Pvt. Emmit Arthur McDow was born on April 13, 1914, in Elk City, Oklahoma, to James W. McDow and Claudia F. Sapp-McDow. With his sister and brother, he grew up on Route #2, Canute, Washita County, Oklahoma. It is known that his father died during the 1920s. He registered on October 16, 1940, with Selective Service when the draft act took effect and stated that he worked for the Civilian Conservation Corps and gave his residence as Camp BR-81-C, in Vallecito, Colorado. He named his mother as his contact person.
He was inducted into the U. S. Army on March 24, 1941, in Oklahoma City, and was sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky, to do his basic training. Basic training was rushed and finished in seven weeks. In the case of the medics, their basic training was as short as three weeks before they began training as medics. The Army believed that hands-on training was the best way to be taught medical training and did not offer classes to the medics. The few classes available to them dealt with administrative duties. On March 28th, he had a furlough home to see his family.
On June 1st, at Camp Polk, Louisiana, the 753rd GHQ Tank Battalion was activated. Most of its officers and many of its first enlisted men were sent to join the battalion from Ft. Benning, Georgia. On June 3rd, 492 men from Selective Service left Ft. Knox and joined the battalion, on June 5th. It is known that some men took their specialized training at Camp Polk, but other men assigned to the battalion may have remained at Ft. Knox and attended school there.
The Louisiana maneuvers took place taking place, but the battalion did not take part in them since it was still training. The 192nd Tank Battalion - which was predominately made up of National Guardsmen - took part in the maneuvers and was ordered to Camp Polk, at the end of the September, instead of returning to Ft. Knox as expected. The members of the battalion speculated where they were going to be sent. Some men said Ft. Benning, others said Ft. Lewis, Washington, while still others said they would return to Ft. Knox, Kentucky. It was on the side of a hill that the members of the 192nd were informed that they were being sent overseas. It was at this time that those National Guardsmen who were married with dependents, with other dependents, 29 years old or older, or whose National Guard enlistments would end while the battalion was overseas, were allowed to resign from federal service. Replacements for the men came from the 753rd Tank Battalion. The battalion’s commander, because of his age, was replaced by Major Theodore Wickord his executive officer who got the command after Captain Walter Write turned it down to stay with A Company.
Many of the original members of the 192nd believed they had been selected to be sent overseas because they had performed well on the Louisiana maneuvers. The story was that they were personally selected by General George S. Patton – who had commanded their tanks as part of the Blue Army under Patton's command during the maneuvers – to go overseas. Although Patton praised the 192nd and the 191st Tank Battalion who participated in the maneuvers as the First Tank Group, there is no evidence that Patton had anything to do with the 192nd being sent to the Philippines.
There was also the story that early in 1941 a squadron of American planes was flying over the Lingayen Gulf. One of the pilots, who was flying at a lower altitude, noticed something odd in the water. He took his plane down identified a flagged buoy in the water and saw another in the distance. The planes came upon more buoys that lined up - in a straight line for 30 miles to the northwest - in the direction of Formosa which had a large radio transmitter used by the Japanese military. The squadron continued its flight plan south to Mariveles and returned to Clark Field. When the planes landed, what they saw was reported, but it was too late to do anything that day.
The next day, another squadron was sent to the area and found that the buoys had been picked up by a fishing boat – with a tarp on its deck covering the buoys – which was seen making its way to shore. Since communication between the Air Corps and the Navy was difficult, the boat escaped. According to this story, it was at that time the decision was made to build up the American military presence in the Philippines since it was a daily or almost daily occurrence for Japanese planes to fly over the area.
The reality was that the 192nd was part of the First Tank Group which was headquartered at Ft. Knox and operational by June 1941. Besides the 192nd, the group was made up of the 70th and 191st Tank Battalions – the 191st had been a medium National Guard tank battalion, while the 70th was a Regular Army tank battalion– at Ft. Meade, Maryland. The tank group also contained the 193rd Tank Battalion at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and the 194th Tank Battalion at Ft. Lewis, Washington. The 192nd, 193rd, and 194th had been National Guard light tank battalions. It is known that the military presence in the Philippines was being built up at the time, and documents show the entire tank group had been scheduled to be sent to the Philippines well before June 1941.
On August 13, 1941, Congress voted to extend federalized National Guard units’ time in the regular Army by 18 months, and on August 14th, the 194th received its orders to go overseas. The buoys being spotted by the pilot may have sped up the transfer of the tank battalions to the Philippines with only the 194th and 192nd reaching the islands, but it was not the reason for the battalions going to the Philippines. It is also known that the 193rd Tank Battalion was on its way to Hawaii – during its trip to the Philippines – when Pearl Harbor was attacked. When it arrived in Hawaii the battalion was held there. One of the two medium tank battalions - most likely the 191st - was on 48-hour standby orders for the Philippines but the orders were canceled on December 10th because the war with Japan had started.
It was at this time that replacements from the 753rd Tank Battalion joined the 192nd as replacements for men released from federal service because of family obligations or because their enlistments would end while the battalion was overseas. Both old and new members of the battalion were given furloughs home so that they could say goodbye to family and friends but they had to be back at Camp Polk by the morning of October 14th. At the base, the men lived in tents, and it was stated that it seemed to rain every day they were there. Some men said they didn't take showers for days because they were always wet.
The battalion was scheduled to receive new M3 tanks, but none were available for some long-forgotten reason. A large number of the battalion’s new tanks came from the 753rd Tank Battalion and the 3rd Armor Division. The tanks were only new to the 192nd, and in many cases, the tanks were within 5 hours of their 100-hour required maintenance. The battalion also received peeps (later known as jeeps) and half-tracks to replace their staff cars and scout cars.
HQ Company left for San Francisco a few days earlier than the rest of the battalion. At 8:30 A.M. on October 20th, over different train routes, the letter companies were sent to San Francisco, California. A Company took the southern route along the Mexican border through Needles, California, and north through Los Angeles to San Francisco. B Company went west through Denver and the Rocky Mountains, C Company went a little further north through the center of the country, and D Company went north and then west along the Canadian border and then south along the west coast.
Most of the soldiers of each company rode on one train that was followed by a second train that carried the company’s tanks. At the end of the second train was a boxcar followed by a passenger car that carried some soldiers. When they arrived in San Francisco, they were ferried, by the USAT General Frank M. Coxe, to Ft. McDowell on Angel Island. On the island, they were given physicals and inoculated by the battalion’s medical detachment. Men found to have minor health issues were held back and scheduled to rejoin the battalion at a later date, while other men were simply replaced by men sent to the island as replacements that may have come from the 757th Tank Battalion which was at Ft. Ord, California. To maintain secrecy, the soldiers were not allowed off the island. It was also at this time that Col. James R. N. Weaver joined the 192nd as its commanding officer.
HQ Company left for the West Coast a few days earlier than the rest of the 192nd to make preparations for the battalion. At 8:30 A.M. on October 20th, over at least three train routes, the companies were sent to San Francisco, California. Most of the soldiers of each company rode on one train that was followed by a second train that carried the company’s tanks. At the end of the second train was a boxcar, with equipment and spare parts, followed by a passenger car that carried soldiers. HQ Company and A Company took the southern route, B and C Companies went west through the middle of the country on different train routes, and D Company went north then west along the Canadian border. When they arrived in San Francisco, they were ferried, by the USAT General Frank M. Coxe, to Ft. McDowell on Angel Island where they spent five days. As the ferry passed Alcatraz, a soldier on the boat said to them, “I’d rather be here than going where you all are going.”
On the island, they were given physicals by the battalion’s medical detachment. Men found to have minor health issues were held back and scheduled to rejoin the battalion at a later date. Other men were simply replaced with men - who appeared to have come from the 757th Tank Battalion at Ft. Ord, California - sent to the island for that purpose. The soldiers spent their time making preparations since they were not allowed off the island for security reasons. Some soldiers believed that the “quarantine” was done to prevent soldiers from going AWOL (Absent Without Leave). It was said that at night the San Francisco skyline and Bay Bridge were beautiful. It was at this time that Col. James R. N. Weaver joined the 192nd as its commanding officer.
The 192nd boarded the USAT Gen. Hugh L. Scott and sailed on Monday, October 27th. The sea was rough during this part of the trip, so many tankers had seasickness and also had a hard time walking on deck until they got their “sea legs.” It was stated that about one-tenth of the battalion showed up for inspection the first morning on the ship. Once they recovered they spent much of the time training in breaking down machine guns, cleaning weapons, and doing KP.
During this part of the trip, one of the soldiers had an appendectomy. A day or two before the ships arrived in Hawaii, the ships ran into a school of flying fish. Since the sea was calm, that night they noticed the water was a phosphorous green. The sailors told them that it was St. Elmo's Fire. The ship arrived at Honolulu, Hawaii, on Sunday, November 2nd, and had a four-day layover. As the ship docked, men threw coins in the water and watched native boys dive into the water after them. They saw two Japanese tankers anchored in the harbor that arrived to pick up oil but had been denied permission to dock.
The morning they arrived in Hawaii was said to be a beautiful sunny day. Most of the soldiers were given shore leave so they could see the island. During this time they visited pineapple ranches, coconut groves, and Waikiki Beach which some said was nothing but stones since it was man-made. They also noticed that the island residents were more aware of the impending war with Japan. Posters were posted everywhere. Most warned sailors to watch what they said because their spies and saboteurs on the island. Other posters in store windows sought volunteers for fire-fighting brigades. Before they left Hawaii, an attempt was made to secure two 37-millimeter guns and ammunition so that the guns could be set up on the ship’s deck and the tank crews could learn how to load them and fire them, but they were unable to acquire the guns.
When they arrived at Guam on Sunday, November 16th, the ships took on water, bananas, coconuts, and vegetables. Although they were not allowed off the ship, the soldiers were able to mail letters home before sailing for Manila the next day. At one point, the ships passed an island at night and did so in total blackout. This for many of the soldiers was a sign that they were being sent into harm’s way. The blackout was strictly enforced and men caught smoking on deck after dark spent time in the ship’s brig. Three days after leaving Guam the men spotted the first islands of the Philippines. The ships sailed around the south end of Luzon and then north up the west coast of Luzon toward Manila Bay.
The ships entered Manila Bay, at 8:00 A.M., on Thursday, November 20th, and docked at Pier 7 later that morning. One thing that was different about their arrival was that instead of a band and a welcoming committee waiting at the pier to tell them to enjoy their stay in the Philippines and see as much of the island as they could, a party came aboard the ship – carrying guns – and told the soldiers, “Draw your firearms immediately; we’re under alert. We expect a war with Japan at any moment. Your destination is Fort Stotsenburg, Clark Field.” At 3:00 P.M., as the enlisted men left the ship, a Marine was checking off their names. When an enlisted man said his name, the Marine responded with, “Hello sucker.” Those who drove trucks drove them to the fort, while the maintenance section remained behind at the pier to unload the tanks. Some men stated they rode a train to Ft. Stotsenberg while other men stated they rode busses to the base.
At the fort, the tankers were met by Gen. Edward P. King Jr. who welcomed them and made sure that they had what they needed. He also was apologetic that there were no barracks for the tankers and that they had to live in tents. The fact was he had not learned of their arrival until days before they arrived. He made sure that they had dinner – which was a stew thrown into their mess kits – before he left to have his own dinner. D Company was scheduled to be transferred to the 194th Tank Battalion so when they arrived at the fort, they most likely moved into their finished barracks instead of tents that the rest of the 192nd. The 194th had arrived in the Philippines in September and its barracks were finished about a week earlier. The company also received a new commanding officer, Capt. Jack Altman.
The other members of the 192nd pitched their tents in an open field halfway between the Clark Field Administration Building and Fort Stotsenburg. The tents from WW I and pretty ragged. They were set up in two rows and five men were assigned to each tent. There were two supply tents and meals were provided by food trucks stationed at the end of the rows of tents. Their tanks were in a field not far from the tanks. The worst part of being in the tents was that they were near the end of a runway. The B-17s when they took off flew right over the bivouac about 100 feet off the ground. At night, the men heard planes flying over the airfield. Many men believed they were Japanese, but it is known that American pilots flew night missions.
The 192nd arrived in the Philippines with a great deal of radio equipment to set up a radio school to train radiomen for the Philippine Army. The battalion also had many ham radio operators after arriving at Ft. Stotsenburg, the battalion set up a communications tent that was in contact with ham radio operators in the United States within hours. The communications monitoring station in Manila went crazy attempting to figure out where all these new radio messages were coming from. When they were informed it was the 192nd, they gave the 192nd frequencies to use. Men sent messages home to their families that they had arrived safely.
With the arrival of the 192nd, the Provisional Tank Group was activated on November 27th. Besides the 192nd, the tank group contained the 194th Tank Battalion with the 17th Ordnance Company joining the tank group on the 29th. Both units had arrived in the Philippines in September 1941. Military documents written after the war show the tank group was scheduled to be composed of three light tank battalions and two medium tank battalions. Col. Weaver left the 192nd, was appointed head of the tank group, and was promoted to brigadier general. Major Theodore Wickord permanently became the commanding officer of the 192nd.
It was at this time that the process to transfer D Company to the 194th Tank Battalion began. As part of the transfer, all the company's medical records were organized so that they could be given to the medical detachment of the 194th. D Co. officers were transferred to other companies of the 194th.
The day started at 5:15 with reveille and anyone who washed near a faucet with running water was considered lucky. At 6:00 A.M. they ate breakfast followed by work – on their tanks and other equipment – from 7:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. Lunch was from 11:30 A.M. to 1:30 P.M. when the soldiers returned to work until 2:30 P.M. The shorter afternoon work period was based on the belief that it was too hot to work in the climate. The term “recreation in the motor pool,” meant they worked until 4:30 in the afternoon.
During this time, the battalion members spent much of their time getting the cosmoline out of the barrels of the tanks' guns. Since they only had one reamer to clean the tank barrels, many of the main guns were cleaned with a burlap rag attached to a pole and soaked in aviation fuel. It was stated that they probably only got one reamer because Army ordnance didn't believe they would ever use their main guns in combat. The tank crews never fired their tanks' main guns until after the war had started, and not one man knew how to adjust the sights on the tanks. The battalion also lost four of its peeps, later called jeeps, used for reconnaissance to the command of the United States Armed Forces Far East also known as USAFFE.
It is known that during this time the tank battalions went on at least two practice reconnaissance missions under the guidance of the 194th. They traveled to Baguio on one maneuver and to the Lingayen Gulf on the other maneuver. Gen. Weaver, the tank group commander, was able to get ammunition from the post’s ordnance department on the 30th, but the tank group could not get time at one of the firing ranges. When the general warning of a possible Japanese attack was sent to overseas commands on November 27th, the Philippine command did not receive it. The reason why this happened is not known and several reasons for this can be given. It is known that the tanks took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night would be a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position was among drums of 100-octane gas and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield.
At Ft. Stotsenburg, the soldiers were expected to wear their dress uniforms. Since working on the tanks was a dirty job, the battalion members wore coveralls to work on the tanks. The 194th Tank wore coveralls in their barracks area to do work on their tanks, but if the soldiers left the battalion’s area, they wore dress uniforms – which were a heavy material and uncomfortable to wear in the heat – everywhere; including going to the PX. Their tropical uniforms had been ordered but had not arrived.
For recreation, the soldiers spent their free time bowling or going to the movies on the base. They also played horseshoes, softball, and badminton, or threw footballs around during their free time. On Wednesday afternoons, they went swimming. Passes were given out and men were allowed to go to Manila in small groups. Before they went into the nearest barrio which was two or three miles away, all the newly arrived troops were assembled for a lecture by the post's senior chaplain. It was said that he put the fear of God and gonorrhea into them.
When the general warning of a possible Japanese attack was sent to overseas commands on November 27th, the Philippine command did not receive it. The reason why this happened is not known and several reasons for this can be given. It is known that the tanks took part in an alert that was scheduled for November 30th. What was learned during this alert was that moving the tanks to their assigned positions at night would be a disaster. In particular, the 194th’s position was among drums of 100-octane gas, and the entire bomb reserve for the airfield and the bombs were haphazardly placed. On December 1st, the tankers were ordered to the perimeter of Clark Field to guard against Japanese paratroopers. From this time on, two tank crew members remained with each tank at all times and were fed from food trucks.
The battalion's reconnaissance section was ordered to a rice paddy which was about a half-mile from the airfield. This was its assigned position in case the Japanese attempted to land troops or use paratroopers to capture the airfield.
Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, 192nd, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks and would have thrown them away in battle. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th. The next day Weaver visited every tank company of the tank group.
Although official reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were sent to the military command in the Philippines at 2:30 am, For the tankers, it was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th at 7:00 a.m. Gen. Weaver, Maj. Miller, Major Wickord, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance, read the messages of the attack. Miller left the tent and informed the officers of the 194th about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the members of the tank crews were ordered to their tanks which were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions at Clark Field.
Roy Diaz stated that at 4 am the C Company's first sergeant entered their barracks and woke them up and told them that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and told them that the Japanese were on their way. He also stated the men got up and began loading machine gun belts. S/Sgt. Byron Veillette, A Co., ran through the 194th's command area shouting that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Capt. Fred Moffitt gathered his men and told C Company that the US was at war. Many tankers didn't believe the war had started since they expected to participate in maneuvers. Some men believed this was just the start of the maneuvers. The tank crew members, not with their tanks, were ordered to them. The battalion's halftracks took up positions next to them. The reconnaissance detachment went to its position in the rice paddy. They watched P-40 fighters take to the air from the battalion's positions. It was said that in every direction a man looked, American planes could be seen in the sky. The tankers got most of their news about the attack from listening to radio dispatches received on a big radio on what was the command half-track.
Gen. Weaver on December 2nd ordered the tank group to full alert. According to Capt. Alvin Poweleit, 192nd, Weaver appeared to be the only officer on the base interested in protecting his unit. On December 3rd the tank group officers had a meeting with Gen Weaver on German tank tactics. Many believed that they should be learning how the Japanese used tanks. That evening when they met Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, they concluded that he had no idea how to use tanks and would have thrown them away in battle. It was said they were glad Weaver was their commanding officer. That night the airfield was in complete black-out and searchlights scanned the sky for enemy planes. All leaves were canceled on December 6th. The next day Weaver visited every tank company of the tank group.
Although official reports of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were sent to the military command in the Philippines at 2:30 am, For the tankers, it was the men manning the radios in the 192nd communications tent who were the first to learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 8th at 7:00 a.m. Gen. Weaver, Maj. Miller, Major Wickord, and Capt. Richard Kadel, 17th Ordnance, read the messages of the attack. Miller left the tent and informed the officers of the 194th about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the members of the tank crews were ordered to their tanks which were joined by the battalion’s half-tracks at their assigned positions at Clark Field.
Roy Diaz stated that at 4 am the C Company's first sergeant entered their barracks and woke them up and told them that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and told them that the Japanese were on their way. He also stated the men got up and began loading machine gun belts. S/Sgt. Byron Veillette, A Co., ran through the 194th's command area shouting that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. Capt. Fred Moffitt gathered his men and told C Company that the US was at war. Many tankers didn't believe the war had started since they expected to participate in maneuvers. Some men believed this was just the start of the maneuvers. The tank crew members, not with their tanks, were ordered to them. The battalion's halftracks took up positions next to them. The reconnaissance detachment went to its position in the rice paddy. They watched P-40 fighters take to the air from the battalion's positions. It was said that in every direction a man looked, American planes could be seen in the sky. The tankers got most of their news about the attack from listening to radio dispatches received on a big radio on what was the command half-track.
Capt. Jack Atman told the members of the company of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was stated that most of the men had already heard the news of the attack. Any member of a tank crew that was not with their tanks was ordered to his tank. The company's half-tracks were ordered to tank up positions next to the tanks at their assigned position. The remaining members of the company remained in the battalion's bivouac and did their assigned jobs.
Major Miller called his officers together and told them of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He then ordered the tank company officers to take their tanks to their assigned position at Clark Field. Those officers and men not assigned to tanks or half-tracks performed their assigned duties. Around 8:00 A.M., the planes of the Army Air Corps took off and filled the sky. At noon, the planes landed and were lined up – near the pilots’ mess hall – in a straight line to be refueled. While the planes were being serviced, the pilots went to lunch. The members of the tank crews received their lunches from the battalion’s food trucks. It was reported that only two of the seven radar sets in the Philippines were operational and the dispatches the operators sent to Manila of approaching planes took an hour to reach Manila. One 194th half-track crew tuned into a Manila radio station and heard a news flash that Clark Field was being bombed. At about 12:45 p.m. an amphibious plane landed on a runway near the tankers and after it came to a stop, its passengers and crew got and and ran to the opposite side of the airfield. About 11 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the company lived through the Japanese attack on Clark Field. (It should be noted that the attack on Pearl Harbor happened at 1:55 A.M. on December 8th in the Philippines, so the attack on Clark Field was almost 11 hours later.)
News reached the tankers that Camp John Hay had been bombed at 9:00 am All morning the sky above the airfield was filled with American planes. Men said no matter what direction they looked they saw planes. At 11:45 am the American planes landed and were parked in a straight line - to make it easier for the ground crews to service them - outside the pilots' mess hall. The men assigned to the tanks and half-tracks were receiving their lunches at food trucks. Gen. King put out a written order telling the unit commanders that the threat of being bombed was over and they could allow their men to return to the main base, in rotations, for rest, baths, and hot meals. It was lunchtime and members of the tank battalion not assigned to tanks were allowed to go to the mess hall to eat. Col. Miller ordered the men under his command to remain with their tanks and half-tracks.
The tankers were eating lunch when planes approached the airfield from the north. At first, they thought the planes were American and counted 54 planes in formation. They then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. It was only when bombs began exploding on the runways that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers.
The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One tanker stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield.
After the attack, the soldiers watched as the dead, the dying, and the wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, trucks, and anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. When the hospital filled, they watched the medics place the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing.
The tankers were receiving lunch from their food trucks and as they stood in line to be fed they watched as 54 planes approached the airfield from the northwest. Men commented that the planes must be American Navy planes. That was until someone saw Red Dots on the wings and then saw what looked like “raindrops” falling from the planes. Maj. Miller shouted at his men to take cover and then bombs began exploding on the runways. It was then that the tankers knew the planes were Japanese. It was stated that no sooner had one wave of planes finished bombing and were returning to Formosa than another wave came in and bombed. The second wave was followed by a third wave of bombers. One member of the 192nd, Robert Brooks, D Co., was killed during the attack and several tankers were wounded.
The bombers were quickly followed by Japanese fighters that sounded like angry bees to the tankers as they strafed the airfield. The tankers watched as American pilots attempted to get their planes off the ground. As they roared down the runway, Japanese fighters strafed the planes causing them to swerve, crash, and burn. Those that did get airborne were barely off the ground when they were hit. The planes exploded and crashed to the ground tumbling down the runways. The Japanese planes were as low as 50 feet above the ground and the pilots would lean out of the cockpits so they could more accurately pick out targets to strafe. The tankers said they saw the pilots’ scarfs flapping in the wind. One member of the 192nd stated that a man with a shotgun could have shot a plane down. The men on the tanks opened fire on the planes as they flew over. One new lieutenant chastised them for giving away their position even though the tanks were plainly visible from the air.
The Coast Artillery had trained with the latest anti-aircraft guns while in the States, but the decision was made to send them to the Philippines with older guns. They also had proximity fuses for the shells and had to use an obsolete method to cut the fuses since the unit's fuse cutter was in Manila being repaired at the time of the attack. Many of the shells they fired fell to the ground without exploding.
The Zeros strafed the airfield and headed toward and turned around behind Mount Arayat and returned to strafe again. When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. It was stated that the bodies of the dead lay on the runways since many were Air Corps ground crew members. It also appeared that everything was on fire from airplane hangers, automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. The runways of the airfield were pot-marked with craters from the bombs. The entire attack lasted about 45 minutes.
When the Japanese were finished, there was not much left of the airfield. The tankers watched as the dead, dying, and wounded were hauled to the hospital on bomb racks, on trucks, and in and on cars. Anything else that could carry the wounded was in use. Within an hour the hospital had reached its capacity. As the tankers watched the medics placed the wounded under the building. Many of these men had their arms and legs missing. The battalion members set up cots under mango trees for the wounded and even the dentist gave medical aid to the wounded. The battalion's medics gave first aid to the wounded.
The tank crews spent much of the time loading bullets by hand from rifle cartridges into machine gun belts since they had gone through most of their ordnance during the attack. That night, since they did not have any foxholes, the men used an old latrine pit for cover since it was safer in the pit than in their barracks. The entire night they were bitten by mosquitoes. Without knowing it, they had slept their last night on a cot or bed, and from this point on, the men slept in blankets on the ground. One result of the attack was D Company was never transferred to the 194th and remained part of the 192nd throughout the Battle of Bataan.
The next day, those men not assigned to a tank or half-track walked around Clark Field to look at the damage. As they walked, they saw there were hundreds of dead. Some were pilots who had been caught asleep, because they had flown night missions, in their tents during the first attack. Others were pilots who had been killed attempting to get to their planes.
The men from both tank battalions recovered the 50 caliber machine guns from the planes that had been destroyed on the ground and got most of them to work. They propped up the wings of the damaged planes so they looked like the planes were operational hoping this would fool the Japanese to come over to destroy them. When the Japanese fighters returned, the tankers shot two planes down. After this, the planes never returned.
After the attack 194th was sent to a bivouac three kilometers north of Clark Field at Mabalacat. They spent their time loading ammunition belts because they had fired so much during the attack on Clark Field. The tankers were issued Infield and Springfield rifles. Since the rifles were from World War I, one out of every two worked. The tankers cannibalized two of the same type of rifles to get one working rifle.
On the night of the 12th, the battalion was ordered to bivouac south of San Fernando near the Calumpit Bridge. Attempting the 40-mile move, without lights, at night was a nightmare and one tank overturned when it went off the road. They finally arrived at their new bivouac at 6:00 A.M. on December 13th and spent the rest of the day and the next night there. The tanks were in an area of few trees surrounded by rice paddies, meaning the furthest they could go off the road was a few feet. Because of this, the battalion was scattered in three locations. Japanese planes flew over but did not bomb or strafe them.
The tankers bivouacked near the barrio of Muntinlupa. There they had the job of attempting to defend against any invading troops. The battalion's six reconnaissance half-tracks and 40 men were supposed to defend against any landings at Batangas Bay, Tayabas Bay, and Balayan Bay. The battalion remained there from Dec. 14th to Dec. 24th. During this time the tankers spent much of their time on reconnaissance patrols hunting down Fifth Columnists who used flares at night and mirrors during the day near ammunition dumps. An order had been issued that no lights could be used at night. On one occasion, they saw someone signaling with a flashlight from a building. The tanks opened fire on the building. When they entered the building, there was no one in it, but they also had no more problems with fifth columnists.
The tanks spent the night at Tagatay Ridge. The tankers slept on the ground in sleeping bags. During the night they were awakened when the gasoline truck sent to fuel the tanks exploded and lit the area like it was day. Someone had placed gasoline cans on the batteries and one battery sparked and the can exploded. The next day they continued their trip south and had to cross bridges with ten-ton limits. The tanks were fourteen tons but the bridges held. It was also stated the battalion was sent to Batangas in southern Luzon. On the 15th, the battalion received 15 Bren gun carriers but turned some over to the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. These were manned by grounded Air Corps men and used to test the ground to see if it could support the weight of tanks.
It was at this time that Emmit had the chance to send home a telegram to his parents. In it, he wished them a Merry Christmas. This was the first word his family had from him since a message he had sent home before the start of the war that his mother received on December 8, 1941.
On December 22nd, A Company and D Company, 192nd, were ordered to the Agno River near Carmen. C Company remained behind at Batangas. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. started the more than 150-mile movement north to meet the Japanese at an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. They soon discovered that without air cover it was unsafe to move during the day, so the tanks were moved at night to prevent them from being attacked by Japanese planes. It was stated that driving a tank at night was never safe, but something that a tank driver learned to do. One reason this was unsafe was that the tank crews never knew what lay ahead. George Chumley D Co., 192nd, stated that, "anyone who said he wasn't afraid was lying," and that they were always afraid. What happened is that the men became used to being afraid. When they got close to their objective, to protect the battalion from strafing, most of the battalion went to the left on Route 3 toward Tarlac and the river while A Company was sent down Route 5 toward Cabanatuan and San Jose and then along the river until it rejoined the rest of the battalion. When the tanks passed through the barrio of San Jose, they saw the dead bodies of Filipino men, women, and children who had mistaken Japanese Zeros for American planes. When they came out to wave at the planes, they were strafed.
When the battalion arrived at its destination near Lingayen Gulf, D Company's tanks were near a ridge, so many of the tankers climbed to the top, where they found defending troops, ammunition, and guns. The soldiers were just sitting there watching the Japanese ships in the Gulf since they had received orders not to fire. The tankers walked down the ridge and waited until they received orders to drop back and let the Japanese occupy the ridge. They watched as the Japanese brought their equipment to the top of the ridge. The Americans finally received orders to launch a counterattack which failed.
It was on December 24th, that Miller was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. On that date, the tanks were sent to an area 85 miles northwest of Manila. The tankers at 2:15 P.M. on Christmas Eve started a 105-mile movement to meet the Japanese. The tanks were supported by two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible. Men stated that the US had asked them to hold out for six months. Later on the 24th, the battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. One platoon from A Co. had taken positions west of Carmen. When they began taking fire from a strong Japanese force, he ordered the tanks to open fire with their machine guns. It was at 3:00 P.M. on December 25th that the tankers engaged the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions with the tanks withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. Realizing that they had a very good chance of being cut off, the platoon's commanding officer ordered his tanks to withdraw through Carmen the evening of December 26th.
The tank battalions formed a defensive line along the southern bank of the Agno River with the tanks of the 192nd holding the Agno River from Carmen to Tayug, and the 194th holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road. The tanks were about five yards apart. It was on the 26th that the Japanese artillery fire began landing near the tanks. The Self-propelled mounts of the Filipino Scout would take positions between the tanks fire several rounds and move to another position. Shells began landing around the tanks, so the crews buttoned themselves in their tanks. The tanks did not have anti-personnel shells to use against infantry, but the tankers used the tanks’ 37-millimeter guns against armored vehicles and their machine guns against infantry. The fire stopped the Japanese advance for a while but the Japanese brought up more artillery and resumed the attack. It was at this time that Sgt. Herbert Stobel - who was standing in the turret of his tank - was killed when a shell exploded above his tank. The tanks fell back toward Bamban and then skirmished with the Japanese at Plaridel. At Calumpit, the tanks were involved in a full blown battle.
That day, the tank battalions were also given the job of holding the line against enemy armor and major thrusts until 5:00 A.M. on December 27th. Col. Ernest Miller – being the senior officer – was given authority to withdraw both tank battalions before 5:00 A.M. if he felt it was necessary. The tanks held the line but withdrew at 7:30 P.M. before the bridges they needed to cross were blown up at 11:30 P.M. that night.
Two volunteers were needed, on the 28th, to set up machine guns at the far end of the bridge to harass the Japanese. Pvt. Gerald Bell and Pvt. August Bender, who were assistant tank drivers, volunteered to take two antiaircraft machine guns from the tanks to the far end of the bridge and set up machine gun nests. It was stated that Bell and Bender held their position and died after being surrounded. The Japanese attempted to cross the river in several places. The tankers fired on them with their machine guns killing as many as 500 enemy troops and knocking out three tanks with the support of two divisions of the Philippine Army. According to Capt. John Riley, most of the men had already concluded they would lose the battle for Luzon, but they also made the decision that they would tie up the Japanese as long as possible.
The 192nd and part of the 194th fell back to form a new defensive line the night of December 27th. Arrangements had been made for the tanks to pick up their rations at Tarlac Depot. From there they fell back to the south bank of the BanBan River which they were supposed to hold for as long as possible. The tankers found their tanks being used as “mobile pillboxes.” The tanks were at Santo Tomas near Cabanatuan on December 28th and 29th serving as a rear guard against the Japanese. The two Filipino Army Divisions withdrew leaving the tank battalions alone to face the Japanese. The tankers held up the Japanese as long as possible before withdrawing. The 192nd received the order to withdraw and radioed the 194th, but for some unknown reason, the 194th tank commander whose tank had the long-wave radio did not forward the order to the other tanks of his battalion. The battalion finally was ordered to withdraw and 1st Lt. Harold Costigan informed the members of A Company, and D Company, 192nd, that they would have to fight their way out. The tanks fought their way through Carmen losing two tanks but saving the crews except for Capt. Edward Burke who had been hit by enemy fire. He was presumed dead but had been captured by the Japanese.
The tank battalions, on the 31st, were holding open two bridges at Calumpit so that the Southern Luzon forces could withdraw toward Bataan. It was noted that convoys of trucks would pass the tanks carrying absolutely nothing. It was then that Lt. Col. Miller sent out detachments of trucks to warehouses and had the men load them with ammunition, food, and high-octane fuel that was used by the tanks. It was stated that one detachment went all the way to Ft. Stotsenburg. The trucks returned carrying 6 tons of canned food and 12,000 gallons of fuel.
The 194th, at 2:00 am the morning of January 1st, crossed a bridge over the San Fernando River which was destroyed since all Filipino and American units had already crossed. They were now on the main road into Bataan. A defensive line was set up from Guagua to Porac to the swamps along Pampanga Bay. The bridge on a side road that ran from Guagua to Sexmoan and back onto Route 7 was destroyed. At 4:00 am, the battalion dug into new positions. They listened to Japanese troop movements and heard the sound of tanks. They watched five Japanese 89A medium tanks come into view in an open field. The tanks stopped because no reconnaissance had been done in the area. Within minutes, there were five destroyed Japanese tanks
That same day, conflicting orders were received by the defenders who were attempting to stop the Japanese advance down Route 5. Doing this would allow the Southern Luzon Forces, including the battalion's C Company, to withdraw toward Bataan. General Wainwright was unaware of the orders since they came from Gen. MacArthur’s chief of staff. Because of the orders, there was confusion among the Filipinos and American forces defending the bridge, over the Pampanga River, about withdrawing from the bridge and half of the defenders withdrawing. Due to the efforts of the Self-Propelled Mounts, the 71st Field Artillery, and a frenzied attack by the 192nd, the Japanese were halted and the Southern Luzon forces escaped. C Co., 194th, rejoined the rest of the 194th.
From January 2nd to 4th, the 192nd was again holding a road open from San Fernando to Dinalupihan so the southern forces could escape. A Co. 192nd, on January 5th, was near the Gumain River attached to the 194th. It was evening and they believed they were in a relatively safe place. Lt. Kenneth Bloomfield told his men to get some sleep. Their sleep was interrupted by the sound of a gunshot. The tankers had no idea that they were about to engage the Japanese who had launched a major offensive. There was a great deal of confusion and the battle lasted until 5:00 A.M. when the Japanese broke off the attack having lost half of their troops.
The Japanese attacked on January 6th at Layac Junction. The defenders included the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 26th Cavalry, artillery, self-propelled mounts, and the tank group. The tanks were stopped and the crews were sleeping when the tanks came under small arms fire. The crews returned fire. Next came mortar fire. This was the first major battle in the defense of Bataan and the defenders halted the advance.
That night the tanks withdrew into the peninsula with the 192nd holding its position so that the 194th could leapfrog past it, cross the bridge, and then cover the 192nd’s withdrawal over the bridge. The engineers were ready to blow up the bridge, but Lt. Col. Ted Wickord, 192nd, noticed A Co. 192nd, was missing and ordered the engineers to wait until he had looked to see if they were anywhere in sight. He found the company, asleep in their tanks, because they had not received the order to withdraw across the bridge. After they had crossed, the bridge was destroyed which made the 192nd the last American unit to enter Bataan. Each tank platoon lost one tank at this time. This was done to provide tanks to D Company, while those crews still without tanks were used as replacements. It was on the 7th, that the food ration was cut in half, and not too long after this was done malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever began hitting the soldiers.
The tank companies also were given the job of protecting the artillery. The guns were mobile and hooked onto the tanks with a special carriage which allowed them to be moved. According to the tankers, it took a lot of preparation to set them up and a lot of preparation to take them down. The tankers didn’t like doing this job because minutes after the guns began firing, the Japanese sent up reconnaissance planes to find the guns. When they did find the guns, Zeros would appear and strafe the area. The gun crews quickly learned to “shoot and scoot.” After firing a few rounds the guns were quickly broken down and moved out of the area.
On January 12th, Co. D, 192nd, and Co. C, 194th, were sent to Cadre Road in a forward position with little alert time. Land mines were planted on January 13th by ordnance to prevent the Japanese from reaching Cadre Road. C Co., 194th, was sent to Bagac to reopen the Moron Highway which had been cut by the Japanese on January 16th. At the junction of Trail 162 and the Moron Highway, the tanks were fired on by an anti-tank gun which was knocked out by the tanks. They cleared the roadblock with the support of infantry.
General Weaver also issued the following orders to the tank battalions around this time: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”
During this time, the tanks often found themselves dealing with officers who claimed they were the ranking officers in the area and that they could change the tank company’s orders. Most wanted the tanks to kill snipers or do some other job the infantry had not succeeded at doing. This situation continued until Gen Weaver gave a written order to every tank commander that if an officer attempted to change their orders, they should hand the officer the order. When the officer looked up at the tank commander, the tank commander had his handgun aimed at the officer. Gen Weaver had ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer attempting to change their orders. This ended the problem.
On January 20th, A Company was sent to save the command post of the 31st Infantry. On the 24th, they supported the troops along the Hacienda Road, but they could not reach the objective because of landmines that had been planted by ordnance. The battalion held a position a kilometer north of the Pilar-Bagac Road with four self-propelled mounts. At 9:45 A.M., a Filipino warned the tankers that a large force of Japanese was on their way. When they appeared the battalion and self-propelled mounts opened up with everything they had. The Japanese broke off the attack, at 10:30 A.M., after losing 500 of their 1200 men. It was also at this time that the Japanese ended the assault and waited for fresh troops to arrive.
The defenders were ordered to withdraw on the 25th to a new line known as the Pilar-Begac Line. The tanks covered the withdrawal with the 192nd covering the withdrawing troops in the Aubucay area and the 194th covering the troops in the Hacienda area. At 6:00 PM the withdrawal started over the only two roads out of the area which quickly became blocked, and the Japanese could have wiped out the troops but did not take advantage of the situation.
The tank battalions, on January 28th, were given the job of protecting the beaches. The Japanese later admitted that the tanks guarding the beaches prevented them from attempting landings. The tank battalions, on their own, took up the job of protecting the airfields at Cabcaban, Bataan, and Mariveles, since Japanese paratroopers were known to be available. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces.
One night, the Japanese attempted to land troops on a beach guarded by B Co., 192nd. There was a tremendous firefight, but the next morning not one Japanese soldier landed on the beach. The Japanese later told the tankers that the tanks were the reason why they attempted no other landings. While doing this job, the member of B Co. also noticed that each morning when the PT boats were off the coast of Bataan they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. The tank crews made arrangements with the PT boats to be at a certain place off the beach at a certain time and waited for the Zeros to arrive and attack. This time when they arrived, they were met by machine gun fire from the PT boats but also from the machine guns of the tanks and half-tracks. When the Zeros broke off the attack, they had lost nine of twelve planes.
The tanks were at the Abucay-Hacienda Line which on the east went from Manila Bay to the mountains in the center of Bataan and held by the 1st Corps. It then extended, on the west, from the mountains to the South China Sea and was held by the 2nd Corps. The mountains had no fortifications since it was believed they were impenetrable. The Japanese occupied them and were able to get the defenders to fire at their own men by setting off firecrackers between the units. Snipers were the biggest problem and the tanks often found themselves being ordered by an officer - who claimed to be the "immediate commander" because he was the highest-ranking officer in the area - to exterminate the problem. This situation got so bad that Gen Weaver gave each tank commander a written order that he handed to the officer. After reading it, the officer would look up at the tank commander who had his .45 pointed at the officer. Weaver's order, ordered the tank commanders to shoot any officer who attempted to change their orders.
Because of the jungle canopy, the nights on Bataan were so dark that the tankers could not see after dark. It was at night that the Japanese liked to attack. When the attacks came, if the tankers were lucky they were able to use their tanks’ machine guns on them. They could not use the turret machine guns since the guns could not be aimed at the ground. If the tank commander had attempted to use his pistol standing in the turret, he was an easy target, so the tanks would simply withdraw from the position.
Both battalions were sent to cover the junctions of the Back Road and East Road with the Abucay-Hacienda Road on January 25th. The defenders dropped back to the Pilar-Bagac Line which was a solid line from one side of Bataan to the other. To do this, the tanks held the old line and attempted to give the impression that a counter-attack was taking shape while the other troops withdrew. While holding the position, the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, fought its way to the position at 3:00 A.M. One platoon was sent to the front of the column of trucks that were loading the troops. The tanks provided heavy fire so that the infantry could withdraw and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. Later in the day, both the 192nd and 194th held a defensive line on the Balanga-Cardre-BaniBani Roads until the withdrawal was completed at midnight. They held the position until the night of January 26th, when they dropped back to a new defensive line roughly along the Pilar-Bagac Roads.
It was in the jungle that the tankers found out how inappropriate the M3 tanks were for use in the Philippines. Off the road, they had to travel with their turrets backward. If the tankers did not do this, the guns would get stuck in the jungle growth. The tanks were also restricted to the roads since they would get stuck in the mud of the rice fields. The high silhouettes and straight sides of the M3 also made the tanks easy targets for the Japanese.
The 194th's tanks were ordered to withdraw. During the withdrawal, one of A Company's platoon, under the command of 2nd Lt. Carroll Guin, had fallen behind another platoon and took the wrong turn where the roads came together as a "Y." The road they went down went back to the front lines. The platoon was stopped by 1st Lt. Ted Spaulding who had seen them gone down the road, chased them down with his half-track, and then ran on foot to the lead tank stopping it about two miles from the front.
The tankers also found the engineers were ready to blow a bridge before the battalion had crossed it. Spaulding and 1st Lt. Charles Fleming ordered them to wait. Not long after this, the 194th under Lt. Col. Miller arrived and crossed. When it was believed all the vehicles had crossed, the engineers lit the fuses. Just then a half-track arrived carrying Capt. Fred Moffet began to cross the bridge when about halfway across he saw smoke. Moffet ordered his driver to back the half-track off the bridge which went up in an explosion seconds later. A board from the explosion hit Moffet and injured his leg.
The 194th set up its bivouac in a Mango grove. It was said that the trees made it impossible for the Japanese planes to see the tanks. A stream also ran through the grove which provided the tankers with the opportunity to bathe. For most of their time in the grove, things were quiet. They heard that the 192nd had been involved in two battles with the Japanese, the first involved Japanese Marines landing on points of Bataan, and the second was to eliminate two pockets of Japanese troops trapped behind the main defensive line when the attack was pushed back. They also heard that the 192nd had suffered several casualties.
The 17th Ordnance Company and the battalion's maintenance section worked on the tanks to keep them running. In some cases, they cut down the barrels of the main guns so they could be used. They also reported that the rivets in the hauls popped when the tanks were hit by enemy fire, and the rivets injured the crews. The tank group command reported that the tanks' suspension systems were failing. It was determined that the volute springs were freezing up because of their exposure to salt water. This information was sent to Washington D.C. which ordered that every vehicle using the volute spring suspension system be given new suspension systems. It also resulted in the M3 being redesigned. The front of the tanks was sloped removing the right angle, the hauls were welded, the doors in front of the driver and assistant driver were removed, and an escape hatch in the belly of the tanks was added.
Throughout the Battle of Bataan, men held the belief that aid would arrive. The tanks and half-tracks were well hidden in the jungle around the airfields and different plans were in place to be used against Japanese forces. The Japanese bombed the airfields during the day and at night the engineers would repair them. 50-gallon drums were placed around the airfields to mark the runways, and at night fires could be lit in them to outline the landing strip. The soldiers were hungry and began to eat everything they could get their hands on to eat. If it could be eaten, it soon became scarce on Bataan. The Carabao were tough but if they were cooked long enough they could be eaten. They also began to eat horse meat provided by the 26th U.S. Cavalry. During this time the soldiers ate monkeys, snakes, lizards, horses, and mules. The only animal that most men could not eat was the monkeys. The reason why was the monkeys’ faces made them look too human.
The battalion was given beach duty to defend one of the two beaches on the east side of Bataan where the Japanese could land troops. The tank crews were also assigned guard duty. Their job was to prevent Japanese infiltrators. The tankers set up roadblocks along gravel roads and stopped and searched everyone coming down the road. The tankers ordered anyone coming down the road to halt and if the person didn’t they opened fire. It was noted that the battalion's bivouac was along the road that ranThe tanks also became a favorite target of the Japanese receiving fire on trails and while hidden in the jungle and could not fight back. The situation was so bad that other troops avoided being near the tanks. In one case, the 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company’s offer of assistance in a counter-attack. They were also involved in skirmishes with the Japanese, but the battalion was not involved in either the Battle of the Points or the Battle of the Pockets.
On one occasion, the tankers were moving their tanks to a sugarcane field. They discovered that the field was filled with Japanese soldiers. The tankers opened fired and killed over 300 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese sent raiding parties into the Filipino and American lines at night. They would kill someone and then drop back. To prevent themselves from giving away their positions, the Americans had orders to use bayonets at night and not their guns.
The reality was that the same illnesses that were taking their toll on the Bataan defenders were also taking their toll on the Japanese. American newspapers wrote about the lull in the fighting and the building of defenses against the expected assault that most likely would take place. The soldiers on Bataan also knew that an assault was coming, they just didn’t know when it would take place. The Japanese dropped surrender leaflets on the defenders that were printed on tissue paper. Most showed a scantily clad blond on them. Men stated that if the picture had been a hamburger and milkshake the Japanese may have had the results they wanted. The one good thing about the leaflets is that they made good toilet paper.
On March 1st, food rations were cut in half again. Men hunted for food and it was said they had eaten anything that moved on the peninsula. The hardest thing for men to eat were the monkeys since they looked human when they went to cook them. The Japanese also dropped leaflets on the defenders with the picture of a scantily clad blond telling them to surrender. One tanker said that they may have gotten a better result if the picture was of a hamburger and a milkshake. The amount of gasoline in March was reduced to 15 gallons a day for all vehicles except the tanks. This would later be dropped to ten gallons a day. It was during this time that Gen Wainwright wanted to turn the tanks into pillboxes. Gen Weaver pointed out to Wainwright that they did not have enough tanks to effectively do this, and if they did, they soon would have no tanks so Wainwright abandoned the idea. Since the tanks were the only vehicles receiving fuel, they were used to carry 115-millimeter shells to the artillery by attaching them to long poles. Gen. Weaver suggested to Gen. Wainwright that a platoon of tanks be sent to Corregidor, but Wainwright declined.
The tank crews were assigned guard duty. Their job was to prevent Japanese infiltrators. The tankers set up roadblocks along gravel roads and stopped and searched everyone coming down the road. The tankers anyone coming down the road to halt and if the person didn’t they opened fire. The tanks also became a favorite target of the Japanese receiving fire on trails and while hidden in the jungle. and could not fight back. The situation was so bad that other troops avoided being near the tanks. In one case, the 26th Cavalry turned down a tank company’s offer of assistance in a counter-attack.
For most of March, the situation on Bataan was relatively quiet and the Japanese had been fought to a standstill. On one occasion, two tanks had gotten stuck in the mud, and the crews were working to free them. While they were doing this, a Japanese regiment entered the area. Lt. Colonel Ernest Miller ordered his tanks to fire on the Japanese at point-blank range. He also ran from tank to tank directing the crew's fire. The Japanese were wiped out. On March 21st, the last major battle was fought by the tanks.
The defenders of Bataan had held out nearly four months at this point. Gen. Masaharu Homma was reported to have said that the Americans were slowly being pushed back. But, he then stated, in what appeared to be frustration, that the American command seemed to be able to predict every attack that he planned and successfully repel it.
By this point, the tankers knew that there was no help on the way. Many had listened to Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson on short-wave radio. When asked about the Philippines, he said, “There are times when men must die.” The soldiers cursed in response because they knew that the Philippines had already been lost.
In March, Gen Douglas MacArthur had given orders to Gen. King and Gen. Wainwright that they were not to surrender and fight to the last man. At some point during this time, the Pentagon had sent a message to MacArthur that if either Gen. King or Gen. Wainwright believed that surrendering was his only and best option each man had permission to surrender his forces. MacArthur chose not to forward this message to them.
The reality was that the same illnesses that were taking their toll on the Bataan defenders were also taking their toll on the Japanese. American newspapers wrote about the lull in the fighting and the building of defenses against the expected assault that most likely would take place. The soldiers on Bataan also knew that an assault was coming, they just didn’t know when it would take place. The newspapers in the U.S. wrote about the lull in Bataan and the preparations for the expected offensive.
Having brought in combat-harden troops from Singapore, the Japanese launched a major offensive on April 3rd supported by artillery and aircraft. The artillery barrage started at 10 AM and lasted until noon and each shell seemed to be followed by another that exploded on top of the previous shell. At the same time, wave after wave of Japanese bombers hit the same area dropping incendiary bombs that set the jungle on fire. The defenders had to choose between staying in their foxholes and being burned to death or seeking safety somewhere else. As the fire approached their foxholes those men who chose to attempt to flee were torn to pieces by shrapnel. It was said that arms, legs, and other body parts hung from tree branches. A large section of the defensive line at Mount Samat was wiped out. The next day a large force of Japanese troops came over Mt. Samat and descended the south face of the volcano. This attack wiped out two divisions of defenders and left a large area of the defensive line open to the Japanese.
C Company, 194th, was attached to the 192nd and had only seven tanks left. A counter-attack was launched – on April 6th – by the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts which was supported by tanks. Its objective was to restore the line, but Japanese infiltrators prevented this from happening. Other tanks of C Company tanks were supporting the 2nd Battalion, 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, which was moving east on Trail 8 toward Limay. It was about 5:00 A.M. at the junction of Trails 8 and Trail 6 when the battalion was ambushed by a large number of Japanese. The 1st Platoon of Company C was acting as part of the point when the lead tank was knocked out by anti-tank fire and the following tank was forced off the trail. The Japanese attacked the line held by American troops on April 8th. It was said that the Japanese made what the Americans called "A Bridge of Death" where the Japanese threw themselves on the barbed wire until there were enough bodies on it so the following troops could walk over it. The defenders were not only defending against a frontal attack, but they also were defending against attacks on their flanks and rear.
It was the evening of April 8th that Gen. King decided that further resistance was futile, since approximately 25% of his men were healthy enough to fight, and he estimated they would last one more day. In addition, he had over 6,000 troops who were sick or wounded and 40,000 civilians who he feared would be massacred. His troops were on one-quarter rations, and even at that ration, he had two days of food left. He also believed his troops could fight for one more day. Company B and D, 192nd, and A Company, 194th, were preparing for a suicide attack on the Japanese in an attempt to stop the advance. At 6:00 P.M. tank battalion commanders received this order: “You will make plans, to be communicated to company commanders only, and be prepared to destroy within one hour after receipt by radio, or other means, of the word ‘CRASH’, all tanks and combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, gas, and radios: reserving sufficient trucks to close to rear echelons as soon as accomplished.”
Capt. Jack Altman informed the members of D Company of the surrender and instructed them to destroy any equipment that would be useful to the Japanese. The company circled their tanks and fired armor-piercing shells into the engines of each tank. After the gas cocks were opened, hand grenades were thrown into the crew compartments.
According to a member of HQ Co., 194th, Gen. King spoke to the men and said, “I’m the man who surrendered you, men. It’s not your fault.” He also spoke to the members of the 17th Ordnance Company and B Company, 192nd, and told them something similar. King ordered them to surrender and threatened to court-martial anyone who didn’t. Gen. King with his two aides, Maj. Cothran and Captain Achille C. Tisdelle Jr. got into a jeep carrying a large white flag. They were followed by another jeep – also flying another large white flag – with Col. Collier and Maj. Hurt in it. As the jeeps made their way north they were strafed and small bombs were dropped by a Japanese plane. The drivers of both jeeps and the jeeps were provided by the tank group and both men managed to avoid the bullets. The strafing ended when a Japanese reconnaissance plane ordered the fighter pilot to stop strafing.
At about 10:00 a.m.the jeeps reached Lamao where they were received by a Japanese Major General who informed Gen. King that he reported his coming to negotiate a surrender and that an officer from the Japanese command would arrive to do the negotiations. The Japanese officer also told him that his troops would not attack for thirty minutes while King decided what he would do. No Japanese officer had arrived from their headquarters and the Japanese attack had resumed.
King sent Col. Collier and Maj. Hunt back to his command with instructions that any unit in the line of the Japanese advance should fly white flags. After this was done a Japanese colonel and interpreter arrived and King was told the officer was Homma’s Chief of Staff who had come to discuss King’s surrender. King attempted to get assurances from the Japanese that his men would be treated as prisoners of war, but the Japanese officer – through his interpreter – accused him of declining to surrender unconditionally. At one point King stated he had enough trucks and gasoline to carry his troops out of Bataan. He was told that the Japanese would handle the movement of the prisoners. The two men talked back and forth until the colonel said through the interpreter, “The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians.” King found no choice but to accept him at his word.
Unknown to Gen. King, an order attributed to Gen. Masaharu Homma – but in all likelihood from one of his subordinates – had been given. It stated, “Every troop which fought against our army on Bataan should be wiped out thoroughly, whether he surrendered or not, and any American captive who is unable to continue marching all the way to the concentration camp should be put to death in the area of 200 meters off the road.”
After hearing the order to surrender, Emmit and other members of the company made the decision that they would attempt to escape to Australia. They found a boat and managed to get the engine working. It is known that nineteen members of D Company were on the boat. The men decided that they would not attempt to escape until after dark. As they waited, they were warned by a Filipino that there were Japanese on the cliffs above them.
Before they sailed, they picked up an American captain and three soldiers. They told the captain of their plan. He pulled out his handgun and told them that they were going to Corregidor. Being that he had them at gunpoint, they went to Corregidor. As they attempted to reach the island, the Japanese shelled them and planes dropped bombs at them. It is known that he did not go to Ft. Drum with other men from D Company.
Once on the island, he was assigned to fight with the 4th Marines. It is known that a number of tankers were assigned to defend Skipper Hill which faced Bataan. It was said - whether true or not - that during the night for the following four days after the surrender of Bataan, the men on Corregidor could still see flashes from battle as troops who refused to surrender continued to fight. During this time, the Japanese set up artillery on the beach that fired on Corregidor. Most of the Japanese artillery was knocked out by the guns on Corregidor, so the Japanese set up the rest in the jungle. Men stated that at night they could count as many as 24 separate batteries firing on the island. The shelling and bombing by Japanese planes were slowly knocking out the guns and weakening the defenses. The men on Corregidor knew that a landing was going to be attempted, they just didn’t know when it would take place.
The Japanese barrage of April 29th was intense and it was said that it was because it was the emperor’s birthday. One shall hit the magazine for Battery Geary resulting in a tremendous explosion. The exchange between the Japanese guns and American guns lasted all day. The men guarding South Shore Road were moved to Monkey Point at the beginning of May. The reason this was done was that the Japanese landings were expected to take place there.
It was said that during the nights for the next four days after the surrender of Bataan, the men on Corregidor could still see flashes from battle as troops who refused to surrender continued to fight. This may be an apocryphal statement. During this time, the Japanese set up artillery on the beach that fired on Corregidor. Most of the Japanese artillery was knocked out by the guns on Corregidor, so the Japanese set up the rest in the jungle. They also set up guns among the hospital buildings of Hospital #1 using the POWs there as human shields. Men stated that at night they could count as many as 24 separate batteries firing on the island. Between the shelling and bombing by Japanese planes, they were slowly knocking out the guns and weakening the defenses. The men on Corregidor knew that a landing was going to be attempted, they just didn’t know when it would take place. Gen. Wainwright was given the opportunity to evacuate but he refused and said, "I have been with my men from the start, and if captured I will share their lot."
The Japanese began shelling Monkey Point on the night of May 5th in preparation for the landing. The men on the island watched as Japanese barges began concentrating at various points off Bataan. The barges began to make their way toward Corregidor, and the island’s remaining guns began shelling them. It was said that one of the island’s mortar batteries got so hot that the crew had to stop firing to let the mortar cool down. Another gun turned blue from the continuous firing and its breach warped and would not open. The landing came the night of the 5th. When the Japanese landed, the defenders pushed them from the beach at Monkey Point three times. Anti-aircraft guns from Ft. Hughes were firing on the Japanese as they landed. The shells exploded above the barges killing many. When the final assault on the island took place it was said that the Japanese believed that it had failed. The first tank to land on the island was one of the tanks abandoned by a 192nd tank crew. The Japanese inflicted heavy casualties and the defenders fell back to the Malinta tunnel.
The official surrender of the island was at noon on May 6th, but many units had surrendered earlier in the morning. The Japanese herded them onto an area covered with concrete known as the 92nd Garage which they had hastily surrounded with barbed wire. The POWs were told if they left the area without a guard that they would be shot. The only POWs not to be sent there were the men who were hospitalized in the Malinta Tunnel.
The Japanese herded them onto an area covered with concrete known as the 92nd Garage - which was the servicing area for seaplanes - that they had been hastily surrounded with barbed wire. The Japanese put the POWs into detachments of 1,000 men with a colonel in charge of each detachment. The POWs were told if they left the area without a guard that they would be shot. The only POWs not to be sent there were the men who were hospitalized in the Malinta Tunnel. The area was said to be approximately 500 feet wide and 1500 feet long and was located between the beach and cliffs along Corregidor’s southern shore.
One of the first things the Japanese did to show the POWs they were in charge was they made the POWs strip off their clothes and pile them up until the pile was about ten feet high. Then they told the POWs they had five minutes to get dressed. Men grabbed whatever clothing they could get their hands on. The POWs were put on a concert tarmac, the Japanese soldiers took whatever they wanted from the POWs. They were not fed for three days. When they were fed, they were fed rice. Each POW was given a number which was painted on the back of his shirt or his pants if he didn’t have a shirt. The Filipino POWs were put on one side of the slab and separated from the Americans by an imaginary line. Open slit trenches were dug for the POWs to use as latrines. The surface of the latrines crawled with life and flies and other insects were everywhere which helped to spread disease. It was also stated that about 90% of the POWs became ill with dysentery, diarrhea, and malaria.
A detail was created to collect wood for the POWs to cook with. Twenty-five of the POWs were on this detail. One day a guard believed that two of the POWs had roamed too far, so he made all the POWs remove their head coverings and sit facing the sun. On a different detail, another POW was severely beaten after a Japanese guard was shocked attempting to start the truck the man drove for the Japanese. Other POWs had short-wired the starter and the guard had received a shock. The POW who was beaten could not work for four days.
The POWs were put to work by the Japanese cleaning up debris on the island and the POWs were used to resume construction of the airfield that was being built on the island. Any ordnance left on the island was collected and the POWs loaded the captured food from Malinta Tunnel on barges that took it to Manila. The POWs supplemented their meals with canned food they found while cleaning the debris or stealing it while it was being loaded onto barges.
One detachment of POWs had the job of collecting the dead and burying them. The Japanese combat soldiers were a lot more respectful to the POWs than those troops who had not been in combat. POWs stated that they watched a Japanese soldier make a cross for the grave of a Marine, place a jug of water in it, and step back and salute. The guards allowed the POWs working on this detail to hunt for food and water.
For two weeks, the POWs were held in the garage area without any shade and with little water. Finally, the Japanese brought barges to take the POWs to Luzon. It was said that the POWs had to swim out to the barges. POWs stated they were packed into the barges and even when it was apparent no more men would fit, the Japanese still tried to put more on the barges. The POWs were taken to a point off the coast of Luzon on the east side of Manila Bay and made to jump into the water and swim to shore. Once on shore, they were put to work filling in shell craters on a pier. After they finished they were sent to a warehouse.
Around 4:00 one afternoon, they were lined up and put on a work detail. The POWs were put on small boats and taken to an area near Manila. The next day the men were taken to the Wawa Dam over the Marikina River. The POWs worked in the area of the dam repairing roads, moving large rocks, and repairing a dock. As they worked, the Japanese guarding them drank from buckets of water but for three days and nights made no effort to give any water to the POWs. When a new Japanese officer took over, he treated the POWs better. They did this work until the work ended on May 18th when they returned to the warehouse. It was stated they spent a total of 15 to 18 days at the warehouse. They received food and water and then were loaded onto an old ship that looked like it hauled ore. They were taken to Manila, disembarked, and marched ten miles to Bilibid Prison. Anyone who fell out was left behind. During the march, the Americans saw Filipinos flash the “V” for victory. Other Filipinos left tubs of water with cups so they could drink. The Filipinos tried to give them coconuts, cigarettes, and other items, but those who were caught were beaten by the Japanese..
His parents received a letter from the War Department in May 1942.
Dear Mrs. C. McDow:
According to War Department records, you have been designated as the emergency addressee of Private Emmit A. McDow, 38,021,013, who, according to the latest information available, was serving in the Philippine Islands at the time of the final surrender.
I deeply regret that it is impossible for me to give you more information than is contained in this letter. In the last days before the surrender of Bataan, there were casualties which were not reported to the War Department. Conceivably the same is true of the surrender of Corregidor and possibly other islands of the Philippines. The Japanese Government has indicated its intention of conforming to the terms of the Geneva Convention with respect to the interchange of information regarding prisoners of war. At some future date, this Government will receive through Geneva a list of persons who have been taken prisoners of war. Until that time the War Department cannot give you positive information.
The War Department will consider the persons serving in the Philippine Islands as “missing in action” from the date of surrender of Corregidor, May 7, 1942, until definite information to the contrary is received. It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government will communicate a list of prisoners of war at an early date. At that time you will be notified by this office in the event that his name is contained in the list of prisoners of war. In the case of persons known to have been present in the Philippines and who are not reported to be prisoners of war by the Japanese Government, the War Department will continue to carry them as “missing in action” in the absence of information to the contrary, until twelve months have expired. At the expiration of twelve months and in the absence of other information the War Department is authorized to make a final determination.
Recent legislation makes provision to continue the pay and allowances of persons carried in a “missing” status for a period not to exceed twelve months; to continue, for the duration of the war, the pay and allowances of persons known to have been captured by the enemy; to continue allotments made by missing personnel for a period of twelve months and allotments or increase allotments made by persons by the enemy during the time they are so held; to make new allotments or increase allotments to certain dependents defined in Public Law 490, 77th Congress. The latter dependents generally include the legal wife, dependent children under twenty-one years of age, and dependent mother, or such dependents as having been designated in official records. Eligible dependents who can establish a need for financial assistance and are eligible to receive this assistance the amount allotted will be deducted from pay which would otherwise accrue to the credit of the missing individual.
Very Truly Yours
(signed)
J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General
The POWs spent the night at Bilibid Prison in what was called the Outer Compound. Those POWs being held in Bilibid were held in the Inner compound. From May 26th to 28th, the Japanese marched 2,000 POWs a day from Bilibid to the train station in Manila where they boarded freight cars. Each car held 75 to 80 men. In the cars, the POWs were taken to the barrio of Cabanatuan where they lived in an old schoolhouse for the night. The next morning, the POWs formed 100 men detachments and then ordered them to march. The march to the camp was 15 to 20 miles, and the POWs were warned that anyone who fell would be killed. When the first POW fell a guard ran up to him and aimed his rifle at him, but the man got up and ran back into the column. This happened several times until a POW fell and could not get up. The guard aimed his gun at the man, but when he still didn't get up, the guard raised his arm, and in his hand was a red flag. A truck pulled up and the POW was put into it. When the prisoners saw this, it wasn’t very long until many of them were falling out and were not able to get up so they could get a ride to the camp.
The POWs walked almost six miles and passed Cabanatuan #1 - which had not opened - where the men who were captured on Bataan and took part in the death march were held. They next passed Cabanatuan #2 which was about four miles past Camp #1. The camp did not have an adequate water supply and was closed, but it later reopened and housed Naval POWs. They continued to Cabanatuan 3 which was about seven miles from Camp #1 and was where those men captured on Corregidor were taken. The POWs arrived at Camp #3 from May 26th to May 29th in detachments of 1500 to 2,000 men which meant the total number of POWs in the camp was about 6,000 men.
Four POWs walked away from the camp on May 30th. After they escaped, the men realized that they had no place to go, so they attempted to surrender themselves to the Japanese. The Japanese tied them to posts and left them to hang in the sun. They also beat the POWs with boards. The Japanese also showed the men water but would not give them any to drink. The next day, while the POWs were eating dinner, the Japanese marched the men to where the prisoners were eating. They had the men dig their own graves and gave each man a cigarette and water. They also offered blindfolds to the men. All the men took a blindfold except one. That man spat at the Japanese before they shot him. After they were shot, the men fell backward into the graves. When one man who had survived the execution attempted to crawl out of the grave, a Japanese officer shot him with his pistol. He next shot each man to make sure they were dead.
Meals at first consisted of an onion soup without any onions in it. Later, the meals consisted of 16 ounces of rice for each man each day, and 4 ounces of top greens (similar to spinach) were issued. Once a week, one ounce of carabao meat was issued. Two ounces of coconut were issued and this was used with cornstarch and sugar to make a pudding. Also, once per week for one month, one small banana was issued and this was also used for pudding. It appears that during the first month in the camp, the POWs also received 15 limes.
The camp hospital consisted of 30 wards that could hold 40 men each, but it was more common for them to have 100 men in them. Each man had approximately an area of 2 feet by 6 feet to lie in. The sickest POWs were put in “Zero Ward,” which was called this because it was missed by the Japanese when they counted the barracks. The Japanese put a fence up around the building to protect themselves from diseases and would not go into the area. There were two rolls of wooden platforms around the perimeter of the inside of the building. The sickest POWs were put on the lower platform which had holes cut into it so they could relieve themselves. The platforms were covered with human excrement which dripped down from the higher platform until the POWs lying on the lower platform. Most of those who entered the ward died.
According to records kept at Cabanatuan #1, Pvt. Emmit A. McDow died from malnutrition and an abscess to the right hip at approximately 8:00 A.M. on Monday, July 13, 1942. He was the 857 POW to die in the camp and was buried in the camp cemetery in Grave 1106 with 31 other POWs who died on that date.
In May 1943, the families of men whom the War Department did not have any information on received letters from the department.
Dear Mrs. C. McDow:
The records of the War Department show your son, Private Emmit A. McDow, 38,021,013, Infantry, missing in action in the Philippine Islands since May 7, 1942.
All available information concerning your son has been carefully considered and under the provisions of Public Law 490, 77th Congress, as amended, an official determination has been made continuing him on the records of the War Department in a missing status. The law sited provides that pay and allowances are to be credited to the missing person’s account and payment of allotments to authorized allottees are to be continued during the absence of such persons in a missing status.
I fully appreciate your concern and deep interest. You will, without further request on your part, receive immediate notification of any change in your son’s status. I regret that the far-flung operations of the present war, the ebb and flow of the combat over the great distances in isolated areas, and the characteristics of our enemies impose on us the heavy burden of uncertainty with respect to the safety of our loved ones.
Very Truly Yours
(signed)
J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General
It is not known that some families in 1944 received another letter from the War Department telling them that it was declaring their relative dead while other families received a letter stating that the relatives status as missing in action would be continued. Emmit’s family was told he was still considered missing in action.
When the POWs at Cabanatuan and Bilibid Prison were liberated in January and February 1945, respectively, the death records kept in Camp O’Donnell, Cabanatuan, Bilibid Prison, from work details and individual units were recovered. It was from those records that the actual dates of death for men who had been listed as Missing in Action were learned.
His mother received a telegram from the War Department.
MRS C MCDOW
ROUTE 2 CANUTE OKLAHOMA
=REPORT NOW RECEIVED THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS STATES THAT YOUR SON PRIVATE EMMIT A MC DOW WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED MISSING IN ACTION DIED THIRTEEN JULY NINETEEN FORTY TWO WHILE A PRISONER OF WAR OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AS A RESULT OF DISEASE THE SECRETARY OF WAR EXTENDS HIS DEEP SYMPATHY CONFIRMING LETTER FOLLOWS=
=J A ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.
J A ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
A letter followed.
Dear Mrs. McDow:
It is with profound regret that I confirm the recent telegram informing you of the death of your son, Private Emmit A. McDow, 38,021,013, Infantry, who was previously reported missing in action.
An official report has now been received which states that he was killed in action in the Philippine Islands on 13 July 1942.
I realize the great suspense you have endured during this unfortunately long period and now, the finality to those hopes which you have cherished for his safety. Although little may be said or done at this time to alleviate your grief, it is my fervent hope that later the knowledge that he gave his life for his country may be sustaining comfort to you.
I extend my profound sympathy in your bereavement.
Sincerely, yours
(signed)
J. A. ULIO
The Adjutant General
This was followed by another letter.
Dear Mrs. McDow:
Permit me to extend to you my heartfelt sympathy for the loss of your son, Private Emmit A. McDow, 38,020,013, who died on the thirteenth of July, 1942, from malaria and an abscess on his right hip at Cabanatuan Camp, Philippine Islands, while a prisoner of war of the Japanese.
The casualty reports received contain few details. They were of necessity meager, due to the inability of the persons confined by the Japanese to prepare and keep the necessary records. We do know, however, that he is buried on Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Anything I can say is scant consolation to you in your grief. It is my fervent hope that later, the knowledge that his courage and sacrifices contributed to the final victory may be of sustaining comfort to you.
Very truly yours
(signed)
C. W. MacELLVEN
Major, AGD
Ass’t Adj Gen
The American Graves Registration Service had the job of recovering the dead, so in early 1945, it sent out teams to the POW camps to recover the dead. One team reported that on the marker in Plot 11, Row 0, Grave 1106 in the Cabanatuan Cemetery was one of Emmit’s government issued identification tags along with ID tags of other men buried in the grave. When the grave was exhumed Emmit’s other ID tag was found with his remains. In a shelter half – because caskets were not available – Emmit was buried in the United States Armed Forces Cemetery #2, Manila, in Plot 3, Row 15, Grave 1878, on February 18, 1946. The cemetery was a holding area for the dead until dental records were available to confirm identification.
His mother received a letter dated October 3, 1946, telling her where Emmit was buried. The letter also stated that she would receive another letter in the future with information on her options for his final burial. That letter, dated November 20, 1946, provided her with her options for his burial and asked her to fill-out and return an enclosed form, to the Quartermaster Corps in Washington DC, indicating where she wanted him buried.
In a written response, dated December 9, 1947, she stated that Emmit should remain buried where he was at. She also thanked the War Department for its kindness. On October 11, 1949, Pvt. Emmit McDow was buried in the new American Military Cemetery, outside of Manila, in Plot E, Row 6, Grave 52. The flag from his casket was sent to his mother with a letter, dated November 7, 1949, telling her the location of his grave. Pvt. Emmit A. McDow’s cross shows he was a member of the 194th Tank Battalion. D Company was attached to the 194th Tank Battalion, but it was never officially transferred to the 194th and remained part of the 192nd Tank Battalion. The company is listed on the Presidential Unit Citations awarded to the 192nd.
