2nd Lt. John Henry Allen was born on June 28, 1917, in Minnesota to John H. Allen Sr. and Rose Bollman-Allen, and had a brother. The family resided at 343 Washington Avenue, Saint Paul, Minnesota. It appears his mother died in 1930 and his father also may have died in the 1930s. He attended Central High School and graduated in 1935. He attended the University of Minnesota and took part in ROTC. After graduating, it appears he was inducted into the Regular Army and named his brother as his contact person.
The National Guardsmen who were 29 years old or older, married with dependents, who had other dependents, or whose enlistments in the National Guard would end while the 192nd was overseas were allowed to resign from federal service. Many of these men were replaced by men from the 753rd Tank Battalion, but other men who joined the 192nd came from the 32nd Armor Regiment stationed at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. John may have joined the battalion from the 32nd Armor Regiment as a replacement for an officer.
On the island, they were given physicals by the battalion’s medical detachment. Men found to have minor health issues were held back and scheduled to rejoin the battalion at a later date. Other men were simply replaced with men who had been sent to the island as replacements, and he may have joined the 192nd on the island as a replacement. It is known that the 757th Tank Battalion was at Ft. Ord, California, and that men from the battalion joined the 192nd to replace men who failed their final physicals. It was also at this time that Col. James R. N. Weaver became the commanding officer of the 192nd.
When they arrived at Guam on Sunday, November 16th, the ships took on water, bananas, coconuts, and vegetables. Although they were not allowed off the ship, the soldiers were able to mail letters home before sailing for Manila the next day. At one point, the ships passed an island at night and did so in total blackout. This for many of the soldiers was a sign that they were being sent into harm’s way. The blackout was strictly enforced and men caught smoking on deck after dark spent time in the ship’s brig. Three days after leaving Guam the men spotted the first islands of the Philippines. The ships sailed around the south end of Luzon and then north up the west coast of Luzon toward Manila Bay.
The ships entered Manila Bay, at 8:00 A.M., on Thursday, November 20th, and docked at Pier 7 later that morning. One thing that was different about their arrival was that instead of a band and a welcoming committee waiting at the pier to tell them to enjoy their stay in the Philippines and see as much of the island as they could, a party came aboard the ship – carrying guns – and told the soldiers, “Draw your firearms immediately; we’re under alert. We expect a war with Japan at any moment. Your destination is Fort Stotsenburg, Clark Field.” At 3:00 P.M., as the enlisted men left the ship, a Marine was checking off their names. When an enlisted man said his name, the Marine responded with, “Hello sucker.” Those who drove trucks drove them to the fort, while the maintenance section remained behind at the pier to unload the tanks. Some men stated they rode a train to Ft. Stotsenberg while other men stated they rode busses to the base.
The day started at 5:15 with reveille and anyone who washed near a faucet with running water was considered lucky. At 6:00 A.M. they ate breakfast followed by work – on their tanks and other equipment – from 7:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. Lunch was from 11:30 A.M. to 1:30 P.M. when the soldiers returned to work until 2:30 P.M. The shorter afternoon work period was based on the belief that it was too hot to work in the climate. The term “recreation in the motor pool,” meant they worked until 4:30 in the afternoon.
During this time, the battalion members spent much of their time getting the cosmoline out of the barrels of the tanks’ guns. Since they only had one reamer to clean the tank barrels, many of the main guns were cleaned with a burlap rag attached to a pole and soaked in aviation fuel. It was stated that they probably only got one reamer because Army ordnance didn’t believe they would ever use their main guns in combat. The tank crews never fired their tanks’ main guns until after the war had started, and not one man knew how to adjust the sights on the tanks. The battalion also lost four of its peeps, later called jeeps, used for reconnaissance to the command of the United States Armed Forces Far East also known as USAFFE.
Before they went into the nearest barrio which was two or three miles away, all the newly arrived troops were assembled for a lecture by the post’s senior chaplain. It was said that he put the fear of God and gonorrhea into them.
It is known that during this time the battalion went on at least two practice reconnaissance missions under the guidance of the 194th. It traveled to Baguio on one maneuver and to the Lingayen Gulf on the other maneuver. Gen. Weaver, the tank group commander, was able to get ammunition from the post’s ordnance department on the 30th, but the tank group could not get time at one of the firing ranges.
At Ft. Stotsenburg, the soldiers were expected to wear their dress uniforms. Since working on the tanks was a dirty job, the battalion members wore coveralls to work on the tanks. The 192nd followed the example of the 194th Tank Battalion and wore coveralls in their barracks area to do work on their tanks, but if the soldiers left the battalion’s area, they wore dress uniforms – which were a heavy material and uncomfortable to wear in the heat – everywhere; including going to the PX.
For recreation, the soldiers spent their free time bowling or going to the movies on the base. They also played horseshoes, softball, and badminton, or threw footballs around during their free time. On Wednesday afternoons, they went swimming. Passes were given out and men were allowed to go to Manila in small groups.
When the general warning of a possible Japanese attack was sent to overseas commands on November 27th, the Philippine command did not receive it. The reason why this happened is not known and several reasons for this can be given. It is known that the tanks took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night would be a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position was among drums of 100-octane gas, and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield and the bombs were haphazardly placed. On December 1st, the tankers were ordered to the perimeter of Clark Field to guard against Japanese paratroopers. From this time on, two tank crew members remained with each tank at all times and were fed from food trucks.
On Monday, December 1st, the tanks were ordered to the perimeter of Clark Field to guard against paratroopers. The 194th guarded the northern end of the airfield, while the 192nd guarded the southern end where the two runways came together and formed a V. Two members of every tank crew remained with their tanks at all times, and meals were brought to them by food trucks. On Sunday, December 7th, the tankers spent a great deal of the day loading bullets into machine gun belts and putting live shells for the tanks’ main guns into the tanks.
Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. When Poweleit suggested they dig air raid shelters – since their bivouac was so near the airfield – the other officers laughed. He ordered his medics to dig shelters near the tents of the companies they were with and at the medical detachment’s headquarters. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th.
It was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn – at 2 a.m. – of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th. Major Ted Wickord, Gen. James Weaver, and Major Ernest Miller, 194th, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance read the messages of the attack. At one point, even Gen. King came to the tent to read the messages. The officers of the 192nd were called to the tent and informed of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The 192nd’s company commanders were called to the tent and told of the Japanese attack.
Most of the tankers heard about the attack on Pearl Harbor at roll call that morning. Some men believed that it was the start of the maneuvers they were expecting to take part in. They were also informed that their barracks were almost ready and that they would be moving into them shortly. News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 a.m.
Capt. Fred Bruni called the company together and told them of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Most of the men laughed and thought that this was just the start of the maneuvers they were expecting. He told them to listen up and that this was not a joke. Having been in the Philippines for eighteen days, they believed that this was the start of the extended maneuvers. Bruni told them to listen to him because what he was saying was the truth. He again told them that Pearl Harbor had been bombed. HQ Company remained behind in the battalion’s bivouac and they were given guns and told to clean them. As they did this, they still believed that they had started maneuvers.
On Monday, December 1st, the tanks were ordered to the perimeter of Clark Field to guard against paratroopers. The 194th guarded the northern end of the airfield, while the 192nd guarded the southern end where the two runways came together and formed a V. Two members of every tank crew remained with their tanks at all times, and meals were brought to them by food trucks. On Sunday, December 7th, the tankers spent a great deal of the day loading bullets into machine gun belts and putting live shells for the tanks’ main guns into the tanks.
Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. When Poweleit suggested they dig air raid shelters – since their bivouac was so near the airfield – the other officers laughed. He ordered his medics to dig shelters near the tents of the companies they were with and at the medical detachment’s headquarters. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th.
It was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn – at 2 a.m. – of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th. Major Ted Wickord, Gen. James Weaver, and Major Ernest Miller, 194th, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance read the messages of the attack. At one point, even Gen. King came to the tent to read the messages. The officers of the 192nd were called to the tent and informed of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The 192nd’s company commanders were called to the tent and told of the Japanese attack.
Most of the tankers heard about the attack on Pearl Harbor at roll call that morning. Some men believed that it was the start of the maneuvers they were expecting to take part in. They were also informed that their barracks were almost ready and that they would be moving into them shortly. News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 a.m.
The tanks were stationed on both sides of the Calumpit Bridge, on December 31st and January 1st. keeping the bridge open for the Southern Luzon forces. The defenders were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5 which would allow the Southern Luzon Forces to withdraw into Bataan. Platoons from B and C Company saw movement in the distance and opened fire. They later learned that they had knocked out five Japanese tanks. It was while doing this job that the defenders received orders to withdraw. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge over the Pampanga River with half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a fierce attack by the 192nd Tank Battalion the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon Forces crossed the bridge.
From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Company, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th Tank Battalion. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having suffered 50 percent casualties.
It was at this time the tank battalions received these orders which came from Gen. Weaver: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”
The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance. That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.
The next day, the battalions were between Culo and Hermosa and assigned a road to enter Bataan which was worse than having no road. The half-tracks kept throwing their rubber tracks and members of the 17th Ordnance Company assigned to each battalion had to re-track them in dangerous situations. The battalion’s tanks had shore duty from Abucay to Lamao on the east side of Bataan. The area took most of the Japanese artillery fire, bombings, and strafing. Self-propelled mounts were assigned to the tank group and each needed a driver so tank drivers were reassigned to the SPMs. The SPMs had a crew of an American driver, a Filipino Scout sergeant who commanded the SPM, and a gun crew from the Philippine Army. The tank drivers were replaced by other members of the battalion who could drive tanks. The tank battalions also received 15 Bren-gun carriers each which were driven by members of the Army Air Corps who reassigned themselves to the tank battalions. Other self-attached Army-Air Corps personnel repaired engines, welded, and served in tank crews. The battalion’s medics were scattered among the companies providing aid. The battalion dropped back to Kilometer 142 on the 12th and did not stay long. When kitchen trucks arrived, the little food they had was divided up among the men.
During this time, the members of HQ Company drove fuel and supply trucks keeping the tanks supplied. It was not unusual for them to find themselves behind enemy lines since the line had moved since they received their orders. Those trained as tank mechanics kept the tanks running often making the repairs on the front line, while other men repaired electric systems on the tanks.
On January 12th, Co. D, 192nd, and Co. C, 194th, were sent to Cadre Road in a forward position with little alert time. Land mines were planted on January 13th by ordnance to prevent the Japanese from reaching Cadre Road. C Co., 194th, was sent to Bagac to reopen the Moron Highway which had been cut by the Japanese on January 16th. At the junction of Trail 162 and the Moron Highway, the tanks were fired on by an anti-tank gun which was knocked out by the tanks. They cleared the roadblock with the support of infantry.
Around this time, drivers were needed for the Self-Propelled Mounts, and tank drivers were reassigned to the SPMs. The SPMs had a crew of an American driver, a Filipino Scout sergeant who commanded the SPM, and a gun crew from the Philippine Army. The drivers were replaced by other members of the battalions who could drive tanks.
The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks were given the job of covering the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.
It was in the jungle that the tankers found out how inappropriate the M3 tanks were for use in the Philippines. Off the road, they had to travel with their turrets backward. If the tankers did not do this, the guns would get stuck in the jungle growth. The tanks were also restricted to the roads since they would get stuck in the mud of the rice fields. The high silhouettes and straight sides of the M3 also made the tanks easy targets for the Japanese.
Companies A and C were ordered to the west coast of Bataan while B Company – which was held in reserve – and 17th Ordnance held the southern shore of Bataan. During the night, they were kept busy with repeated threats both on and offshore. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.
The battalions were sent to cover the junctions of the Back Road and East Road with the Abucay-Hacienda Road on January 25th. While holding the position, the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, fought its way to the position at 3:00 A.M. One platoon was sent to the front of the column of trucks that were loading the troops. The tanks provided heavy fire so that the infantry could withdraw and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. Later in the day, both the 192nd and 194th held a defensive line on the Bakanga-Cardre-BaniBani Roads until the withdrawal was completed at midnight. They held the position until the night of January 26th, when they dropped back to a new defensive line roughly along the Pilar-Bagac Roads. When ordered to withdraw to the new line, the 192nd found that the bridge at Balanga, that they were supposed to use had been destroyed by enemy fire. To withdraw, they had to use secondary roads to get around the barrio. The tanks held their position for six hours after they were supposed to have withdrawn which prevented the Japanese from overrunning the defenders. On the morning of January 27th, a new battle line had been formed and all units were supposed to be beyond it but tanks were still straggling in at noon.
The tank companies also were given the job of protecting the artillery. The guns were mobile and hooked onto the tanks with a special carriage which allowed them to be moved. According to the tankers, it took a lot of preparation to set them up and a lot of preparation to take them down. The tankers didn’t like doing this job because minutes after the guns began firing, the Japanese sent up reconnaissance planes to find the guns. When they did, Zeros would appear and strafe the area. The gun crews quickly learned to “shoot and scoot.” After firing a few rounds the guns were quickly broken down and moved out of the area.
On January 28th, the tank battalions were given beach duty with the 194th assigned the coast from Limay to Cacaben. The half-tracks were used to patrol the roads. The Japanese attempted several landings on Bataan. One night while on this duty, the B Company, engaged the Japanese in a firefight as they attempted to land troops on the beach. When morning came, not one Japanese soldier had successfully landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that their presence on the beach stopped them from attempting landings.
During this time, the members of HQ Company had the jobs of keeping the tanks running, supplying them with food and ammunition, and recovering disabled tanks and other vehicles. It was noted that tank barrels that were damaged were cut down so they could be used. The members of the company often found themselves behind enemy lines since the defensive line was very fluid.
The battalions took on the job of guarding the airfields in Bataan in February which had been constructed because of the belief that aid would be coming by air. Throughout the Battle of Bataan, men held the belief that aid would arrive. The Japanese bombed the airfields during the day and at night the engineers would repair them. 50-gallon drums were placed around the airfields to mark the runways, and at night fires could be lit in them to outline the landing strip. The well-camouflaged tanks surrounded the airfield and had several plans on how they would defend the airfields from paratroopers.
While guarding the beach the members of B Company noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be off the beach one morning and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when the Zeros attacked, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes.
One result of doing this job was that it was discovered that the tanks’ suspension systems froze up after being exposed to salt water. With the 17th Ordnance Company, HQ company figured out a way to fix the systems and keep the tanks running. The information on the suspension systems freezing up was sent to Washington and resulted in new suspension systems being installed on all tracked vehicles.
The tankers stated that because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since they could not be aimed at the ground as the Japanese got close to the tanks. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position. The tanks were at Orion on the 19th and at Kilometer 147 on the 20th. That night the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach, but the tanks opened fire on them stopping the landing. The tankers and 17th Ordnance worked all day on the 23rd replacing tracks on the tanks.
As to prove how dark it was under the jungle canopy, the B and C Companies had bivouacked for the night, when, at 3:00 a.m., according to Pvt. Herbert Kirchhoff, all hell broke loose. “We thought we were being shelled (by the Japanese) It sounded like the end of the world.” As it turned out, the shells that were landing around them were from American artillery. A Japanese convoy had bivouacked for the night about 100 yards from the tank companies.
After being up all night on the morning of February 3rd, the tankers of B Company attempted to get some sleep. Every morning “Recon Joe” flew over attempting to locate the tanks. The jungle canopy hid the tanks from the plane. A sergeant became aggravated about being woken up, pulled his half-track onto the beach, took a “pot shot” at the plane, and missed. Twenty minutes later, Japanese planes appeared and bombed the position. Most of the soldiers took cover under the tanks. When the attack was over, the tankers found two men dead, one man was wounded, and another was severely wounded with his leg partially blown off. The tankers attempted to put him in a jeep, but his leg kept flopping and got in the way. To get him into the jeep, his leg was cut off but he died from his wounds.
The tankers took on the job of guarding the airfields on their own. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces. The Japanese bombed the airfields during the day and at night the engineers would repair them. 50-gallon drums were placed around the airfields to mark the runways, and at night fires could be lit in them to outline the landing strip.
It was said that because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since the guns could not be aimed at the ground. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position.
During this time, the tanks often found themselves dealing with officers who claimed they were the ranking officers in the area and that they could change the tank company’s orders. Most wanted the tanks to kill snipers or do some other job the infantry had not succeeded at doing. This situation continued until Gen Weaver gave a written order to every tank commander that if an officer attempted to change their orders, they should hand the officer the order. When the officer looked up at the tank commander, the tank commander had his handgun aimed at the officer. Gen Weeaver had ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer attempting to change their orders. This ended the problem.
The tanks took part in the Battle of the Points on the west coast of Bataan. The Japanese landed troops but ended up trapped. When they attempted to land reinforcements, they landed in the wrong place. One was the Lapay-Longoskawayan points from January 23rd to 29th, the Quinauan-Aglaloma points from January 22nd to February 8th, and the Sililam-Anyasan points from January 27th to February 13th. The Japanese had been stopped, but the decision was made by Brigadier General Clinton A. Pierce that tanks were needed to support the 45th Infantry Philippine Scouts, so he requested tanks from the Provisional Tank Group.
On February 2nd, a platoon of C Co. 192nd tanks was ordered to Quinauan Point where the Japanese had landed troops. The tanks arrived at about 5:15 P.M. He did a quick reconnaissance of the area, and after meeting with the commanding infantry officer, decided to drive tanks into the edge of the Japanese position and spray the area with machine-gun fire. The progress was slow but steady until a Japanese .37 milometer gun was spotted in front of the lead tank, and the tanks withdrew. It turned out that the gun had been disabled by mortar fire, but the tanks did not know this at the time.
The decision was made to resume the attack the next morning, so the 45th Infantry dug in for the night. The next day, the tank platoon did reconnaissance before pulling into the front line. They repeated the maneuver and sprayed the area with machine gunfire. As they moved forward, members of the 45th Infantry followed the tanks. The troops made progress all day long along the left side of the line. The major problem the tanks had to deal with was tree stumps which they had to avoid so they would not get hung up on them. The stumps also made it hard for the tanks to maneuver. Coordinating the attack with the infantry was difficult, so the decision was made to bring in a radio car so that the tanks and infantry could talk with each other.
At Agaloloma Point, C Company lost one tank, on February 2nd, that had gone beyond the area controlled by the defenders. The tank was disabled by a thermite mine. It appeared that the crew – Sgt. Elmer Smith, Pvt. Vernor Deck, Pvt. Sidney Rattner, and Pvt. Robert Young – was killed by hand grenades thrown into the tank as they attempted to evacuate it. When the tank was recovered, the battalion’s maintenance section removed the bodies which was a gruesome job. The bodies were so badly mangled that the only way to identify them was by matching personal possessions and clothing to the bodies. One man appeared to have been alive when the Japanese began to fill the tank with dirt from the foxhole they dug under it since a handgun with a spent bullet casing was found in the tank. The tank was put back into service.
Only 3 of 23 tanks were being used and without the support of infantry and the trick during the attack through the jungle was to avoid large trees and clear a way for the infantry to attack. This they did by thrusting into the jungle. They only became aware of enemy positions when they were fired on. The tanks were supposed to have support from mortars but the ammunition was believed to be defective. It was found that the mortars were manned by inexperienced air corpsmen converted to infantry who had no idea that the arming pins on the mortar shells had to be pulled before firing them so the shells landed and did not explode.
On February 4th, at 8:30 A.M. five tanks and the radio car arrived. The tanks were assigned the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, so each tank commander knew which tank was receiving an order. Each tank also received a walkie-talkie, as well as a radio car and infantry commanders. This was done so that the crews could coordinate the attack with the infantry and so that the tanks could be ordered to where they were needed. The Japanese were pushed back almost to the cliffs when the attack was halted for the night. The attack resumed the next morning and the Japanese were pushed to the cliff line where they hid below the edge of the cliff out of view. It was at that time that the tanks were released to return to the 192nd.
At the same time the Battle of the Points was taking place, platoons of tanks from B and C Companies were involved in the Battle of the Pockets from January 23rd to February 17th. The Japanese launched a major offensive which was stopped and pushed back to the original battleline. Two pockets of Japanese Marines were trapped behind the defensive line.
To exterminate the Japanese, two methods were used. The first was to have three Filipino soldiers ride on the back of the tank. As the tank went over a Japanese foxhole, the Filipinos dropped three hand grenades into the foxhole. Since the grenades were from WWI, one out of three usually exploded. The other method used to kill the Japanese was to park a tank with one track over the foxhole. The driver gave the other track power resulting in the tank going around in a circle and grinding its way down into the foxhole. The tankers slept upwind of their tanks so they would not smell the rotting flesh in the tracks.
The Japanese sent soldiers, with cans of gasoline, against the tanks who attempted to jump onto the tanks, pour gasoline into the vents on the back of the tanks, and set the tanks on fire. If the tankers could not machine gun the Japanese before they got to a tank, the other tanks would shoot them as they stood on the tank. The tankers did not like to do this because of what the bullets hitting the hull of the tank did to the crew inside the tank. When the bullets hit the tank, its rivets would pop and wound the men inside the tank. Since the stress on the crews was tremendous, the tanks rotated into the pocket one at a time. A tank entered the pocket and the next tank waited for the tank that had been relieved to exit the pocket before it would enter. This was repeated until all the tanks in the pocket were relieved.
While this was going on, General Masahara Homma – the Japanese commanding officer on Luzon – stated that the Americans were slowly being beaten back, but he also complained that the Americans could predict and defend against every Japanese plan of attack.
At the same time as the Battle of the Points, the battalion took part in what became known as the Battle of the Pockets. The Japanese had launched an offensive at the same time that troops were landing on the points. The advance was stopped and pushed back to the original defensive line. Two pockets of Japanese troops were left trapped behind the main defensive line. What made this job of eliminating the Japanese so hard was that they had dug “spider holes” among the roots of the trees. Because of this situation, the Americans could not get a good shot at the Japanese. Since the stress on the crews was tremendous, the tanks rotated into the pocket one at a time. A tank entered the pocket and the next tank waited for the tank that had been relieved to exit the pocket before it would enter. This was repeated until all the tanks in the pocket were relieved.
It appears two methods were used to eliminate the foxholes. One method was to have three Filipino soldiers on the back of the tank. Each man had a sack full of hand grenades. When the tank went over the foxhole, the men each dropped a grenade into it. Since the hand grenades were World War I munitions, one of the three grenades usually exploded. It was stated that the tanks would also park with one track over the foxhole and then the driver would only give power to one track. This resulted in the tank going in a circle grinding the unpowered track to dig its way down into the earth. The tankers stated they slept upwind of their tanks.
During the Battle of Toul Pocket, Cpl. Jack Bruce, A Co., was hit by enemy fire and an attempt was made to rescue him. On February 12th. during this recovery attempt, Sgt. John Hopple, HQ Co, was wounded by a sniper as he, Sgt. Owen Sandmire, A Co., and two other members of the battalion attempted to rescue Bruce. The four men crawled out to Bruce, while under fire, put him on the litter, and returned him to American lines. Three of the four rescuers were wounded. Sandmire drove Hopple and the others who had been wounded to the field hospital. To do this he drove down the west coast of Bataan, through Mariveles, and back up the east coast to the field hospital. Because of the tropical climate, infections set in quickly. Hopple succumbed to his wounds later in the day on February 18th at Hospital #1, Little Baguio, on Bataan. Bruce survived but later died as a Prisoner of War.
One of the greatest dangers facing the tankers at this time was snipers. The snipers would tie themselves onto trees and sit in them among the branches for days. One sniper had been taking shots at the tankers for days. After the sniper took a shot the men would attempt to determine what tree the sniper was in a particular tree. They would then begin firing on the lower branches of the tree where they believed the sniper attached to the trunk. As they fired they worked his way up the tree with their gunfire.
The tank crews were assigned guard duty. Their job was to prevent Japanese infiltrators. The tankers set up roadblocks along gravel roads and stopped and searched everyone coming down the road. The tankers anyone coming down the road to halt and if the person didn’t they opened fire. The tanks also became a favorite target of the Japanese receiving fire on trails and while hidden in the jungle. and could not fight back. The situation was so bad that other troops avoided being near the tanks. In one case, the 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company’s offer of assistance in a counter-attack.
The reality was that the same illnesses that were taking their toll on the Bataan defenders were also taking their toll on the Japanese. American newspapers wrote about the lull in the fighting and the building of defenses against the expected assault that most likely would take place. The soldiers on Bataan also knew that an assault was coming, they just didn’t know when it would take place. The newspapers in the U.S. wrote about the lull in Bataan and the preparations for the expected offensive.
Having brought in combat-harden troops from Singapore, the Japanese launched a major offensive on April 3rd supported by artillery and aircraft. The artillery barrage started at 10 AM and lasted until noon and each shell seemed to be followed by another that exploded on top of the previous shell. At the same time, wave after wave of Japanese bombers hit the same area dropping incendiary bombs that set the jungle on fire. The defenders had to choose between staying in their foxholes and being burned to death or seeking safety somewhere else. As the fire approached their foxholes those men who chose to attempt to flee were torn to pieces by shrapnel. It was said that arms, legs, and other body parts hung from tree branches. A large section of the defensive line at Mount Samat was wiped out. The next day a large force of Japanese troops came over Mt. Samat and descended the south face of the volcano. This attack wiped out two divisions of defenders and left a large area of the defensive line open to the Japanese.
A Co. was attached to the 194th Tank Battalion and was on beach duty with A Co., 194th. When the breakthrough came, the two tank companies were directly in the path of the advance. When the Japanese attempted to land troops, their smoke screen blew into their troops causing them to withdraw.
On April 7th, the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, supported by tanks, attempted to restore the line, but Japanese infiltrators prevented this from happening. During this action, one tank was knocked out but the remaining tanks successfully withdrew. C Company, 194th, which was attached to the 192nd, had only seven tanks left. The Japanese attacked the line held by American troops on April 8th. It was said that the Japanese made what the Americans called “A Bridge of Death” where the Japanese threw themselves on the barbed wire until there were enough bodies on it so the following troops could walk over it. The defenders were not only defending against a frontal attack, but they also were defending against attacks on their flanks and rear.
It was the evening of April 8th that Gen. King decided that further resistance was futile, since approximately 25% of his men were healthy enough to fight, and he estimated they would last one more day. In addition, he had over 6,000 troops who were sick or wounded and 40,000 civilians who he feared would be massacred. His troops were on one-quarter rations, and even at that ration, he had two days of food left. He also believed his troops could fight for one more day. Companies B and D, 192nd, and A Company, 194th, were preparing for a suicide attack on the Japanese in an attempt to stop the advance. At 6:00 P.M. tank battalion commanders received this order: “You will make plans, to be communicated to company commanders only, and be prepared to destroy within one hour after receipt by radio, or other means, of the word ‘CRASH’, all tanks and combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, gas, and radios: reserving sufficient trucks to close to rear echelons as soon as accomplished.”
That evening, Capt. Donald Hanes, HQ’s commanding officer, gave his men the news of the surrender. While informing the members of the company of the surrender, he waved his arm toward the tanks and told the men that they would no longer need them. He told the sergeants what they should do to disable the tanks. He emphasized that they all were to surrender together and that they should destroy their weapons and any supplies that could be used by the Japanese. The soldiers disabled their guns, piled up the ammunition, and set the pile on fire. The only thing they were told not to destroy was the company’s trucks.
It was at 10:00 P.M. that the decision was made to send a jeep – under a white flag – behind enemy lines to negotiate terms of surrender. The problem soon became that no white cloth could be found. Phil Parish, a truck driver for A Company realized that he had bedding buried in the back of his truck and searched for it. The bedding became the “white flags” that were flown on the jeeps. At 11:40 P.M., the ammunition dumps were destroyed.
At midnight Companies B and D, and A Company, 194th, received an order from Gen. Weaver to stand down. At 2:oo A.M. April 9th, Gen. King sent a jeep under a white flag carrying Colonel Everett C. Williams, Col. James V. Collier, and Major Marshall Hurt to meet with the Japanese commander about terms of surrender. (The driver was from the tank group.) Shortly after daylight Collier and Hunt returned with word of the appointment. It was at about 6:45 A.M. that tank battalion commanders received the order “crash.” As Gen. King left to negotiate the surrender, he went through the area held by B Company and the 17th Ordnance Company and spoke to the men. He said to them, “Boys. I’m going to get us the best deal I can. When you get home, don’t ever let anyone say to you; you surrendered. I was the one who surrendered.” Gen. King with his two aides, Maj. Wade R. Cothran and Captain Achille C. Tisdelle Jr. got into a jeep carrying a large white flag. Another jeep followed them – also flying another large white flag – with Col. Collier and Maj. Hurt in it. As the jeeps made their way north, they were strafed and small bombs were dropped by a Japanese plane. The drivers of both jeeps managed to avoid the bullets and while POWs would receive Silver Stars. The strafing ended when a Japanese reconnaissance plane ordered the fighter pilot to stop strafing.
At about 10:00 A.M. the jeeps reached Lamao where they were received by a Japanese Major General who informed Gen. King that he reported his coming to negotiate a surrender and that an officer from the Japanese command would arrive to do the negotiations. The Japanese officer also told him that his troops would not attack for thirty minutes while King decided what he would do. No Japanese officer had arrived from their headquarters and the Japanese attack had resumed.
King sent Col. Collier and Maj. Hunt back to his command with instructions that any unit in the line of the Japanese advance should fly white flags. After this was done a Japanese colonel and interpreter arrived and King was told the officer was Homma’s Chief of Staff who had come to discuss King’s surrender. King attempted to get assurances from the Japanese that his men would be treated as prisoners of war, but the Japanese officer – through his interpreter – accused him of declining to surrender unconditionally. At one point King stated he had enough trucks and gasoline to carry his troops out of Bataan. He was told that the Japanese would handle the movement of the prisoners. The two men talked back and forth until the colonel said through the interpreter, “The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians.” King found no choice but to accept him at his word.
Unknown to Gen. King, an order attributed to Gen. Masaharu Homma – but in all likelihood from one of his subordinates – had been given. It stated, “Every troop which fought against our army on Bataan should be wiped out thoroughly, whether he surrendered or not, and any American captive who is unable to continue marching all the way to the concentration camp should be put to death in the area of 200 meters off the road.”
On April 9, 1942, the company became Prisoners of War when Bataan was surrendered. It was at this time they heard a rumor that had they held out three more days, reinforcements would have arrived. Within half an hour of hearing this, every member of the company had a working gun even though all weapons supposedly had been destroyed. The company remained in their encampment for three days before the Japanese arrived. The members of the company had their 45s on them with one bullet in the chamber. If the Japanese were going to kill them, they planned on killing themselves. While they were waiting for the Japanese to arrive a horse from the 26th Cavalry came walking into their bivouac which was next another the bivouac of another company of the 192nd. The men ate as much horse meat as they were able to eat.
The Japanese finally arrived and they were now Prisoners of War. A Japanese officer ordered the company members, with their possessions, out onto the road that ran in front of their encampment. Once on the road, the soldiers were ordered to kneel along the sides of the road with their possessions in front of them. As they knelt, the Japanese soldiers, who were passing them, went through their possessions and took whatever they wanted from the Americans. They remained along the sides of the road for hours.
The first Japanese soldiers the POWs dealt with were combat veterans. These soldiers looked upon the POWs as also being combat veterans and treated them fairly well. It was only after they were replaced with Japanese soldiers who had not been in combat that the real abuse of the POWs started.
Arrangements had been made between the tank group and the Japanese to allow the tank companies to ride trucks to Mariveles. HQ Company boarded their trucks and drove to Mariveles. From there, they walked to Mariveles Airfield and sat and waited. As they sat and watched, the POWs noticed a line of Japanese soldiers forming across from them. They soon realized that this was a firing squad and the Japanese were going to kill them. As they sat there watching and waiting to see what the Japanese intended to do, a Japanese Naval officer. in a white uniform, pulled up in front of the soldiers in a car. He got out and spoke to the sergeant in charge of the detail. The officer got back in the car and drove off. While he was driving away, the sergeant ordered the soldiers to lower their guns.
All the POWs knew was that they were being moved north. They had no idea of how long this would take place or where they were going. One Japanese officer had said to them before they started the march, “This will separate the men from the boys.” Later in the day, the men were ordered to form detachments of 100 men and then ordered to move. They had no idea that they had started what they simply called, “the march.” Most of the men had dysentery, some malaria, and others were simply weak from hunger. The first five miles were uphill which was hard on the sick men. It was made harder by the Japanese guards who were assigned a certain distance to march – five or six miles – and made the POWs move at a faster pace so that they could complete their distance as fast as possible. Those who could not keep up and fell were bayoneted. When the guards were replaced, the POWs again found themselves moving at a fast pace because they also wanted to complete their assigned portion of the march as fast as possible. At one point they ran past Japanese artillery that was firing at Corregidor with Corregidor returning fire. Shells began landing among the POWs who had no place to hide and some of the POWs were killed by incoming shells. Corregidor did destroy three of the four guns.
The heat on the march was intolerable, and those who begged for water were beaten by the guards with their rifle butts because they had asked. Those who were exhausted or suffering from dysentery and dropped to the side of the road were shot or clubbed to death. Food on the march was minimal when it was given to the prisoners, each would receive a pint of boiled rice. The Filipino people seeing the condition of the prisoners attempted to aid them by passing food to the Americans. If the Filipinos were caught doing this, they were beheaded. The further north they marched the more bloated dead bodies they saw. The ditches along the road were filled with water, but many also had dead bodies in them. The POWs’ thirst got so bad they drank the water. Many men would later die from dysentery.
Members of the company stated that the Japanese marched them in the morning and then marched them into a rice paddy and had them get together as close as possible. They were then ordered to sit, but since they were so close together, all they could do was squat. The Japanese left the POWs in the paddy in the sun. They had no hats to cover their heads because they had been taken away from them. When it was decided it was time to move on there were a good number of POWs who didn’t get up because they had died.
During the march, the Americans were seldom allowed to stop. Men stated that they were not fed until the fifth day or sixth day, but that they weren’t sure which it was since the days blurred together. Those who stopped or dropped out were bayoneted. For the men, hearing other men who had fallen to the ground begging for help and not being able to stop to help them was one of the hardest things they experienced on the march. The POWs who continued to march and those who had fallen both knew that to do so meant death for both men.
The lack of food and water was also a major issue for the POWs. Water cost many POWs their lives. The POWs were amazed by the courage of the Filipino people who openly defied the Japanese by giving food and water to the POWs. It was said that every 200 or 300 yards were artesian wells, but the POWs were not allowed to drink from them. As men became more desperate, they would run to the wells only to find that the Japanese had sent advance teams ahead who shot or bayoneted those attempting to get water from them. The further north they marched the more bloated dead bodies they saw. The ditches along the road were filled with water, but many also had dead bodies in them. The POWs’ thirst got so bad they drank the water and many of these men would later die from dysentery.
The column of POWs was often stopped and pushed off the road and made to sit in the sun for hours. While they sat there, the guards would shake them down and take any possession they had that the guards liked. When they were ordered to move again, it was not unusual for the Japanese to ride past them in trucks and entertain themselves by swinging at the POWs with their guns or with bamboo poles.
When they were north of Hermosa, the POWs reached the pavement which made the march easier. They received an hour break, but any POW who attempted to lay down was jabbed with a bayonet. After the break, they marched through Layac and Lubao. At this time, a heavy shower took place and many of the men opened their mouths to get water. The guards allowed the POWs to lie on the road. The rain revived many of the POWs and gave them the strength to complete the march.
The Japanese finally acknowledged that they had to do something, so they opened a new camp at Cabanatuan. Only the POWs who were considered too ill to be moved remained in Camp O’Donnell and most of those men died.
In May, his brother received a letter from the War Department
“Dear Mr. C. Allen:
“According to War Department records, you have been designated as the emergency addressee of Second Lieutenant John H. Allen Jr., O,890,115, who, according to the latest information available, was serving in the Philippine Islands at the time of the final surrender.
“I deeply regret that it is impossible for me to give you more information than is contained in this letter. In the last days before the surrender of Bataan, there were casualties which were not reported to the War Department. Conceivably the same is true of the surrender of Corregidor and possibly other islands of the Philippines. The Japanese Government has indicated its intention of conforming to the terms of the Geneva Convention with respect to the interchange of information regarding prisoners of war. At some future date, this Government will receive through Geneva a list of persons who have been taken prisoners of war. Until that time the War Department cannot give you positive information.
“The War Department will consider the persons serving in the Philippine Islands as “missing in action” from the date of surrender of Corregidor, May 7, 1942, until definite information to the contrary is received. It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government will communicate a list of prisoners of war at an early date. At that time you will be notified by this office in the event that his name is contained in the list of prisoners of war. In the case of persons known to have been present in the Philippines and who are not reported to be prisoners of war by the Japanese Government, the War Department will continue to carry them as “missing in action” in the absence of information to the contrary, until twelve months have expired. At the expiration of twelve months and in the absence of other information the War Department is authorized to make a final determination.
“Recent legislation makes provision to continue the pay and allowances of persons carried in a “missing” status for a period not to exceed twelve months; to continue, for the duration of the war, the pay and allowances of persons known to have been captured by the enemy; to continue allotments made by missing personnel for a period of twelve months and allotments or increase allotments made by persons by the enemy during the time they are so held; to make new allotments or increase allotments to certain dependents defined in Public Law 490, 77th Congress. The latter dependents generally include the legal wife, dependent children under twenty-one years of age, and dependent mother, or such dependents as having been designated in official records. Eligible dependents who can establish a need for financial assistance and are eligible to receive this assistance the amount allotted will be deducted from pay which would otherwise accrue to the credit of the missing individual.
“Very Truly yours
J. A. Ulio (signed)
Major General
The Adjutant General”
From September to December, the Japanese issued numbers to the POWs. The first men to receive numbers were those being sent to Manchuria on October 8th on the Tottori Maru. It was during this time that John became POW 1-03913. This was his POW number as long as he remained in the Philippines. Records kept by the POW medical staff show that they requested that John and four other POWs be allowed to be admitted to the hospital side of the camp on October 7th. It is not known if the request was honored.
The Japanese announced to the POWs in the camp that on October 14th the daily food ration for each POW would be 550 grams of rice, 100 grams of meat, 330 grams of vegetables, 20 grams of fat, 20 grams of sugar, 15 grams of salt, and 1 gram of tea. In reality, the POWs noted that the meals were wet rice and rice coffee for breakfast, Pechi green soup and rice for lunch, and Mongo bean soup, Carabao meat, and rice for dinner.
The work day started an hour before dawn when the POWs were awakened. They then lined up and bongo (roll call) was taken. The POWs quickly learned to count off quickly in Japanese because the POWs who were slow to respond were hit with a heavy rod. A half-hour before dawn was breakfast, and at dawn, they went to work. Those working on details near the camp returned to the camp for lunch, a tin of rice, at 11:30 AM and then returned to work. The typical workday lasted 10 hours.
The POWs were organized in groups on November 11th. Group I was made up of all the enlisted men who had been captured on Bataan. Group II was the POWs who had come from Camp 3, and Group III was composed of all Naval and Marine personnel from both Camps 1 and 3 and any civilians in the camp. It was also at this time that an attempt was made to stop the spread of disease. The POWs dug deep drainage ditches, and sump holes for only water, and the garbage began to be buried, and the grass in the camp was cut. Fr. Antonio Bruddenbruck, a German Catholic priest, came to the camp – assisted by Mrs. Escoda – with packages from friends and relatives in Manila on November 12th. There was also medicine and books for the POWs.
One hundred POWs worked on Sunday, November 15th digging latrines and sump holes. Since Sunday was a day off, Lt. Col. Curtis Beecher, USMC, made sure each man received 5 cigarettes. On November 16th, Pvt. Peter Laniauskas was shot trying to escape. Two other POWs were tried by the Japanese for being involved in the escape attempt. One man received 20 days in solitary confinement and the other 30 days. Pvt. Donald K. Russell, on November 20th, was caught trying to reenter the camp at 12:30 A.M. He had left the camp at 8:30 P.M. and secured a bag of canned food by claiming he was a guerrilla. He was executed in the camp cemetery at 12;30 P.M. on November 21st. The Japanese gave out a large amount of old clothing – that came from Manila – to the POWs on November 22nd. On November 23rd, the Japanese wanted to start a farm and needed 750 POWs to do the initial work on it. It was noted that there were only 603 POWs healthy enough to work.
Two POWs in December attempted to escape and were caught. They were tied to the gate of the camp hospital and left there for the day. Each time a guard passed the men, they picked up a stick and beat them. The Japanese were going to shoot them at 4:00 pm that day, but an American doctor, Lt. Col. Craig, convinced the Japanese not to shoot them. The two men were put in the guard house for six months. Fr. Bruddenbrucke returned on December 10th without proper authorization from the authorities in Manila so he was turned away. He had brought a truckload of medicine and food for the POWs. It was estimated by the POWs that he spent $300.00 for fuel to make the trip. A POW Pvt. Art Self was beaten so badly on December 12th, that he died. Fr. Bruddenbrucke returned on December 24th with two truckloads of presents for the men and a gift bag for each. This time he was allowed into the camp. The next day, Christmas, the POWs received 2½ Red Cross boxes. In each box was milk in some form, corn beef, fish, stew beef, sugar, meat and vegetable, tea, and chocolate. The POWs also received bulk corn beef, sugar, meat and vegetables, stew, raisins, dried fruit, and cocoa which they believed would last them three months. The POWs also were given four days off from work.
His brother learned he was a Prisoner of War in December 1942, and his name was officially released on a list of men known to be POWs by the War Department on January 27, 1943.
“REPORT JUST RECEIVED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS STATES THAT YOUR BROTHER SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN H ALLEN IS A PRISONER OF WAR OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS LETTER OF INFORMATION FOLLOWS FROM THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL=
“ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL=”
Within days of receiving the first message, they received a second message:
“The Provost Marshal General directs me to inform you that you may communicate with your brother, postage free, by following the inclosed instructions:
“It is suggested that you address him as follows:
“2nd Lt. John H. Allen, U.S. Army
Interned in the Philippine Islands
C/O Japanese Red Cross, Tokyo, Japan
Via New York, New York
“Packages cannot be sent to the Orient at this time. When transportation facilities are available a package permit will be issued you.
“Further information will be forwarded you as soon as it is received.
“Sincerely
Howard F. Bresee
Colonel, CMP
Chief Information Bureau”
Each month on the eighth, the Japanese read the Japanese declaration of war on the United States to the POWs. This usually got them wound up and the POWs knew that the number of beatings they received would increase. On January 11th, the POWs watched and heard the explosions as Japanese dive bombers bombed and strafed something about 30 kilometers away. They later heard a barrio was attacked killing 102 men, women, and children and wounding 60. On the 13th, the commissary supplies ended. According to the Japanese, this was because guerrillas had burned down half of Cabanatuan which included the warehouse where the supplies were stored. The Japanese issued toilet kits to the POWs on January 14th that had to be shared by four POWs. On January 18th, the same area was bombed again by the Japanese. The Japanese issued Red Cross Boxes to the POWs on January 24th which had to be shared by two POWs. Twelve hundred POWs left the camp on a work detail on January 27th.
The Japanese installed a radio in the hospital so the POWs could hear their version of the war. During February they heard that the Russians were driving the Germans from Russia but Japan would continue to fight on its own. They also heard the Allies were winning the European War and that there had been a battle in the Marshall Islands between the Japanese and Americans.
Multiple work details left the camp each day and returned each evening. Some details were small while others had 1,255 to 1,450 POWs on them. Men who worked near the camp came back at about 11:30 AM for a tin of rice and then returned to work again to finish out a 10-hour day. After they had supper, there wasn’t much for the POWs to do. The Red Cross had sent books, but the Japanese censors took them away a few days after they arrived. The POWs received Christmas telegrams on February 7th. The POWs watched the Marx Brothers’ movie “Room Service” on the 11th and many Japanese propaganda news clips. It was recorded on February 12th that there had not been a death in the camp in eight days. Three POWs died the next day. The Japanese also ordered that the POWs turn in all radios to them, but it is not known if they received any. POWs who did not have blankets were issued blankets by the Japanese on February 22nd. A program was started by the POWs to stop the spread of dysentery. For every full milk can of flies, the POWs turned in, they received cigarettes in return. It was noted that on March 3rd, 12 million flies had been turned in and 320 rats had been turned in.
Another POW, Conley, escaped from the garden detail on July 11, 1943, and was captured in a barrio. At about 11:00 PM, there was a lot of noise in the camp. The next morning, at the camp morgue, POWs described what they saw. Conley’s jaw had been crushed as was the top of his skull, his teeth had all been knocked out with a rifle butt, his left leg had been crushed, and he had been bayoneted in the eyes and scrotum.
Also in July, the names of 500 POWs were posted on the list of POWs being sent to Bilibid Prison. On July 22nd, the POWs were issued new shoes, a suit of “Philippine Blues” and were 2 cans of corn beef, and 3 cans of milk. They were informed they would be taking a 21-day trip. On July 15th, 25 to 30 trucks arrived at the camp to transport POWs to Manila. The trucks with the POWs left at 8:00 P.M. and arrived at Bilibid Prison at 2:00 A.M. The only food the POWs received was rotten sweet potatoes. As it turned out, when they arrived in Manila, they were used in The Dawn of Freedom, a Japanese propaganda film, to show how cruel the Americans were to the Filipinos. After this, they were sent to Japan on the Clyde Maru.
The POWs boarded the Clyde Maru which sailed on July 23rd and arrived at Santa Cruz, Zambales, Philippine Islands, the same day. While anchored there, it was loaded with manganese ore. The ship sailed again on July 26th. During this part of the voyage, 100 POWs, at a time, were allowed on deck from 6:00 A.M. to 4:00 p.m. The ship arrived at Takao, Formosa, on July 28th and remained in the port until August 5 at 8:00 A.M., as part of a nine-ship convoy that arrived at Moji, Japan, on August 7. unlike many other ships, its trip was relatively quick.
The POWs disembarked on August 8th and lined up on the dock. From there they marched to the train station and boarded a train that departed at 9:30 A.M. for a two-day train trip arriving at Omuta, Kyushu, Japan. From there, they marched 18 miles but those who were too sick rode in a truck.
Fukuoka 17 was near a slag and rock pile and was located between the villages of Futase and Iizuka and approximately 50 miles south of Moji and 45 miles to the east of Fukuoka. The camp was 200 yards square when it opened on August 7, 1943, but was expanded to 200 yards wide and 1,000 yards long. The camp was surrounded by a 12-foot wooden fence that had three heavy gauge electrified wires attached to it. The first wire was attached at six feet with the others higher up. The buildings had been used by miners before the mine had been closed as being unsafe. Life at Fukuoka #17 was hard and some prisoners would steal from other prisoners. It was said that the Americans had the worst discipline. To prevent this from happening, the POWs would “buddy up” with each other. While one man was working in the mine, the POW who was not working would watch the possessions of the other man.
Life at Fukuoka #17 was hard and there were prisoners who would steal from other prisoners. It was said that the Americans had the worst discipline. To prevent stealing, the POWs would “buddy up” with each other. While one man was working in the mine, the POW who was not working would watch the possessions of the other man. The camp was considered the worst camp in Japan to be held as a POW and was called so by the POW Recovery Team after the war.
The POWs lived in 33 one-story barracks 120 feet long and 16 feet wide and divided into ten rooms. Officers slept four men in a room while enlisted men slept from four to six men in a room. Each room was lit by a 15-watt bulb, and at the end of each building was a latrine with three stools and a urinal. The POWs slept on beds that were 5′ 8″ long by 2½’ wide. Each POW received three heavy blankets made of tissue paper, scrap rags, and scrap cotton, and a comforter made of tissue paper and cotton batting covered with a cotton pad. At the end of each of the barracks were three stools raised about 1½’ on a hollow brick pedestal that was covered with removable wood seats made by the POWs to reduce the fly problem. There was also a urinal. Concrete tanks were under each stool which were cleaned by Japanese laborers twice a week. The POWs dug air raid shelters that we 6 feet deep 8 feet wide, and 120 feet long. They were covered with timbers covered with 3 feet of slag.
The meals served to the POWs were cooked in the camp kitchen which was manned by 15 POWs. Seven of the POWs were professional cooks. The kitchen had 11 cauldrons, 2 electric baking ovens, 2 kitchen ranges, 4 storerooms, and an icebox. As they entered the mess hall, they would say their POW number to a POW standing by a wooden board. He would take a nail and place it in the hole in front of the man’s number. After all the POWs had been fed, the board was cleared for the next meal. A meal consisted of rice and vegetable soup three times a day. Those POWs working in the mine received 700 grams a day, while camp workers received 450 grams a day. Officers, since they were not required to work, received 300 grams a day. Those working in the mine received three buns every second day since they did not return to camp for lunch. The kitchen was under the command of Lieutenant Commander Edward N. Little, U.S.N., whom the other POWs viewed as a collaborator and put through a court-martial after the war by the Navy and acquitted.
To supplement their diets, the prisoners also ate dog meat, radishes, potato greens, and seaweed. As they entered the mess hall, they would say their POW number to a POW standing by a wooden board. He would take a nail and place it in the hole in front of the man’s number. After all the POWs had been fed, the board was cleared for the next meal. POWs traded their food rations for cigarettes and were referred to as “future corpses.” The situation got so bad that the Japanese finally stepped in and stopped it.
There were also bathing rooms in the camp with two bathing tanks that were 30 feet long, 10 feet wide, and 4 feet deep. The tubs were heated with very hot water. The POWs working in the mine bathed during the winter after cleaning themselves before entering the tubs. They did not bathe during the summer months to prevent skin diseases. After bathing, the men would dress and go to bed for the night. Many filled their canteens with hot water and placed it under their covers. There were also outside wash racks at each barracks. Each had 16 cold water faucets and 16 wooden tubs with drainboards. The POWs used these to wash their clothes, but there was always a shortage of soap.
The camp hospital was a building of ten rooms that could each hold 30 men. There was an isolation ward for 15 POWs usually men suffering from tuberculosis. The POW doctors had little to no medicines or medical supplies to treat the ill. Dental treatment consisted of removing teeth without anesthesia. It is known that 76 POWs died in the camp hospital. In addition, the sick were forced to work. The Japanese camp doctor allowed the sick, who could walk, to be sent into the mine. He also took the Red Cross medical supplies meant for the POWs for his own use and failed to provide adequate medical treatment. Surgery in the camp was performed with scissors and a razor. The POWs who died in the camp died because of the cold and malnutrition. It was said that most of those who died, died because they were starved to death.
The Red Cross boxes sent to the camp were misappropriated by the Japanese. When they arrived, they were locked in a storeroom. They were later issued 3 to 7 months after they arrived. The Japanese intentionally mixed up the contents so the POWs had no idea what had been taken from the boxes. The food in boxes was given out in small quantities so that it had no nutritional value. The POWs who worked in the mine received larger quantities in their boxes instead of the sick who really needed it. The Japanese misappropriated and ate the food and made the POWs watch them eat it.
Corporal punishment was an everyday occurrence at the camp. The guards beat the POWs with fists, clubs, and sandals for the slightest reason and continued until the POW was unconscious. If they didn’t like the way a POW looked at them, the guards beat him. The man was then taken to the guardhouse and put in solitary confinement without food or water for a long period of time. POWs with red hair received worse treatment than other POWs. POWs who failed to bow or salute had to stand in front of the guardhouse for hours. During the winter, the POWs were made to stand at attention and had water thrown on them as they stood in the cold, or they were forced to kneel on bamboo poles. It is known that the POWs were also made to stand in water and shocked with electrical current. At some point in 1945, two POWs were tied to a post and left to die. This was done because they had violated a camp rule. It was stated that one POW was found to have tomatoes hidden in his bunk and was taken outside and beaten. He was then put in the guardhouse where he was beaten every night.
The Japanese interpreter in the camp refused to perform his duties resulting in the POWs receiving beatings because they could not explain the situation. He also would inform the guards of any alleged violations of camp rules which resulted in the POWs being severely beaten. This happened frequently at the mine with the interpreter usually the person responsible. He also, for no reason, slapped and beat the POWs. He was known to hit POWs with a rubber belt. The POWs at the mine were frequently beaten by the civilian workers because of the actions of the interpreter. He also forced POWs who had been injured and assigned to light work at the mine to lift heavy material with their injured arms.
The camp kitchen was under the command of Lieutenant Commander Edward N. Little, U.S.N., whom the other POWs viewed as a collaborator. He was also the highest-ranking American officer in the camp, at the time, and was known to have reported POWs for stealing food which resulted in the POWs being beaten and thrown into the guardhouse. Little turned Pvt. James G. Pavlokos over to the Japanese. Pavlokos was known to be unruly. He had received two bowls of rice from a Japanese soldier and sold one to another POW. According to the POWs, Little knew that turning Pavlokos in meant certain death. He was put in the guardhouse and received rice and water for his meals. The POWs tried to throw him food, but the Japanese saw them and stopped them. He remained there from December 23, 1943, until January 28, 1944, when he died of starvation. Some accounts state he died after being in the stockade for 38 days or longer.
Pvt. Noah Heard, C Company, 194th Tank Battalion, was confined to the guardhouse for stealing food and being caught for the third time. He escaped on May 30, 1944, sometime around midnight. Post-war documents state Heard had escaped six times from the camp. Other documents state that he had been caught stealing five or six times before and was confined to the guardhouse for three or four days each time. Heard escaped and was caught during the night in a latrine. 1st Lt. Kei Yuri ordered that Heard be beaten and he was beaten with fists, clubs, and rifles. On Wednesday, May 31, 1944, Lt. John H. Allen and Lt. Owen W. Romaine were called to the commandant’s office. Lt. Kel Yuri stated he would execute Heard because the Japanese Field Regulation of the Army allowed it and that Heard had signed a document stating he should be killed if he stole again. He told the American officers what he was going to do. The camp interpreter later stated that Yuri said he was going to, “Get rid of him” because Yuri considered him incurable.
This is Lt. Allen’s account of Noah Heard’s execution, “Yuri stood in front of Heard running his thumb along the blade of his sword. Then he put the sword in its scabbard but pushed Heard’s head back with the scabbard.” Heard was then taken behind the guardhouse and ordered by Yuri to kneel. According to Lt. Allen, Heard staggered as he was taken behind the building. Allen and others slipped into an empty building to see what the Japanese were going to do. Allen told the court what he saw. “At the command of Lieutenant Yuri, a Jap guard bayoneted Heard in the middle of his back. Heard grunted and as he rolled over, he screeched. A second Jap bayoneted Heard in the abdomen. Yuri, the interpreter, and others examined the body. It was still twitching so another guard slashed Heard vertically across the throat. Other guards came out and slashed his abdomen to ribbons.” Allen also stated that while Heard was on the ground twitching, a Japanese guard walked up to him and cut his throat.
The Japanese used the camp to shoot scenes for a propaganda movie about the treatment the POWs were receiving. The POWs thought it funny to watch Japanese running around wearing zoot suits and bell-bottom trousers. For a scene in the movie, the Japanese had the POWs move in a large circle. To “aid” the POWs to move in a circle, clubs were used to keep them moving. In another scene, they took a POW to the camp hospital and had him lay in a bed with sheets. The sick actually lay on the building’s floor. They also brought in fresh flowers and fruit and opened Red Cross packages that the POWs never received before the filming. They also had a Japanese nurse sit by the bed and hold the POW’s hand. As soon as the director yelled cut, the POW was thrown out of the bed, and the bed, flowers, fruit, and Red Cross boxes were removed from the building.
The coal mine where the POWs worked was a condemned mine that had experienced an earthquake in 1923, and the deep shafts were closed because they were considered unsafe. The unsafe shafts were reopened in 1943 because the POWs were viewed as expendable and replaceable by the mine’s owner Baron Takanaya Mitsui. (He was tried after the war for war crimes but not convicted.) He supposedly said that the POWs could be replaced if they were killed.
The POWs were awakened and roll call was taken. Afterward, they ate their first meal before lining up and taking roll call again. During the winter, any POW who was caught with his hands in his pockets was beaten. When they arrived at the mine, roll call was taken again.
The POWs worked three different 12-hour shifts each workday and were expected to load three cars of coal each day. They had one day off every ten days. They worked with the constant threat of rocks falling on them. They worked with 90-pound jackhammers which weighed as much or more than them. They drilled holes, packed them with dynamite, and then went to a safe area and waited. After the blast, they returned to remove the coal.
Those POWs who the Japanese believed were not working hard enough were beaten. The civilian employees viewed the POWs as “white slaves” and liked to hit them with lead pipes. Sometimes they used a knotted rope and several POWs lost eyes because the rope hit them around their heads and then was jerked. Working in the mine actually became one of the few places where the POWs were warm during the winter and they often worked only in G-strings. To get out of working in the mine, prisoners paid other POWs to break their arms.
In November 1944, shirts had been stolen from a bundle in a building. The Japanese ordered all the POWs to assemble and told them that they would not be fed until the shirts were returned. The men returned the shirts anonymously, and the POWs received their meal at 10:00 P.M. Another POW, Walter Johnson, between mid-November 1944 and March 1945 was repeatedly beaten with a club the size of a small baseball bat. This was alternated by placing a wire across his back and shoulders and running electricity through it while he stood in water. This was done because Johnson had been caught talking to a Korean while working. POWs who asked to be given lighter work were examined by the interpreter and punched in the face with fists.
The POWs hoped that it would not be long before the war would end. The worse the war went for Japan, the worse the treatment they received. Another POW, Cpl. William N. Knight, who was known for stealing and wore an insignia on his clothing to show he was a thief, was turned over to the Japanese by CLCDR Little and was beaten with a pole two and a half feet long and six inches around until he passed out. He was revived with water and the beating continued. It stated this went on for several days. He was thrown into the cooler. He was starved and died five days later on May 5, 1945. His crime was he had stolen six buns.
American planes began flying over the camp and on several occasions, the POWs experienced signs that the Americans were aware of the POWs. While unloading ships, a B-29 bomber flew over the docks taking pictures. The plane circled the POWs letting them know that its crew knew the POWs were there. The plane then dropped a map to the POWs that showed the location of every camp. On a different occasion, an American bombing mission leveled the town his camp was located next to. The camp was next to a power station. In the morning, the prisoners saw that the entire town had been leveled except for the power plant. It was located too close to the camp.
John was among a number of POWs selected to be sent to Mukden, Manchuria, and boarded an inter-island steamer that took the POWs to Korea during the night. He arrived in Pusan, Korea, on April 25, 1945, when he was sent to Mukden, Manchuria, by train. According to Jack’s diary, he arrived at Mukden on April 29th. There, he was held as a POW at Hooton Camp. One of the biggest problems facing John and the other new arrivals at the camp was the belief among the older residents that the new arrivals were stealing their food and supplies, and making their lives worse by being there. This belief caused friction among the members of the two groups.
The POWs lived in two-story brick barracks that were divided into 10 sections. Five were on the ground floor and five were on the second floor. Each section was divided into four double-decked sleeping bays which could sleep eight men each. 48 POWs slept in each bay and each one was heated by a “petchka” stove. The enlisted POWs received two thin blankets to cover themselves with at night. The officers got one blanket and a mattress. The barracks were infested with fleas, lice, and bedbugs.
For breakfast, they had cornmeal mush and a bun. Lunch was maize and beans, and dinner was beans and a bun. Since they were underfed, the POWs trapped wild dogs to supplement their meals of soybeans which usually came in the form of soup. They continued to trap dogs until while marching to work, they saw one eating a dead Chinese.
The POWs worked either at a machine shop or a sawmill from 7:30 A.M. until 5:30 or 6:00 P.M. each day. The machine shop never produced anything that was useful to the Japanese. Each morning, the POWs were marched three miles to the shop where they worked manufacturing weapons for the Japanese. To prevent the production of weapons, they committed acts of sabotage like pouring sand into the machine oiling holes. The Japanese usually blamed these acts of sabotage on the Chinese in the plant because they believed the Americans were not smart enough to commit the sabotage. Many of the POWs in the camp worked at the MKK Machine Shop which was attempting to produce copies of American weapons. To prevent this from happening, the POWs committed acts of sabotage. Many POWs believed that they never manufactured one usable weapon.
On August 16, 1945, American OSS officers parachuted into the Mukden from a B-24. The team was intercepted by a Japanese detachment of soldiers who ordered them to stop and kneel. As they knelt, the Japanese made menacing gestures with their bayonets. One of the team produced a piece of paper and read to the guards the news of the surrender. They laughed when they heard it and refused to believe the war was over. Another OSS man produced a paper signed by Gen Wedemeyer stating they were an advance team bringing relief to the prisoners. At that moment, a Japanese officer rode up on horseback and spoke to the guards whose entire attitudes suddenly changed. Another officer arrived and apologized to the OSS team. News of the surrender had just been received at the camp. The Japanese were still cautious and blindfolded the members of the team and put them on a truck. They were taken to the local military police headquarters but still were denied access to the camp. After arguing with the Japanese for an hour, they were taken to the camp, but the camp CO refused to give the team access to the POWs. The team protested, but he still did not give them access to the POWs. The team was taken to a local hotel for the night while the camp CO contacted his superiors.
The next day, August 17, 1945, the OSS team members were driven to the camp and met with the prisoners. The POWs were overjoyed and had a million questions. During the conversation, the team learned that Gen. Johnathan Wainwright and other high-ranking officers had been moved to another camp at Sian more than 100 miles away. The POWs at Mukden had been liberated. When the Russians entered Mukden on August 20, one POW slipped around the guards, climbed over the camp wall, and saw Russian tanks passing the camp. The POW could speak some Russian and Polish told the Russians that behind the wall were POWs. The Russians turned around one of the tanks and came through the camp’s gate. The tank stopped near the POWs and the crew disarmed the Japanese and gave the guns to the freed POWs. The Russian general made the Japanese go through a formal surrender ceremony where the camp was turned over to the former POWs. Shortly after this, B-29s dropped 50-gallon drums attached to parachutes to the men in an area marked by lit oil drums. The lead plane came down and saw the POWs. It circled and dropped medical supplies, food, and clothing to them. The planes also dropped walkie-talkies to the former POWs so that they could talk to aircrews. This allowed them to tell the aircrews what they needed. The planes dropped everything from ice cream to strings for a fiddle.
An American Recovery Team arrived at the camp on August 29. Their job was to process the former POWs for transport. The really ill former POWs were flown out while the remaining men took a train to Darian, China. Most boarded the U.S.H.S. Relief and taken to Okinawa. During the trip, the ship went through a terrible storm, and another shop in the group hit a mine resulting in one death. After arriving at Okinawa, the men were flown to the Philippines.
It appears John’s medical condition required him to return to the United States as fast as possible. He was flown to Hawaii and then flown to Hamilton Field north of San Francisco. From there he was taken to Letterman General Hospital for additional medical treatment. He was transferred to Schick General Hospital, Clinton, Iowa, with amoebic dysentery. It is not known how long he remained there. At some point, he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant and later Captain.
Allen testified against Lt. Kel Yuroi, former Fukuoka #17 commandant, and told of the execution of Sgt. Noah Heard. During the trial, Yuri’s defense was that Heard had signed a document that he should be executed if he committed another crime. Yuri was sentenced to death.
It is known that John reenlisted and was stationed at Presidio of Monterey in 1947. John was discharged on March 9, 1948. It is known that he was in Mexico with a friend when he suddenly died on January 30, 1955. He was buried at Ft. Snelling National Cemetery in St. Paul. Minnesota, on February 7, 1955, and buried in Plot E, Row 0, Site 186.
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