a narrow gravel road in the barrio of Lingayen that had a lot of traffic. A bus driver parked his bus in the middle of the road and did not move it even after the tanks turned on their sirens and blew whistles. As they passed the bus, the tanks tore off all of one side of it. The tankers bivouacked about a half-mile from the barrio on a hard sandy beach with beautiful palm trees. The tankers had a swim and got in line for chow at the food trucks. It was then that the battalion’s two doctors told them that they needed to wear earplugs when they swam because the warm water contained bacteria and they could get ear infections that were hard to cure. No one came down with an ear infection. The soldiers went to sleep on the beach in their sleeping bags when they began to hear humming and scratching. When they turned on a flashlight they found their sleeping bags were covered with beetles and other bugs. They quickly moved to another area that wasn’t infested.
On Nov, 26th, the 192nd arrived in the Philippines. The battalion brought with it a great deal of radio equipment to set up a radio school to train radiomen for the Philippine Army. The battalion also had many ham radio operators. Within hours after arriving at Ft. Stotsenburg, the battalion set up a communications tent that was in contact with ham radio operators in the United States. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When they were informed it was the 192nd, they gave the 192nd frequencies to use. Men sent messages home to their families.
With the arrival of the 192nd, the Provisional Tank Group was activated on November 27th. Besides the 194th, the tank group contained the 192nd. The 17th Ordnance Company joined the tank group on the 29th. Military documents written after the war show the tank group was scheduled to be composed of three light tank battalions and two medium tank battalions. The exact makeup of the First Tank Group in the US. Col. James R. N. Weaver who had been put in charge of the 192nd in San Francisco, was appointed head of the tank group and promoted to brigadier general. Major Theodore Wickord permanently became the commanding officer of the 192nd. It was at this time, men from both tank battalions and the 17th Ordnance Company were assigned to the tank group.
The 192nd was sent to the Philippines with a great deal of radio equipment. It had been given the job of setting up a radio school to train the radio operators for the Philippine Army. The battalion had a large number of ham radio operators and set up a communications tent that was in contact with the United States within hours after the battalion’s arrival. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When it was informed it was the 192nd, they gave the battalion frequencies to use. Men were able to send messages home to their families.
It is known that during this time the battalions went on at least two practice reconnaissance missions under the guidance of the 194th. They traveled to Baguio on one maneuver and to the Lingayen Gulf on the other maneuver. Gen. Weaver, the tank group commander, was able to get ammunition from the post’s ordnance department on the 30th, but the tank group could not get time at one of the firings ranges at the base.
The tanks also took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night was a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position below Watch Hill was among drums of 100-octane fuel and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield. The next day the tanks were ordered back to the airfield to guard against Japanese paratroopers after reconnaissance planes reported Japanese transports milling about in a large circle in the South China Sea. The 194th’s position was moved to an area between the two runways below Watch Hill. From this time on, two tank crew members remained with each tank at all times and were fed from food trucks. On December 1st, the two tank battalions were put on full alert and ordered to their positions at Clark Field. The 194th had the job to protect the northern half of the airfield from paratroopers while the 192nd guarded the southern half. Two crewmen remained with the tanks at all times and received their meals from food trucks. The airfield’s two runways were shaped like a “V” and the Army Air Corps’ hangers and headquarters were at the point of the “V”. The tankers slept in sleeping bags on the ground under their tanks or palm trees.
The battalion’s reconnaissance section was ordered to a rice paddy which was about a half-mile from the airfield. This was its assigned position in case the Japanese attempted to land troops in planes or use paratroopers to capture the airfield.
The battalion’s reconnaissance section was ordered to a rice paddy which was about a half-mile from the airfield. This was its assigned position in case the Japanese attempted to land troops or use paratroopers to capture the airfield.
Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, 192nd, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks and would have thrown them away in battle. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th. The next day Weaver visited every tank company of the tank group.
Although official reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were sent to the military command in the Philippines at 2:30 am, For the tankers, it was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th at 7:00 a.m. Gen. Weaver, Maj. Miller, Major Wickord, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance, read the messages of the attack. Miller left the tent and informed the officers of the 194th about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the members of the tank crews were ordered to their tanks which were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions at Clark Field.
Roy Diaz stated that at 4 am the C Company’s first sergeant entered their barracks and woke them up and told them that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and told them that the Japanese were on their way. He also stated the men got up and began loading machine gun belts. S/Sgt. Byron Veillette, A Co., ran through the 194th’s command area shouting that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Capt. Fred Moffitt gathered his men and told C Company that the US was at war. Many tankers didn’t believe the war had started since they expected to participate in maneuvers. Some men believed this was just the start of the maneuvers. The tank crew members, not with their tanks, were ordered to them. The battalion’s halftracks took up positions next to them. The reconnaissance detachment went to its position in the rice paddy. They watched P-40 fighters take to the air from the battalion’s positions. It was said that in every direction a man looked, American planes could be seen in the sky. The tankers got most of their news about the attack from listening to radio dispatches received on a big radio on what was the command half-track.
Maj. Ernest Miller told his officers that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Capt. Ed Burke went to A Company and told them that they were at war. The tanks crew members not with their tanks were ordered to them. The battalion’s half-tracks took up positions next to the tanks. Those men not assigned to a tank or half-track did their jobs in the battalion’s bivouac.
News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 a.m. All morning the sky above the airfield was filled with American planes. Men said no matter what direction they looked they saw planes. At 11:45 the American planes landed and were parked in a straight line – to make it easier for the ground crews to service them – outside the pilots’ mess hall. The men assigned to the tanks and half-tracks were receiving their lunches at food trucks. Gen. King put out a written order telling the unit commanders that the threat of being bombed was over and they could allow their men to return to the main base, in rotations, for rest, baths, and hot meals. It was lunchtime and members of the tank battalion not assigned to tanks were allowed to go to the mess hall to eat. Col. Miller ordered the men under his command to remain with their tanks and half-tracks.
Around 8:00 A.M., the planes of the Army Air Corps took off and filled the sky. At noon, the planes landed and were lined up – near the pilots’ mess hall – in a straight line to be refueled. While the planes were being serviced, the pilots went to lunch. The members of the tank crews received their lunches from the battalion’s food trucks. It was reported that only two of the seven radar sets in the Philippines were operational and the dispatches the operators sent to Manila of approaching planes took an hour to reach Manila. One 194th half-track crew tuned into a Manila radio station and heard a news flash that Clark Field was being bombed. At about 12:45 p.m. an amphibious plane landed on a runway near the tankers and after it came to a stop, its passengers and crew got and and ran to the opposite side of the airfield. About 11 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the company lived through the Japanese attack on Clark Field. (It should be noted that the attack on Pearl Harbor happened at 1:55 A.M. on December 8th in the Philippines, so the attack on Clark Field was almost 11 hours later.)
The tankers were eating lunch when planes approached the airfield from the north. At first, they thought the planes were American and counted 54 planes in formation. They then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. It was only when bombs began exploding on the runways that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers.
The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One tanker stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield.
After the attack, the soldiers watched as the dead, the dying, and the wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, trucks, and anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. When the hospital filled, they watched the medics place the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing.
The tankers were receiving lunch from their food trucks and as they stood in line to be fed they watched as 54 planes approached the airfield from the northwest. Men commented that the planes must be American Navy planes. That was until someone saw Red Dots on the wings and then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. Maj. Miller shouted at his men to take cover and then bombs began exploding on the runways. It was then that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers. One member of the 192nd, Robert Brooks, D Co., was killed during the attack and several tankers were wounded.
The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One member of the 192nd stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. The men on the tanks opened fire on the planes as they flew over. One new lieutenant chastised them for giving away their position even though the tanks were plainly visible from the air.
The Coast Artillery had trained with the latest anti-aircraft guns while in the States, but the decision was made to send them to the Philippines with older guns. They also had proximity fuses for the shells and had to use an obsolete method to cut the fuses since the unit’s fuse cutter was in Manila being repaired at the time of the attack. Many of the shells they fired fell to the ground without exploding.
The Zeros strafed the airfield and headed toward and turned around behind Mount Arayat and returned to strafe again. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. It was stated that the bodies of the dead lay on the runways since many were Air Corps ground crew members. It also appeared that everything was on fire from airplane hangers, automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. The runways of the airfield were pot-marked with craters from the bombs. The entire attack lasted about 45 minutes.
When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. The tankers watched as the dead, dying, and wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, on trucks, and in and on cars. Anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. Within an hour the hospital had reached its capacity. As the tankers watched the medics placed the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing. The battalion members set up cots under mango trees for the wounded and even the dentist gave medical aid to the wounded. The battalion’s medics gave first aid to the wounded.
After the attack, the tank crews spent much of the time loading bullets by hand from rifle cartridges into machine gun belts since they had gone through most of their ordnance during the attack. That night, since they did not have any foxholes, the men used an old latrine pit for cover since it was safer in the pit than in their barracks. The entire night they were bitten by mosquitoes. Without knowing it, they had slept their last night on a cot or bed, and from this point on, the men slept in blankets on the ground. One result of the attack was D Company was never transferred to the 194th and remained part of the 192nd throughout the Battle of Bataan.
The next day, those men not assigned to a tank or half-track walked around Clark Field to look at the damage. As they walked, they saw there were hundreds of dead. Some were pilots who had been caught asleep, because they had flown night missions, in their tents during the first attack. Others were pilots who had been killed attempting to get to their planes.
The men from both tank battalions recovered the 50 caliber machine guns from the planes that had been destroyed on the ground and got most of them to work. They propped up the wings of the damaged planes so they looked like the planes were operational hoping this would fool the Japanese to come over to destroy them. When the Japanese fighters returned, the tankers shot two planes down. After this, the planes never returned.
After the attack 194th was sent to a bivouac three kilometers north of Clark Field at Mabalacat. They spent their time loading ammunition belts because they had fired so much during the attack on Clark Field. The tankers were issued Infield and Springfield rifles. Since the rifles were from World War I, one out of every two worked. The tankers cannibalized two of the same type of rifles to get one working rifle.
On the night of the 12th, the battalion was ordered to bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. Attempting the 40-mile move, without lights, at night was a nightmare and one tank overturned when it went off the road. They finally arrived at their new bivouac at 6:00 A.M. on December 13th and spent the rest of the day and the next night there. The tanks were in an area of few trees surrounded by rice paddies, meaning the furthest they could go off the road was a few feet. Because of this, the battalion was scattered in three locations. Japanese planes flew over but did not bomb or strafe them.
The tankers bivouacked near the barrio of Muntinlupa. There they had the job of attempting to defend against any invading troops. The battalion’s six reconnaissance half-tracks and 40 men were supposed to defend against any landings at Batangas Bay, Tayabas Bay, and Balayan Bay. The battalion remained there from Dec. 14th to Dec. 24th. During this time the tankers spent much of their time on reconnaissance patrols hunting down Fifth Columnists who used flares at night and mirrors during the day near ammunition dumps. An order had been issued that no lights could be used at night. On one occasion, they saw someone signaling with a flashlight from a building. The tanks opened fire on the building. When they entered the building, there was no one in it, but they also had no more problems with fifth columnists.
The tanks spent the night at Tagatay Ridge. The tankers slept on the ground in sleeping bags. During the night they were awakened when the gasoline truck sent to fuel the tanks exploded and lit the area like it was day. Someone had placed gasoline cans on the batteries and one battery sparked and the can exploded. The next day they continued their trip south and had to cross bridges with ten-ton limits. The tanks were fourteen tons but the bridges held. It was also stated the battalion was sent to Batangas in southern Luzon. On the 15th, the battalion received 15 Bren gun carriers but turned some over to the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. These were manned by grounded Air Corps men and used to test the ground to see if it could support the weight of tanks.
On December 22nd, A Company and D Company, 192nd, were ordered to the Agno River near Carmen. C Company remained behind at Batangas. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. started the more than 150-mile movement north to meet the Japanese at an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. They soon discovered that without air cover it was unsafe to move during the day, so the tanks were moved at night to prevent them from being attacked by Japanese planes. It was stated that driving a tank at night was never safe, but something that a tank driver learned to do. One reason this was unsafe was that the tank crews never knew what lay ahead. George Chumley D Co., 192nd, stated that, “anyone who said he wasn’t afraid was lying,” and that they were always afraid. What happened is that the men became used to being afraid. When they got close to their objective, to protect the battalion from strafing, most of the battalion went to the left on Route 3 toward Tarlac and the river while A Company was sent down Route 5 toward Cabanatuan and San Jose and then along the river until it rejoined the rest of the battalion. When the tanks passed through the barrio of San Jose, they saw the dead bodies of Filipino men, women, and children who had mistaken Japanese Zeros for American planes. When they came out to wave at the planes, they were strafed.
When the battalion arrived at its destination near Lingayen Gulf, D Company’s tanks were near a ridge, so many of the tankers climbed to the top, where they found defending troops, ammunition, and guns. The soldiers were just sitting there watching the Japanese ships in the Gulf since they had received orders not to fire. The tankers walked down the ridge and waited until they received orders to drop back and let the Japanese occupy the ridge. They watched as the Japanese brought their equipment to the top of the ridge. The Americans finally received orders to launch a counterattack which failed.
It was on December 24th, that Miller was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. On that date, the tanks were sent to an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. on Christmas Eve started a 105-mile movement to meet the Japanese. The tanks were supported by two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible. Men stated that the US had asked them to hold out for six months. Later on the 24th, the battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. One platoon from A Co. had taken positions west of Carmen. When they began taking fire from a strong Japanese force, he ordered the tanks to open fire with their machine guns. It was at 3:00 P.M. on December 25th that the tankers engaged the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions with the tanks withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. Realizing that they had a very good chance of being cut off, the platoon’s commanding officer ordered his tanks to withdraw through Carmen the evening of December 26th.
The tank battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. The tanks were about five yards apart. It was on the 26th that the Japanese artillery fire began landing near the tanks. The Self-propelled mounts of the Filipino Scout would take positions between the tanks fire several rounds and move to another position. Shells began landing around the tanks, so the crews buttoned themselves in their tanks. The tanks did not have anti-personnel shells to use against infantry, but the tankers used the tanks’ 37-millimeter guns against armored vehicles and their machine guns against infantry. The fire stopped the Japanese advance for a while but the Japanese brought up more artillery and resumed the attack. It was at this time that Sgt. Herbert Stobel – who was standing in the turret of his tank – was killed when a shell exploded above his tank. The tanks fell back toward Bamban and then skirmished with the Japanese at Plaridel. At Calumpit, the tanks were involved in a full blown battle.
That day, the tank battalions were also given the job of holding the line against enemy armor and major thrusts until 5:00 A.M. on December 27th. Col. Ernest Miller – being the senior officer – was given authority to withdraw both tank battalions before 5:00 A.M. if he felt it was necessary. The tanks held the line but withdrew at 7:30 P.M. before the bridges they needed to cross were blown up at 11:30 P.M. that night.
Two volunteers were needed, on the 28th, to set up machine guns at the far end of the bridge to harass the Japanese. Pvt. Gerald Bell and Pvt. August Bender, who were assistant tank drivers, volunteered to take two antiaircraft machine guns from the tanks to the far end of the bridge and set up machine gun nests. It was stated that Bell and Bender held their position and died after being surrounded. The Japanese attempted to cross the river in several places. The tankers fired on them with their machine guns killing as many as 500 enemy troops and knocking out three tanks with the support of two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible.
The 192nd and part of the 194th fell back to form a new defensive line the night of December 27th. Arrangements had been made for the tanks to pick up their rations at Tarlac Depot. From there they fell back to the south bank of the BanBan River which they were supposed to hold for as long as possible. The tankers found their tanks being used as “mobile pillboxes.” The tanks were at Santo Tomas near Cabanatuan on December 28th and 29th serving as a rear guard against the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. The tankers held up the Japanese as long as possible before withdrawing. The 192nd received the order to withdraw and radioed the 194th, but for some unknown reason, the 194th tank commander whose tank had the long-wave radio did not forward the order to the other tanks of his battalion. The battalion finally was ordered to withdraw and 1st Lt. Harold Costigan informed the members of A Company, and D Company, 192nd, that they would have to fight their way out. The tanks fought their way through Carmen losing two tanks but saving the crews except for Capt. Edward Burke who had been hit by enemy fire. He was presumed dead but had been captured by the Japanese.
The tank battalions, on the 31st, were holding open two bridges at Calumpit so that the Southern Luzon forces could withdraw toward Bataan. It was noted that convoys of trucks would pass the tanks carrying absolutely nothing. It was then that Lt. Col. Miller sent out detachments of trucks to warehouses and had the men load them with ammunition, food, and high-octane fuel that was used by the tanks. It was stated that one detachment went all the way to Ft. Stotsenburg. The trucks returned carrying 6 tons of canned food and 12,000 gallons of fuel.
The 194th, at 2:00 am the morning of January 1st, crossed a bridge over the San Fernando River which was destroyed since all Filipino and American units had already crossed. They were now on the main road into Bataan. A defensive line was set up from Guagua to Porac to the swamps along Pampanga Bay. The bridge on a side road that ran from Guagua to Sexmoan and back onto Route 7 was destroyed. At 4:00 am, the battalion dug into new positions. They listened to Japanese troop movements and heard the sound of tanks. They watched five Japanese 89A medium tanks come into view in an open field. The tanks stopped because no reconnaissance had been done in the area. Within minutes, there were five destroyed Japanese tanks
That same day, conflicting orders were received by the defenders who were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5. Doing this would allow the Southern Luzon Forces, including the battalion’s C Company, to withdraw toward Bataan. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge, over the Pampanga River, about withdrawing from the bridge and half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a frenzied attack by the 192nd, the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon forces escaped. C Co., 194th, rejoined the rest of the 194th.
From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Co. 192nd, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having lost half of their troops.
The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. The tanks were stopped and the crews were sleeping when the tanks came under small arms fire. The crews returned fire. Next came mortar fire. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance.
That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.
The tank companies also were given the job of protecting the artillery. The guns were mobile and hooked onto the tanks with a special carriage which allowed them to be moved. According to the tankers, it took a lot of preparation to set them up and a lot of preparation to take them down. The tankers didn’t like doing this job because minutes after the guns began firing, the Japanese sent up reconnaissance planes to find the guns. When they did find the guns, Zeros would appear and strafe the area. The gun crews quickly learned to “shoot and scoot.” After firing a few rounds the guns were quickly broken down and moved out of the area.
On January 12th, Co. D, 192nd, and Co. C, 194th, were sent to Cadre Road in a forward position with little alert time. Land mines were planted on January 13th by ordnance to prevent the Japanese from reaching Cadre Road. C Co., 194th, was sent to Bagac to reopen the Moron Highway which had been cut by the Japanese on January 16th. At the junction of Trail 162 and the Moron Highway, the tanks were fired on by an anti-tank gun which was knocked out by the tanks. They cleared the roadblock with the support of infantry.
General Weaver also issued the following orders to the tank battalions around this time: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”
During this time, the tanks often found themselves dealing with officers who claimed they were the ranking officers in the area and that they could change the tank company’s orders. Most wanted the tanks to kill snipers or do some other job the infantry had not succeeded at doing. This situation continued until Gen Weaver gave a written order to every tank commander that if an officer attempted to change their orders, they should hand the officer the order. When the officer looked up at the tank commander, the tank commander had his handgun aimed at the officer. Gen Weaver had ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer attempting to change their orders. This ended the problem.
On January 20th, A Company was sent to save the command post of the 31st Infantry. On the 24th, they supported the troops along the Hacienda Road, but they could not reach the objective because of landmines that had been planted by ordnance. The battalion held a position a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road with four self-propelled mounts. At 9:45 A.M., a Filipino warned the tankers that a large force of Japanese was on their way. When they appeared the battalion and self-propelled mounts opened up with everything they had. The Japanese broke off the attack, at 10:30 A.M., after losing 500 of their 1200 men. It was also at this time that the Japanese ended the assault and waited for fresh troops to arrive.
The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks covered the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.
The tank battalions, on January 28th, were given the job of protecting the beaches. The Japanese later admitted that the tanks guarding the beaches prevented them from attempting landings. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.
One night, the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach guarded by B Co., 192nd. There was a tremendous firefight, but the next morning not one Japanese soldier landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that the tanks were the reason why they attempted no other landings. While doing this job, the member of B Co. also noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast of Bataan they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be at a certain place off the beach at a certain time and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when they arrived, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes.
The tanks were at the Abucay-Hacienda Line which on the east went from Manila Bay to the mountains in the center of Bataan and held by the 1st Corps. It then extended, on the west, from the mountains to the South China Sea and was held by the 2nd Corps. The mountains had no fortifications since it was believed they were impenetrable. The Japanese occupied them and were able to get the defenders to fire at their own men by setting off firecrackers between the units. Snipers were the biggest problem and the tanks often found themselves being ordered by an officer – who claimed to be the “immediate commander” because he was the highest-ranking officer in the area – to exterminate the problem. This situation got so bad that Gen Weaver gave each tank commander a written order that he handed to the officer. After reading it, the officer would look up at the tank commander who had his .45 pointed at the officer. Weaver’s order, ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer who attempted to change their orders.
Because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since the guns could not be aimed at the ground. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position.
Both battalions were sent to cover the junctions of the Back Road and East Road with the Abucay-Hacienda Road on January 25th. The defenders dropped back to the Pilar-Bagac Line which was a solid line from one side of Bataan to the other. To do this, the tanks held the old line and attempted to give the impression that a counter-attack was taking shape while the other troops withdrew. While holding the position, the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, fought its way to the position at 3:00 A.M. One platoon was sent to the front of the column of trucks that were loading the troops. The tanks provided heavy fire so that the infantry could withdraw and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. Later in the day, both the 192nd and 194th held a defensive line on the Balanga-Cardre-BaniBani Roads until the withdrawal was completed at midnight. They held the position until the night of January 26th, when they dropped back to a new defensive line roughly along the Pilar-Bagac Roads.
It was in the jungle that the tankers found out how inappropriate the M3 tanks were for use in the Philippines. Off the road, they had to travel with their turrets backward. If the tankers did not do this, the guns would get stuck in the jungle growth. The tanks were also restricted to the roads since they would get stuck in the mud of the rice fields. The high silhouettes and straight sides of the M3 also made the tanks easy targets for the Japanese.
The 194th’s tanks were ordered to withdraw. During the withdrawal, one of A Company’s platoon, under the command of 2nd Lt. Carroll Guin, had fallen behind another platoon and took the wrong turn where the roads came together as a “Y.” The road they went down went back to the front lines. The platoon was stopped by 1st Lt. Ted Spaulding who had seen them gone down the road, chased them down with his half-track, and then ran on foot to the lead tank stopping it about two miles from the front.
The tankers also found the engineers were ready to blow a bridge before the battalion had crossed it. Spaulding and 1st Lt. Charles Fleming ordered them to wait. Not long after this, the 194th under Lt. Col. Miller arrived and crossed. When it was believed all the vehicles had crossed, the engineers lit the fuses. Just then a half-track arrived carrying Capt. Fred Moffet began to cross the bridge when about halfway across he saw smoke. Moffet ordered his driver to back the half-track off the bridge which went up in an explosion seconds later. A board from the explosion hit Moffet and injured his leg.
According to a member of HQ Co., 194th, Gen. King spoke to the men and said, “I’m the man who surrendered you, men. It’s not your fault.” He also spoke to the members of the 17th Ordnance Company and B Company, 192nd, and told them something similar. King ordered them to surrender and threatened to court-martial anyone who didn’t. Gen. King with his two aides, Maj. Cothran and Captain Achille C. Tisdelle Jr. got into a jeep carrying a large white flag. They were followed by another jeep – also flying another large white flag – with Col. Collier and Maj. Hurt in it. As the jeeps made their way north they were strafed and small bombs were dropped by a Japanese plane. The drivers of both jeeps and the jeeps were provided by the tank group and both men managed to avoid the bullets. The strafing ended when a Japanese reconnaissance plane ordered the fighter pilot to stop strafing.
At about 10:00 a.m.the jeeps reached Lamao where they were received by a Japanese Major General who informed Gen. King that he reported his coming to negotiate a surrender and that an officer from the Japanese command would arrive to do the negotiations. The Japanese officer also told him that his troops would not attack for thirty minutes while King decided what he would do. No Japanese officer had arrived from their headquarters and the Japanese attack had resumed.
King sent Col. Collier and Maj. Hunt back to his command with instructions that any unit in the line of the Japanese advance should fly white flags. After this was done a Japanese colonel and interpreter arrived and King was told the officer was Homma’s Chief of Staff who had come to discuss King’s surrender. King attempted to get assurances from the Japanese that his men would be treated as prisoners of war, but the Japanese officer – through his interpreter – accused him of declining to surrender unconditionally. At one point King stated he had enough trucks and gasoline to carry his troops out of Bataan. He was told that the Japanese would handle the movement of the prisoners. The two men talked back and forth until the colonel said through the interpreter, “The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians.” King found no choice but to accept him at his word.
Unknown to Gen. King, an order attributed to Gen. Masaharu Homma – but in all likelihood from one of his subordinates – had been given. It stated, “Every troop which fought against our army on Bataan should be wiped out thoroughly, whether he surrendered or not, and any American captive who is unable to continue marching all the way to the concentration camp should be put to death in the area of 200 meters off the road.”
Col. Miller gathered the members of all the companies together and told them of the surrender. He stated that Gen. King surrendered because he wanted to prevent the needless slaughter of his men. He then instructed them to destroy their tanks and half-tracks. An officer from the finance department showed up and each man received about $15.00 in pesos as partial payment for the last four months, Men gamble it away while others made wisecracks about how they were going to spend it. The members of C Company, who had been fighting with the 192nd, managed to reach the battalion’s bivouac.
The 194th remained in its bivouac, at Kilometer 167.8, northeast of Mariveles, all day without seeing one Japanese soldier. That night the soldiers went to sleep and were still sleeping when the Japanese entered their bivouac. They were awakened with kicks from hobnailed boots and jabs from bayonets that communicated the message to form two columns. They were now Prisoners of War. It was noted that several of the Japanese had red faces as if they had fevers. When one Japanese soldier fell over, the others beat him until he got up and stood on his own. This was the first sign that being a Japanese Prisoner of War was not going to be a pleasant experience. As they stood there, the Japanese soldiers took their watches, rings, money, and anything else they wanted. They took the glasses from the men wearing them and smashed the lenses. A Japanese officer spoke to Bernie Fitzpatrick and another member of the company. He pretty much told them, “We will treat you as we treat our own. We can in honor do no less.”
Lt Col. Miller presented himself so the Japanese knew that he was the commanding officer. He removed his hat so that they would know who he was with it on or with it off. The men were ordered to assemble, in the jungle, about three blocks from their disabled tanks. The area was near a hospital in Mariveles. The battalion cooks were ordered to collect all the food from the men so that a final meal of the battalion could take place. The battalion remained in its bivouac all day without seeing one Japanese soldier. During this time, they divided up the food and money from the company’s treasury.
The battalion was ordered to move to the headquarters of the Provisional Tank Group, which was at kilometer marker 168.2. The company had already destroyed all its tanks and vehicles except for one half-track that men rode to the Tank Group Headquarters. Two of the soldier’s clothes were soaked in gasoline so they could use the clothing to burn the half-track. When they arrived at tank group headquarters they had just missed breakfast which was the best one any of the tankers had had in months. The cooks at the HQ were able to give the members of the company a can of food and a can of condensed milk. With a guard escorting them, the men were allowed to get water from a well that was down a hill. When the Japanese realized that they were not a threat, they allowed the prisoners to go to the well unescorted. The Japanese ordered them to remain where they were the rest of the day and they went to sleep along the side of a road. The next day they woke to the sound of Japanese artillery firing at Corregidor. The island had not surrendered. From the battalion’s officers, an older Japanese general attempted to find out where the water line to Corregidor was located. The water line did not exist, but the Japanese believed that it did and that they could get the island to surrender by cutting off its water.
At some point, they were ordered to form 100 men detachments. Miller stated in his book that the battalion started the march at Limay. Other men in his unit stated that when they formed ranks, the Japanese had them march toward Mariveles and that they ran into other detachments of POWs heading in the opposite direction. They then were ordered to reverse their march and ended up where they started. They were ordered to fall out alongside the road until they were ordered to form ranks and were marched about six miles north to Cabcaben Airfield. At a bull pen they were stopped for the night.
The Japanese woke them early the next morning, counted the POWs, and put them in detachments of 100 men. Once the detachments had formed, they were marched north toward Lamao. The first Japanese guards were combat veterans, allowed the column frequent rests since many were sick. It was believed that this happened because they viewed the POWs as combat veterans too. The POWs had started what they simply called “the march” or “the hike.” The first guards were combat veterans who saw the POWs as combat veterans and treated them that way. When they had a rest in Lamao, at noon, they were allowed to rest and look for food. While they were doing this, the Japanese changed guards. It was in this barrio that anyone with the rank of major, or higher, was separated from the enlisted men. Once this was done, these officers were driven, in trucks, to Orani, where they were put in a bullpen on April 12th. They could smell the enclosure before they got to it. Once inside of it, they were ordered to sit. They had no idea that they were sitting in human waste. In the corner of the enclosure was a trench for the POWs to use as a washroom. It was at this barrio that the lower-ranking officers and enlisted men would be reunited with the high-ranking officers.
At 6:30 in the evening, the POWs were ordered to form detachments of 100 men. Once this was done, they resumed the trip north, but this time they were marched at a faster pace and were given very few breaks. The new guards were not combat-harden troops, and they also expected the POWs to move at a faster pace and did not care about their physical condition. The guards were assigned a certain distance to cover and wanted to finish it as fast as possible so they moved the POWs at a fast pace which was hard for the POWs in worse shape. If a man fell the guards did not want to stop the column so they shot or bayoneted the man. When the guards finished their assigned part of the march, the POWs were allowed to rest, but when the new guards took over, they also wanted to finish their part of the march as fast as possible, so the POWs once again were moved at a fast pace. When they did receive a break, they had to sit in the road until they were ordered to move.
The Japanese provided no water to the POWs. Since it was dark, men were able to fill their canteen cups at artesian wells since the guards could not see them. At a small barrio, Filipinos appeared with buckets of water for the POWs. The Filipinos were gone by the time the guards arrived to see what was going on among the POWs. The POWs were left in the compound for the day, and there was no cover from the sun that beat down on them. The Japanese gave enough water to the men to wet their tongues. The POWs did not know it, but they were receiving the sun treatment. Some men went out of their heads and drifted into comas. At 6:30 in the evening, the POWs were ordered to form detachments of 100 men. Once this was done, they resumed the trip north, but this time they were marched at a faster pace and were given very few breaks. When they received a break, they had to sit on the road but they could not lie down. If they tried to lie down, they were jabbed with bayonets. When they were ordered to move, they made their way through Orion and Pilar. At various times they were rested so that the guards could be changed.
The Japanese did not feed them, but they also did not stop the Filipinos who were standing along the sides of the road giving out food to them. The problem again was that there were POWs who broke ranks and ran ahead of other POWs to get the food. Since the Japanese wanted the POWs in columns of four men, they soon stopped the Filipinos from giving food to the POWs. The Japanese had tired of reorganizing the POWs into columns and began to shoot POWs to make the point they were to remain in columns. It was stated that they saw few bodies when they began the march, but the bodies became more common as they got further north.
As the POWs got closer to Lamao, they heard Japanese artillery firing on Corregidor which had not surrendered. The Japanese were sending equipment down the road, so the POWs were forced to the sides so the trucks could pass. As the trucks passed, Japanese soldiers would attempt to hit the POWs in their heads with their rifle butts. The POWs marched north toward Lamao through an area that had recently been shelled and bombed. As they made their way north, more POWs joined the march from the side trails. The closer they got to Lamao, they could hear the Japanese artillery firing on Corregidor. The men were pushed off the road whenever trucks pulling artillery or carrying troops needed to past through them. The Japanese intentionally set up their guns in Hospital #2 t use the sick and wounded as a human shield. During one salvo, a hospital ward was hit killing patients. The POWs are the march had to run past the Japanese artillery as American shells landed around them. An A Co. 194th officer. It was at this time, that 2nd Lt. Ray Bradford was hit by shrapnel and killed. He was buried next to an A Co., 192nd Officer, 1st Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield who had collapsed and died after running past the Japanese artillery. The POWs reached Lamao about noon and the men were able to get water from an artesian well near them without the guards noticing.
The POWs reached Lamao around noon. They again were pushed to the sides of the road so trucks could pass. The Japanese did not notice, but the POWs were near an artesian well and many of the POWs were able to fill their canteens without being seen. They also noticed that because of recent shelling that the jungle had been stripped clean. The POWs were marched north toward Limay. The POWs who had not gotten water drank from the filthy water in the ditches along the road. Most of these men died of dysentery at Camp O’Donnell. Around dusk the POWs reached Limay and were put in a large field. They were not fed, but they were able to lie down and sleep.
The tankers reached Limay late in the day and saw what how the shelling had destroyed the jungle near the road. The POWs were also joined by more men who were joining the main column from trails. It was during this time that men so thirsty drank filthy water from ditches along the roads. Many of these men later developed dysentery and died in Camp O’Donnell. The POWs were taken to a field for the night.
The Japanese ordered them to remain where they were the rest of the day and they went to sleep along the side of a road. The next day they woke to the sound of Japanese artillery firing at Corregidor. The island had not surrendered. From the battalion’s officers, an older Japanese general attempted to find out where the water line to Corregidor was located. The water line did not exist, but the Japanese believed that it did and that they could get the island to surrender by cutting off its water.
At 7:00 P.M., the POWs were ordered to go out on the road near their bivouac. The POWs were ordered out to a road where the Japanese who had no interpreters beat and clubbed the Prisoners of War until they formed ranks. As they stood on the road, a shell from Corregidor hit the barn where they had spent the night. They were put into detachments of 100 men with four men in each row and marched about one kilometer when they were stopped. The Japanese then began searching the POWs. The first thing they had the POWs do was to show their hands. The GI tank wristwatch he was wearing was easily seen. A guard noticed the ring on one man’s hand and asked, “Wife-oo” and the man nodded yes, and the guards moved on to the next POW. They went from man to man taking rings and watches. If a POW attempted to argue for the ring, the guards simply took their bayonets and cut the man’s finger off. A Japanese officer arrived and shouted at the guards who stopped searching the POWs. The POWs had started what they simply called “the hike” or “the march.” The POWs marched for three or four kilometers toward Cabcaben and then turned around and marched back to where they started. They were ordered to sit along the sides of the road.
Late in the afternoon they were ordered to from ranks and marched about over six miles to Cabcaben Airfield. At the airfield they were put into a bull pen with the guards patrolling. It was nearly dusk and more and more detachments of POWs kept arriving. The POWs were given enough space to lie down for the night. The POWs slept closely together because it was cold at night. The next morning the Japanese woke them and had them form ranks. As they made their way north toward the Lamao area of Bataan. They were joined by other POWs coming from side roads and trails. The Japanese had sent out detachments looking for stragglers. There were many more Filipino POWs than Americans and the two groups mixed. The road was hard to walk on because of the holes from the shelling and bombings. There was also destroyed equipment on it and the bodies of the dead. The POWs were moved to the side of the road whenever a Japanese convoy came by heading south. The Japanese soldiers tried to hit the POWs in their heads with their rifle butts as they passed them.
When they started the march, the guards were combat veterans who viewed the POWs as combat veterans. Some men stated that the guards, at first, did not stop them from getting water if they had canteens. When the guards were changed the abuse started. The new guards were not combat veterans. It was only as time went on this was stopped and men were bayoneted or shot attempting to get water. This happened because the POWs broke ranks to run to the artesian wells and the Japanese wanted them to remain in columns.
The guards were assigned a certain distance to cover and wanted to finish it as fast as possible so they moved the POWs at a faster pace which was hard for the POWs in worse shape. If a man fell, the guards did not want to stop the column so they shot or bayoneted the man. When the guards finished their assigned part of the march, the POWs were allowed to rest, but when the new guards took over, they also wanted to finish their part of the march as fast as possible, so the POWs once again were moved at a fast pace.
According to the available information. Robert was last seen somewhere near Lubao on the company’s way to San Fernando on April 12, 1942. He may have been bayoneted on the march or escaped into the jungle and fought as a guerrilla. What is known is that he was never heard of again.
In May, his parents received a message from the War Department.
Dear Mrs. G. Doerck:
According to War Department records, you have been designated as the emergency addressee of Private Robert E. Doerck, 39, 156, 689, who, according to the latest information available, was serving in the Philippine Islands at the time of the final surrender.
I deeply regret that it is impossible for me to give you more information than is contained in this letter. In the last days before the surrender of Bataan, there were casualties which were not reported to the War Department. Conceivably the same is true of the surrender of Corregidor and possibly other islands of the Philippines. The Japanese Government has indicated its intention of conforming to the terms of the Geneva Convention with respect to the interchange of information regarding prisoners of war. At some future date, this Government will receive through Geneva a list of persons who have been taken prisoners of war. Until that time the War Department cannot give you positive information.
The War Department will consider the persons serving in the Philippine Islands as “missing in action” from the date of surrender of Corregidor, May 7, 1942, until definite information to the contrary is received. It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government will communicate a list of prisoners of war at an early date. At that time you will be notified by this office in the event that his name is contained in the list of prisoners of war. In the case of persons known to have been present in the Philippines and who are not reported to be prisoners of war by the Japanese Government, the War Department will continue to carry them as “missing in action” in the absence of information to the contrary, until twelve months have expired. At the expiration of twelve months and in the absence of other information the War Department is authorized to make a final determination.
Recent legislation makes provision to continue the pay and allowances of persons carried in a “missing” status for a period not to exceed twelve months; to continue, for the duration of the war, the pay and allowances of persons known to have been captured by the enemy; to continue allotments made by missing personnel for a period of twelve months and allotments or increase allotments made by persons by the enemy during the time they are so held; to make new allotments or increase allotments to certain dependents defined in Public Law 490, 77th Congress. The latter dependents generally include the legal wife, dependent children under twenty-one years of age, and dependent mother, or such dependents as having been designated in official records. Eligible dependents who can establish a need for financial assistance and are eligible to receive this assistance the amount allotted will be deducted from pay which would otherwise accrue to the credit of the missing individual.
Very Truly yours
(signed)
J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General
In May 1944, the War Department was required to send out a mass mailing to families who had not received any information about their relatives.
Dear Mrs. G. Doerck:
The records of the War Department show your son, Private Robert E. Doerck, 39,156,689, Infantry, missing in action in the Philippine Islands since May 7, 1942.
All available information concerning your son has been carefully considered and under the provisions of Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, an official determination has been made continuing him on the records of the War Department in a missing status. The law cited provides that pay and allowances are to be credited to the missing person’s account and payment of allotments to authorized allottees are to be continued during the absence of such persons in a missing status.
I fully appreciate your concern and deep interest. You will, without further request on your part, receive immediate notification of any change in your son’s status. I regret that the far-flung operations of the present war, the ebb and flow of the combat over the great distances in isolated areas, and the characteristics of our enemies impose on us the heavy burden of uncertainty with respect to the safety of our loved ones.
Very Truly yours
(signed)
J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General
I may of 1944, his mother received another letter from the War Department. Two letters were sent out. One letter informed the family that their relative was being declared dead. The second letter stated the relative’s status of MIA was being continued. It is not known which letter his family received. Since Robert is considered missing in action, his name appears on the Walls of the Missing at the American Military Cemetery in Manila.
It should be mentioned that Robert’s brother, Richard, also died in World War II.
The Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency considers the recovery of Pvt. Robert E. Doerck’s remains as active and is looking for relatives for DNA.
