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REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF
SOUTH LUZON FORCE,
BATAAN DEFENSE FORCE, &
II PHILIPPINE CORPS
IN THE
DEFENSE OF SOUTH LUZON
AND BATAAN

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8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 9 APRIL 1942

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Annex V

REPORT OF

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE M PARKER JR

FORMERLY COMMANDING

THE SOUTH LUZON FORCE, THE BATAAN DEFENSE FORCE

AND THE

II PHILIPPINE CORPS

FROM 8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 9 APRIL 1942

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INTRODUCTION

On 10 June 1942, the Japanese had assembled at Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippine Islands, all the American General Officers and Colonels who had been captured on Bataan or Corregidor. Among these were the Commanders and some of the Staff Officers of all the larger units of the South Luzon Force, the Bataan Defense Force, and the II Philippine Corps.

In conference with these officers, I prepared a narrative report, all copies of which were later confiscated by the Japanese. Some notes were preserved, however, which form the basis of this report. It is accurate in its main feature.

It tells the story of a force attacked during mobilization. Initially lacking in organization and training, and woefully deficient in equipment and vital supplies throughout, it resisted the best troops of Japan until casualties, sickness, and lack of food and ammunition forced it to yield to a superior force.

Mobilization Status of the South Luzon Force, 8 December 1941.

Organization.

The organization of the South Luzon Force on 8 December 1941 consisted of the following units.

Headquarters South Luzon Force

41st Division

51st Division

Staff Luzon Force.

The Headquarters South Luzon Force on 8 December 1941 was organized as follows.

Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr.,	Commanding
Captain John Neiger	Aide
Major Thomas M. Tarpley, Jr.	Adjutant General
Major Ovid O. Wilson	Asst C/S - G-1
Major Dennis M. Moore	Asst C/S - G-2
Captain Arthur G. Christensen	Asst to Asst C/S, G-2
Lt Col Howard D. Johnston	Asst C/S - G-3
Major Albert C. Wolfe	Asst to Asst C/S, G-3
Major John H. Bennett	Asst C/S - G-4
Major Hal C. Granberry, Inf.	Signal Officer
Captain William C. Chenoweth	Engineer Officer
Lt Col Arthur L. Shreve	Artillery Officer
Major W. Hinton Drummond	Surgeon
Lieutenant Nicholas N. Mihailov	Air Liaison Officer
Lt Col K. L. Berry	Quartermaster and Ordnance

This staff had only recently been formed. Throughout the period 1 September, the date of initial mobilization of Philippine Army units, to the latter part of November, there were few officers available, and I had gone through the very active period of initial mobilization and training with a very meager staff, consisting of five officers and two enlisted men.

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The above staff was augmented after December 8, as officers or enlisted personnel became available. A Headquarter and MP Company was eventually formed consisting of a mixture of American MPs, retired Philippine Scout soldiers returned to active duty and Civilian Cooks and Houseboys. Trained technicians were almost totally lacking throughout. Frequent changes in personnel were made to meet existing emergencies.

The following officers served as Chiefs of Staff as shown.

Colonel Stewart C. McDonald December 8 - December 24

Colonel Louis R. Dougherty December 25 - January 23

Brigadier General Arnold J. Funk January 23 - March 2

Colonel Charles L. Steele from March 2 to April 9.

Mobilization of Units.

The units of the South Luzon Force had been mobilized and inducted as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Date</u>
41st Division Headquarters & Hq Co Signal Co, Ord Co (LM)	Tagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st Infantry	Tagaytay	2 Nov 41
42d Infantry	Tagaytay	1 Sep 41
43d Infantry	Tagaytay	24 Nov 41
41st Field Artillery	Tagaytay	24 Nov 41
41st Engineer Battalion	Tagaytay	1 Oct 41
41st Medical Battaion	Tagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st QM Service Company	Tagaytay	17 Nov 41
41st Motor Transport Company	Tagaytay	17 Nov 41
51st Division Headquarters & Hq Co Signal Co, Ord (LM)	Santo Tomas, Batangas	17 Nov 41
51st Infantry	Banay, Banay	2 Nov 41
52d Infantry	Santo Tomas	1 Sep 41
53d Infantry	Rosario	24 Nov 41
51st Field Artillery One Battalion each at	Banay, Banay Santo Tomas Rosario	15 Dec 41

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Date</u>
51st Engineer Battalion	Santo Tomas	25 Oct 41
51st Medical Battalion	Santo Tomas	1 Dec 41
51st QM Service Company	Santo Tomas	17 Nov 41
51st Motor Transport Company	Santo Tomas	17 Nov 41

Personnel

Under the Table of Organization, Philippine Army, the Divisions were organized as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	Officers and men
Three (3) Infantry Regiments (approx 1400 each)	4200
One (1) Artillery Regiment	Approx 1000
One (1) Anti-Tank Battalion	" 600
One (1) Engineer Battalion	" 600
One (1) Medical Battalion	" 500
One (1) Quartermaster Battalion	" 500
Div Hq & Hq Co, Sig Co, Ord Co (LM) Motor Trans Co	" 800
Total	8200

Of this total approximately 500 were officers.

In each division of my force about 40 U. S. Army Officers and 20 U. S. Army or Philippine Scout Non-Commissioned Officers were assigned. In the 41st Division they were instructors, while in the 51st Division the officers were assigned to command to include battalions.

The 41st Division was practically at full strength in personnel at the outbreak of hostilities. The Anti-Tank Battalion, due to lack of equipment was never organized as such but the personnel was absorbed in other units. The personnel of the 41st Division was from Batangas Province or its environs and spoke the Tagalog dialect.

The 51st Division had about two-thirds strength in their Infantry Regiments. Due to lack of equipment the Anti-Tank Battalion was absorbed in other units and two battalions of the 51st Field Artillery were formed into a provisional Infantry Battalion.

The enlisted men of the 51st Division were from the Bicol Peninsula and spoke the Bicolanian dialect while the majority of the officers spoke only Tagalog.

As time progressed Civilian labor was used extensively whenever available as vehicle drivers and as laborers in construction of roads and defense installations and to augment the Service Units. The numbers varied from 1500 to 3000 in my force.

Training.

Prior to 1 September 1941, a thirteen-week schedule of basic training had been prepared for all Philippine Army units. This schedule called for $5\frac{1}{2}$ days, of eight hours daily, each week. It stressed physical development, training with basic weapons, scouting and patrolling and small unit operations. After this thirteen weeks of basic training had been completed, further schedule of battalion and regimental training had been prepared.

On 8 December one regiment in each division, namely the 42d and 52d Infantry had completed their thirteen weeks basic training. The 41st and 51st Infantry had completed five weeks of the training period and the 43d and 53d Infantry had received no training at all. The 41st Field Artillery, mobilized on 24 November, had just begun their training while the 51st Field Artillery was not mobilized until after the declaration of war and due to the shortage of equipment, only two batteries of this unit were ever to function as artillery. The remainder of this unit was organized and trained after the war began as a provisional Infantry Battalion.

Cadre Camps had been established on 1 September for officers and key non-commissioned officers in units not yet mobilized as follows.

41st Division - Canulubang - Major E. T. Lewis

51st Division - Daraga - Major J. H. Bennett

Engineers of all Units - Camp Murphy - Captain William Gay

Signal of all Units - Ft William McKinley - Col. Murphy

Medical of all Units - Ft William McKinley - Col. Duckworth

By this method, limited training was given key personnel, but training of technicians was very inadequate.

In all of the training, many obstacles were encountered. In the 51st Division, for instance, the enlisted men spoke the Bicolanian dialect, the Filipino officers spoke only Tagalog in many instances, and the American Instructors spoke neither, while the Filipino spoke little English.

At some period during the preceding five years, the units of the Philippine Army presumably had received five and one-half months of training. This was never apparent. The training had been done under their own Filipino officers, had consisted largely of close order drill, and was to prove of little value.

Training facilities and equipment were almost non-existent, target ranges were hurriedly improvised but many units went into battle without ever having fired their basic arm.

Equipment.

Infantry. The basic infantry weapons were the Enfield Rifle, the Browning Automatic Rifle, the Browning Water-cooled Machine Gun, and the three-inch Stokes Mortar (obsolescent type).

There were no spare parts available and many of the weapons were found to be incomplete upon unpacking at the warehouse, where they had been long stored.

The well-known structural weakness of the Enfield Rifle (weak extractor) put many rifles out of action early in the war as there were no replacements. Lack of spare parts for machine guns made many of these ineffective. Fully 70% of the mortar ammunition proved to be duds.

Field Artillery. The basic weapons for the Field Artillery were the British 75-mm's with wooden wheels and some 2.95 pack (mountain guns). No transportation was available other than improvised commandeered vehicles. The Field Artillery was also lacking many vital fire control instruments.

All of the above shortages were requisitioned from the United States

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immediately upon their discovery in September, but were never to arrive.

Individual Equipment. The Filipino soldier was equipped with a light paper tropical helmet, fatigue clothes, and rubber-soled, canvas shoes. Full field equipment was lacking in many essentials, such as blankets, shelter-halves, etc. There were no replacements for these items, so many soldiers were shortly barefooted and ragged.

Signal Equipment. The only signal equipment available was that necessary to provide communication within a Command Post. A few radio sets with limited ranges were issued, but lack of trained operators made this means very unreliable.

At the beginning of mobilization during the months of September, October and November, units of my force were scattered in small encampments over the province of Batangas, and the entire lower Bicol Peninsula, with one unit on the Island of Masbate. Control and supervision were exceedingly difficult.

Transportation. A few government sedans were eventually issued to my force, sufficient for the General Officers. Otherwise, commandeered cars, trucks, and busses were the only transportation facilities available. Lack of trained personnel forced the use of civilian drivers and mechanics in most instances. These were most unreliable, often deserting their vehicles at any sign of danger and, as many of the vehicles were in a poor state mechanically, transportation problems greatly hampered movement and operations.

Supply. Initially two systems of supply were in effect, one for the American soldier and the other for the Filipino. After the outbreak of the war, any supplies available were issued without regard to the systems. Many supplies were procured locally and the amount was largely dependent on the initiative and energy of the individual supply officer.

Immediately after the outbreak of war, supply depots for my force were established by USAFFE at Los Banos, Laguna de Bay, and Tanauan, Batangas. However units were supplied from any installations available.

Operations of South Luzon Force.

(See Appendices No's 2 and 3)

Initial Mission. The initial mission assigned the South Luzon Force was to prevent a landing. In the event a landing was made, it was to counter-attack and destroy the landing force.

The Defensive Area. The area assigned the South Luzon Force for defense included all of Southern Luzon, south of the Northern boundary Rosario-Binan-Pililla-Infanta (inclusive) to the line Padre Burgos-Atimonan (inclusive). This latter line (south boundary) cut the bottle-neck into the Bicol Peninsula at its narrowest point. Higher authority had made the decision not to defend the Bicol Peninsula due to the extent of the peninsula and the inadequacy of the troops available.

General Description of Area. The area assigned the South Luzon Force included 250 miles of possible landing beaches. It was ninety miles wide at its widest point and sixty miles in depth.

The area was generally characterized by a good network of all weather roads, crossing over numerous rivers and streams. Many bridges in this area were of permanent stone construction making their destruction by the material available exceedingly difficult.

One railroad ran from Manila South. At Calamba a spur ran to Los Banos. At Malvar it forked, the right (west) fork going to Batangas and the left (east) fork leading into the Bicol Peninsula, where it ended at Daraga.

Several distinct terrain features in this area created many bottle-necks. Its area included five bays all to be considered possible landing places.

Detailed Study of Sectors. Nagsubu, Balayan, and Batangas Bays were considered the most probable landing places, due to their proximity to Manila and the road net leading thereto.

An all-weather road followed the beach on Nasugbu Bay from Nasugbu Point to Calatagan, on Balayan Bay to S. Luis, and on Batangas Bay from

Mabini to Batangas. From this beach highway that practically traversed the beach line of these three bays, several all-weather highways led into improved routes leading to Manila. This area included the terrain features of the Pico-de-Loro Mountain Mass, Mt. Batulac, Tagaytay Ridge, Lake Taal, and the western edge of Laguna de Bay. These formidable obstacles created many bottlenecks which would canalize forces operating in this area to the road net.

Tayabas Bay. Several all-weather roads led from the beach to Highways No. 1 and 23 leading into Manila. This area included the mountain mass, Mt. Banahao. Many streams, the rugged terrain, and the Laguna de Bay would confine forces operating in this area to the roads and terrain adjacent thereto.

Lamon Bay. Only three roads led from points along this fifty-miles of beach, one from Atimonan, one from Mauban, and one from Tignuan. All of these traversed very rugged terrain, through many defiles and with experienced troops would have been easily defended.

The Navy had stated that a landing on this beach was improbable at this time of the year due to monsoons rendering the waters unsuitable for landing operations.

Initial Assignment of Troops to Sectors:

Sectors were assigned as follows: Boundary between Sectors Lemery-Binan (both to 51st Division).

Right (West) Sector - 41st Division

Northern Boundary - Rosario (inclusive) - Binan (exclusive)

Left (East) Sector - 51st Division

Northern Boundary - Binan-Pililla-Infanta (all inclusive)

Southern Boundary - Padre Burgos-Antimonan (both inclusive)

Operations South Luzon Force Prior to 24 December 1941.

On 26 November 1941, I received instructions from the Commanding General USAFFE that diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating rapidly and to alert all troops and be prepared to meet a surprise attack.

I immediately dispatched staff officers to General Lim, (Philippine Army), Colonel Jones, and Lieutenant Colonel Hunter, (then commanding the 51st Infantry at Daraga) with the following orders:

- (1) Establish beach patrol twenty-four hours daily, immediately.
- (2) Prepare plans to move your troops without delay and defend beaches within your sector in case of a surprise landing.

Prior to 8 December 1941, additional warnings were received from USAFFE of possible Japanese surprise landings. My Division Commanders were ordered to occupy the most vulnerable areas within their division sectors, to start preparation of beach defense positions, erect obstacles at both high and low water levels, and to start entrenching. Within the cantonment areas, construction of near-by trenches were ordered to protect personnel in case of surprise air attack. Plans were made to move the 43d Infantry and 52d Infantry by civilian transportation to critical points.

A Provisional Battalion, 86th Field Artillery (155-mm guns), Major Winfield Scott, Commanding, operating under USAFFE control, occupied their dummy position and were engaged in reconnaissance and preparation of battle positions for the defense of Nasugbu, Balayan, and Batangas Bays, the most probable points of attack within South Luzon Force Sector.

About 5:00 AM, 8 December 1941, I was notified by telephone at my quarters at Fort McKinley that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. Staff officers were dispatched to my Division Commanders with orders to alert their divisions and to effect their war plans.

About 9 December, a flight of reconnaissance planes, Philippine Air Corps was attached to the South Luzon Force. Two planes were dispatched twice each day to detect any invasion force. The planes^{were}/dispatched late

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each afternoon and at daylight each morning. One covered a possible invasion force against the Infanta-Atimonan Coast Line, and the other possible invasions against the Nasugbu, Balayan, Batangas, Tayabas Bay Areas.

On 12 December 1941, a telegram from the railroad Station Master at Legaspi reported Japanese transports with naval escort off Legaspi Albay. This force, later estimated as a reinforced Brigade, landed unopposed and immediately started moving to the northwest. Information on the progress of this movement was reported by telegraph by the railroad civilian employees. After the troops had been unloaded, the Japanese immediately started loading all available rice and oil supplies. Orders were issued to remove all available railroad equipment and for all Americans to withdraw to Manila.

Colonel Jones was ordered to dispatch Engineer Detachments to Bicol Peninsula to prepare railroad bridges and highway bridges for demolition. Colonel Casey, USAFFE Engineer Officer, was requested to have railroad civilian employees destroy railroad bridges near Sipicot in order to delay enemy advance to the north.

Further construction in cantonment areas was ordered discontinued, and Engineer troops were ordered to start intensive combat training, with particular emphasis on training of demolition teams and construction of road blocks.

On 14 December, I moved my Command Post from Fort William McKinley to Binan. At this time I ordered my Engineer Officer (Major Chenoweth) to rush to completion the construction of the road between Tagaytay City and Talisay in order to expedite the movement of reserve units from one division sector to the other.

Commercial telephone and telegraph facilities within my sector were meager, especially within the 41st Division Area. For instance to contact the 41st Division Command Post, it was necessary to call through commercial lines in Manila or to use special or scheduled messenger service. Adequate

signal personnel and equipment were not available. A Major of Infantry was appointed as Signal Officer. My personal request for a qualified Signal Officer was refused by USAFFE. Maintaining control of troops deployed over an area of approximately 5000 square miles and with a coast line of approximately 250 miles, placed a great burden on our meager signal personnel.

By 17 December, contact was made at the railroad bridge near Ragay. A demolition detachment of the 51st Engineer Battalion was fired on by a Japanese detachment, while preparing a railroad bridge near Ragay Camarines for destruction. On learning of this contact, I ordered Colonel Jones to send not to exceed one Battalion, reinforced by Engineer Demolition Detachments, into Bicol Peninsula to contact and delay the enemy advance. Both the highway and railroad were ordered to be covered.

About 18 December, Company "C", 194th Tank Battalion was ordered into the South Luzon Force Sector. I recommended that this unit be used on the beaches. This unit was under the control of USAFFE and Colonel Weaver, the Tank Force Commander, recommended that the tanks be held in mobile reserve in the vicinity of Sampaloc, Cavite. This recommendation was approved by USAFFE. On 18 December, I was promoted to Major General A.U.S. Colonel A. M. Jones was promoted to Brigadier General A.U.S.

On 19 December, a Japanese Force, estimated as an Infantry Battalion was reported to be in Sipicot, and Japanese patrols were moving via highway towards Daet and north on the railroad towards Ragay.

On 20 December, a provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts), four batteries, Lieutenant Colonel David S. Babcock, Commanding, was attached to the South Luzon Force and ordered to Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Santo Tomas. The status of the Artillery in my Corps was now as follows:

41st Division Sector:

41st Field Artillery (organic) consisting of:

2 Battalions 75mm guns - 16 guns

1 Battalion 2.95 MT guns - 8 guns

86th Field Artillery (PS) consisting of:

1 Battalion (less one battery) 155mm - 4 guns

51st Division Sector:

✓ 51st Field Artillery (organic) consisting of:

1 Battalion 75mm guns - 8 guns

86th Field Artillery consisting of:

1 Battery 155mm guns - 2 guns

Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Santo Tomas:

1 Battalion of Self-Propelled 75mm guns - 16 guns.

The Field Artillery was disposed in sectors as follows:

41st Division Sector:

41st Field Artillery:

1 Battalion at Lucsuhin (Nasubuu Bay)

1 Battalion at Bana (Balayan Bay)

1 Battalion at Dacanlao (Balayan Bay)

86th Field Artillery (155mm guns):

1 Battery (2 guns) Nasubu (Nasubu Bay)

1 Battery (2 guns) Dacanlao (Balayan Bay)

51st Division Sector:

// 51st Field Artillery (1 Battalion equipped as Field Artillery)

All on Tayabas Bay

86th Field Artillery:

1 Battery at Banaba (Batangas Bay)

The artillery was disposed to cover most vital landing places with the exception of Lamon Bay. The lack of artillery in this area, particularly at Atimonan caused me considerable worry.

On December 20 my artillery officer made a reconnaissance at Atimonan and surveyed positions there. I sent him to Manila on December 22, to request two 155mm howitzers of the newly formed 301st Field Artillery from USAFFE for that sector. This request was refused. This area was so important to me however, that I sent him again on the 23d of December reiterating my request with the strongest arguments possible. The request was again denied.

In the meantime USAFFE had issued an order confining the action of the Self-Propelled-Mount Battalion to the defense of road blocks. After a conference with General King, USAFFE Artillery Officer, this order was amended to allow this unit freedom of action under my orders.

On 22 December, the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, (Regular) Division arrived at Pagsanjan Laguna and was attached to the South Luzon Force. The general line Mauban-Lucban (both inclusive) was established as the southern boundary of the sector assigned to the 1st Infantry Regiment (Philippine Army, Regular Division). This unit was ordered to relieve the troops of the 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry, at Infanta, Tignuan, and Mauban. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, relieved the troops at Mauban, Tayabas. The 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, relieved the troops at Infanta and Tignuan Tayabas. The 1st Infantry, Philippine Army, (less 2d and 3d Battalions) was held in reserve near Pagsanjan. The 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry, when relieved, was moved to Malicbuy. The relief was completed about 6:00 PM 23 December.

About 5:00 PM 22 December, contact was made on the highway near Timbuyo and the Japanese troops were forced to withdraw about ten kilometers. Supply of our troops in the Bicol Peninsula was becoming serious due to the stretch of highway that had not been completed north of Sumalong and the deep mud encountered.

The reconnaissance plane dispatched on the evening of 22 December on its usual reconnaissance east of Infanta and Atimonan failed to return. This was the last plane available to me. The other two had already been destroyed.

On 23 December, the Provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) and the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army (Regular) Division were ordered by USAFFE to move to San Fernando, Tarlac, and revert to the control of the Commanding General, North Luzon Force.

General Jones was ordered to return the 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry to its original sector and the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, was ordered to assemble at Pagsanjan, preparatory to its movement to San

Fernando.

This relief started after dark 23 December. The Provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) started its movement after dark the night 23-24 December. All troops in the Bicol Peninsula were ordered to withdraw north of the line Padre Burgos-Atimonan, and this move was in progress during the night 23-24 December.

At 2:00 AM 24 December, the G-2, 51st Division reported that the Japanese had effected a landing at Atimonan. After daylight it was reported that forty Japanese transports with naval escort were at Atimonan and that twelve transports with naval escort were in Lamon Bay, off Mauban. Landings were reported at Mauban and at Sian.

In view of the changed situation, USAFFE was requested to return the Provisional Battalion (Self-Propelled Mounts) and to revoke the movement order of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army. The Battalion (less 1 Battery) Self-Propelled Mounts was returned and was ordered back to Santo Tomas and attached to the 51st Division. USAFFE approved my request that the 1st Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, remain attached to the South Luzon Force. The 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry was again released to General Jones who ordered it back to Malicbuy.

The enemy established a beach-head at Sian about midnight 23-24 December, and then made their main landing at Atimonan. They effected their landing at Mauban about 4:00 AM, 24 December. As stated above, the last of the three reconnaissance planes available to me failed to return from the afternoon reconnaissance on 22 December. Request for reconnaissance missions by USAFFE on 23 December were disapproved due to the few planes available and due to more important missions to be performed elsewhere. The Filipino aviators had flown under the most hazardous conditions since 8 December, and deserve the highest commendations for their excellent service.

The enemy force that landed at Atimonan was estimated to be a reinforced Division. The force which landed at Mauban was estimated to be a Brigade.

The enemy, after landing at Sian, moved north on Atimonan and along the railroad towards Padre Burgos. The troops under Colonel Cordero were cut off. Several officers, including Colonel Cordero, and a few men succeeded in rejoining their regiment, having moved by boat or banca from Pitolo on Tayabas Bay. Colonel Cordero with a small party destroyed the railroad cut at Padre Burgos. The destruction of bridges on the railroad proved to be most effective. It took the Japanese over a year to make necessary repairs before a train could run between Manila and Legaspi.

At 10:00 AM 24 December, I received orders from USAFFE to move the 41st Division, by motor, at once to Abucay, Bataan, to turn command of the South Luzon Force over to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, and to move to Bataan with my headquarters, establish the Bataan Defense Force, and organize the defense on the Abucay-Mauban line in accordance with the provisions of WPO #3.

A staff officer was dispatched to the Commanding General of the 41st Division to advise General Lim of the move. The necessary transportation was provided by my G-4, who, assisted General Lim in the movement.

I turned over the following staff officers to General Jones for staff duty at the new South Luzon Force Headquarters:

Colonel S. C. MacDonald, Infantry, C/S

Lt. Col. Arthur L. Shreve, Field Artillery, G-3

Captain Arthur G. Christensen, G-2

Captain Frederick L. Berry, Field Artillery, Artillery Officer

At noon 24 December, I turned command of the South Luzon Force over to Brigadier General Jones, and left for Abucay, Bataan, arriving there at 5:00 PM, same date. On arrival I assumed command of the Bataan Defense Force, relieving Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough.

Operations of South Luzon Force 24 December 1941 to 1 January 1942.

(See Appendix No. 2)

Operations of Bataan Defense Force (24 December 1941 to 6 January 1942)

(See Appendix No. 4)

Mission of the Bataan Defense Force

The mission of the Bataan Defense Force was to organize and defend the Bataan Peninsula, as far south as the Service Command area.

Area Assigned for Defense

Northern Boundary: Main Battle Position-The general line Abucay-Mt. Natib-Mauban.

Southern Boundary: The Alangan River-Mount Marivales-Paysawan River (all inclusive).

Eastern Boundary: Approximately 15 miles of shore line of Manila Bay between Abucay and Quitang Point (both inclusive).

Western Boundary: Approximately 15 miles of shore line along the China Sea between Mauban and the Paysawan River (both inclusive).

The distance from Abucay to Mauban along the Main Battle Position was approximately 20 miles. The terrain of the Bataan Defense Sector was very rugged except for a narrow strip varying from one to three miles wide along Manila Bay between Abucay and Orion. Mt. Natib, with an elevation of 4222 feet dominated that portion of the sector north of the Pilar-Bagac Road. It was heavily wooded and cut by many deep ravines.

Mount Samat and Mount Marivales (elevation 4700 feet) were the outstanding terrain features south of the Pilar-Bagac Road. The three mountains formed a mountain range running generally down the middle of the sector. All the terrain south of the Pilar-Bagac Road was heavily wooded or covered by thick jungle growth, except the small area between Pilar and Pandan.

The main streams emptied into the South China Sea or Manila Bay. The main streams which drained the Eastern slope of Mount Natib were the Calaguiman River, the Balantay River, and the Abo Abo River which emptied into the Balanga River. The ground west of Mt. Natib sloped abruptly to the west coast. The streams emptied directly into the China Sea. The

Maldica, Bagac, and Limutan Rivers drained the Southern slope of Mount Samat.

A good all-weather two way road (East Road) ran along the east coast from Abucay to Mariveles, and another from Pilar to Bagac through the broad gap in the mountain range between Mount Natib and Mount Samat. There was a good dry weather road (West Road) between Mariveles and Moron. An improved one way road ran from Abucay to Abucay Hacienda. No other communications existed except narrow trails. Moron was connected with Olongapo by a trail along the coast.

Because of the limited road net, it was evident that, unless additional landings were made, the main force of the Japanese attack would fall against the eastern half of the Main Battle Position. Enemy landings were possible at any place within the sector from both the China Sea and Manila Bay. Because of the road crossing the peninsula from Bagac, this point was considered especially vulnerable to enemy landings. The all-weather two way road from Olongapo to Layac Junction was another possible route of approach for enemy movements.

Organization of the Bataan Defense Force Area

The Bataan Defense Force Area was organized into:

- (1) The Main Battle Position: The general line Abucay-Mt Natib-Mauban.
- (2) The Reserve Battle Position: The general line Orion-Mt Samat-Bagac.
- (3) The Beach Defenses.

The Area was divided into the East Sector and the West Sector. The boundary between sectors was Mt Natib-Maldica River-Pantingan River (all to West Sector). Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough was assigned to command the East Sector, and Brigadier General Clifford Bluemel was assigned to command the West Sector, pending the arrival of Major General J. M. Wainwright. In general those troops composing the North Luzon Force were assigned the West Sector. Since the main effort of a Japanese attack was expected to be made against the East Sector the mass of troops were assigned

to this sector as the troops arrived in Bataan.

ORDER OF ARRIVAL AND TROOP ASSIGNMENT

Upon my arrival in Bataan the only troops then in my area were the Philippine Division (PS) (less the 57th Combat Team and one Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS)), Brigadier General Lough Commanding and the Provisional Air Corps Regiment (organized as an Infantry Regiment) Colonel Harrison H.C. Richards Jr., Commanding.

The order of arrival of units was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Movement Started</u>	<u>Movement completed</u>
31st Division (PA)	2:00 PM 24 December	night 26-27 December
41st Division (PA)	2:00 AM 25 December	28 December
+ 57th Combat Team (PS)	30 December	30-31 December night
1st Regular Division (PA)	27 December	31 December
51st Division (PA)	night 31 December	1 January
1st Brig (PC)(later 2d Reg Div (PA))	1 January	6 January
11th Division (PA)	night 5-6 January	6 January
21st Division (PA)	night 5-6 January	6 January
71st Division (PA)	10:00 PM 2 January (to covering force position)	7 January
26th Cavalry (PS)	night 5-6 January (to covering force position)	9 January

The 86th Field Artillery, 301st Field Artillery, Self-Propelled Mounts, and tanks arrived intermittently during the period 26 December - 6 January. Assignment of troops to sectors was as follows:

To East Sector: 41st Division (PA), 57th Combat Team (PS), 51st Division (PA), 11th Division (PA), 21st Division (PA), 86th Field Artillery, 301st Field Artillery.

To West Sector: 31st Division (PA), 45th Combat Team (less one battalion), 1st Division (PA) Regular, 91st Division (PA), 71st Division (PA), 26th Cavalry (PS).

Organization of Main Battle Position

The Main Battle Position was occupied from left to right by: 57th Combat Team, 41st Division (PA), 51st Division (PA)(less 52d Infantry), Provisional (Infantry) Battalion, 31st Field Artillery, 1st Regular Division (PA).

Work on the Main Battle Position astride the East Road near Abucay was started on 24 December by the 31st Infantry (US)(less one battalion). On 28 January this unit moved to Colis to help prepare the Covering Force position. Work was continued on the 30th December by the 57th Infantry (PS). This unit occupied and completed the organization of a sector approximately 3000 yards wide extending west from Manila Bay. (That portion of the Main Battle Position astride Mt Natib between the left of the 51st Infantry (PA) and Mt Silanganan approximately 9000 meters was not organized for defense but was covered by patrols. The terrain in this area was extremely difficult, traversed by deep gorges and covered with dense jungles. It took two days to travel from the occupied portion of the west sector front to the left flank of the 51st Division. Contact between sectors was never satisfactorily established.)

The MLR on the right ran through the barrio Mabatang to a point approximately 5000 yards west of Abucay Hacienda, and on the left from the beach just north of Mauban to Mt Silanganan. The OPLR on the east ran along the Kalaguiman River and on the west along the Nagbalayong River. The RRL on the right was about 600 yards north of Abucay and on the left flank it ran through Mauban Point. That portion of the Main Battle Position that was occupied was protected by a double apron barbed wire obstacle. A mine field was laid in the left of the 57th Infantry sector. Bridges on the East Road in front of the MLR were destroyed. Fields of fire were cleared and work on trenches, gun emplacements, command posts, etc. was speeded up to the maximum of physical endurance.

Despite the fact that the men were not equipped with individual entrenching tools and that each division had only about fifty picks and shovels and very few axes in the Engineer Battalions, they made a very formidable defensive line by using their bayonets and even meat can lids as entrenching tools. Too much praise cannot be given them for their tremendous effort in organizing the Main Battle Position.

On arrival in Bataan the 41st Division (PA) was initially assigned that portion of the MLR extending from the left of the 31st Infantry (US) to Mt Natib. All three regiments of the 41st Division were employed on the position in order from right to left: 41st Infantry, 42d Infantry, 43d Infantry.

On 5 January the 51st Division (less 52d Infantry on beach defense) relieved elements of the 41st Division (PA) on the Main Battle Position west of Abucay Hacienda. The 41st Division troops which were relieved by the 51st Division was used to strengthen the new 41st Division Sector, which now extended only as far west as Abucay Hacienda. The 51st Division employed both the 51st Infantry and 53d Infantry Regiments on the Main Battle Position. The 51st Infantry occupied a sector of 2100 yards extending west from the Abucay Hacienda. The 53d Infantry occupied a sector defending a front of over 3000 yards on the left of the 51st Infantry.

On the arrival of the 31st Division in Bataan the 32d Infantry (PA) and a provisional battalion of the 31st Field Artillery, armed with rifles, two (2) Cal.50 machine guns and four (4) caliber .30 machine guns were assigned to organize the Mt Silanganan-Mauban portion of the line. On arrival of the 1st Regular Division (PA), the 32d Infantry (PA) was relieved, and the 1st Regular Division (PA) occupied the left of the Main Battle Position and completed the organization thereof.

Supporting Artillery Bataan Defense Force.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
11th F.A. (PA)	10-75mm guns	East Sector Beach Defense
21st F.A. (PA)	24-75mm guns	East Sector Beach Defense
31st F.A. (PA)	8-75mm guns	West Sector-Main Battle Position and Beach Def.
41st F.A. (PA)	16-75mm guns 8-2.95 mm guns	East Sector, Direct Support 41st Division
51st F.A. (PA)	8-75mm guns	East Sector, Direct Support 51st Division

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
71st F.A. (PA)	2-75mm guns 4-2.95's Mt Guns	Covering force, later West Sector
91st F.A. (PA)	8-75mm guns	West Sector
1st Bn, 24th FA (PS)	8-75mm guns 4-2.95 Mt Guns	East Sector, Direct Sup- port 45th Infantry
2d Bn, 24th FA (PS)	8-75mm guns 4-2.95 Mt Guns	West Sector, Direct Sup- port 45th Infantry
1st Bn, 23d FA	12-75mm guns	Covering Force
2d Bn, 23d FA	8-2.95 Mt Guns	West Sector, Main Battle Position
86th FA Bn (PS)	12-155mm guns GPF	East Sector General Support
301st F.A. (PA)	16-155mm guns GPF	East Sector General Support
Prov Bn 92d CAC	6-155mm guns GPF	West Sector Beach Defense

The two Provisional Battalions Self-Propelled Artillery, 27-75mm guns (less one battery) were employed in the East Sector as anti-tank and general support artillery. One battery was assigned the West Sector with a similar mission. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Provisional Artillery Brigade (PS) operated a "Fire Control Center" within the East Sector.

In addition to the above, emplacements for 31 naval guns ranging from one pounders to 3 inch, were started for beach defense. This work was under USAFFE control.

The Reserve Battle Position

The Reserve Battle Position at this time was scarcely more than a line on the map. The Provisional Air Corps Regiment, Colonel Harrison H.C. Richards, A.C. Commanding, started organization of that portion of the Reserve Battle Position astride the East Road just north of Puting early in January.

The 45th Infantry (PS) was directed to lay out and organize the Reserve Battle Position within the West Sector, but the difficulties of the terrain were such that only a small portion of the position was completed

before the 45th Infantry was employed elsewhere.

The Beach Defense

✓ In the East Sector the 57th Infantry (PS) was assigned that portion of the beach from Abucay to Puerto Rivas. The 52d Infantry (PA) Colonel Cordero Commanding, was assigned the sector from Puerto-Rivas to Limay (both inclusive). The 2d Regular Philippine Division occupied the sector on the right of the 52d Infantry (PA). On 11 January the 11th Division, Brigadier General William E. Brougher, Commanding, relieved the 52d Infantry and the 52d Infantry (PA) rejoined the 51st Division (PA) on the Main Battle Position.

The 11th Infantry (PA) was assigned and occupied the sector along the beach between Puerto Rivas and Orion (exclusive). The 12th Infantry (PA) covered that portion of the beach between Orion and Limay, (both inclusive). The 13th Infantry (PA) was held in reserve near Balanga.

The artillery of the 21st Division (PA) was attached to the 11th Division (PA) in order to strengthen the beach defense. The 11th Division (PA) remained on beach defense until 25 January, at which time it was assigned to I Corps.

✕ In the West Sector the 31st Division (PA) was assigned the mission of defending the beach from the RRL to Saysayan Point (inclusive). One battalion of the 45th Infantry (PS) covered Bagac Bay. The Regiment (less two battalions) was in reserve near the junction of the Pilar-Bagac Road and the road leading to Moron. (The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was covering the beach at Marivales).

Bataan Defense Force Reserve

Shortly after midnight 5-6 January the 21st Division having withdrawn into Bataan was assigned a bivouac area in the vicinity of Guitol. It was assigned as Bataan Defense Force reserve.

Reorganization of Units on Arrival in Bataan

The Philippine Army Divisions with the exception of the 31st Division

(PA) and the 41st Division (PA) were badly disorganized and depleted because of constant enemy pressure and the normal difficulties encountered in a withdrawal by untrained troops and inadequate transportation. The 31st Division and 41st Division had not been in combat. It was necessary to place the disorganized divisions in bivouac area for rest and reorganization before they could be used on the preparation of their assigned defensive sectors. On arrival in Bataan, the 51st Division was initially assigned a bivouac area along the trail leading west from Limay. The 11th Division was assigned a bivouac area in the vicinity of Guitol. The 91st Division was assigned a bivouac area about two miles east of Bagac, south of the Pilar-Bagac Road. Several days were spent in reorganization and reconnaissance by the key personnel of these Divisions.

The Covering Force Action at Layac Junction

On 2 January 1942, USAFFE ordered the Commanding General North Luzon Force to organize a covering force at Layac Junction and upon completion of the organization to turn the command of the covering force over to me. The troops allotted for this mission were the 71st Division (PA), the 31st Infantry (US), the 26th Cavalry (PS), the 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery (PS), and the 1st Battalion, 23d Field Artillery (PS). Brigadier General C. A. Selleck was placed in direct command of this force.

The 71st Infantry (PA) occupied the south bank of the Culis River from Almacan to a point just north-east of Culis. The 72d Infantry (PA) was in the position previously prepared by the 31st Infantry (US). This prepared position was astride the East Road just north of Culis and about 1000 yards south of the Layac Junction bridge. It extended about 400 yards west of the East Road. The 1st and 2d Battalions extended the line to the south-west. The disposition set forth above left a wide gap between the left of the 31st Infantry (US) and the nearest hill mass about 3000 yards away. The 26th Cavalry (PS) was assigned to cover this gap and protect the left (west) flank of the covering force. The 1st Battalion, 23d Field

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Artillery and 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery from positions west of the East Road supported the 31st Infantry (US). The remnants of the 71st Field Artillery (PA) supported the 71st Division (PA).

The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry was held in reserve about 1000 yards south-west of Culis.

The 71st Division (PA) was badly disorganized and consisted of the remnants of the 71st Infantry and 72d Infantry. The 31st Infantry (US) had not been in combat. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) had not completely recovered from the bombing it had received on Corregidor a week previously. The 26 Cavalry (PS) was organized into a horse squadron, a motorized squadron, and one Headquarters Squadron.

The position in general lent itself to a good defense. It was on high ground and had good fields of fire. Some work had been done on the position on 28 and 29 December. On 30 December the 31st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was moved to the zig-zag on the Dinalupihan-Olangapo Road. It returned by 4:30 PM, 4 January and spent the remainder of the 4th and all the 5th January on preparation of the position. The 71st Division (PA) worked on the position from 2 to 5 January (inclusive). The 26th Cavalry (PS) arrived on the position during the night 5-6 January.

On 3 January Colonel Skerry sent one of his Engineer Officers to report to General Selleck to assist in the organization of the position. An inspection on 5 January by Colonel Skerry disclosed that little work had been completed. Some wire had been constructed, trenches dug, and gun emplacements constructed. The line occupied was over extended. Early on the morning of 6 January the highway and railroad bridges over the Culo River were destroyed by the North Luzon Force engineers. The Commanding General, North Luzon Force turned the command of the covering force over to me about 6:00 AM, 6 January on orders of the Commanding General, USAFFE.

By 10:30 AM, 6 January, the Japanese had moved their artillery into

position in the vicinity of Sabo and started shelling our position. All during the morning additional hostile artillery including 105mm howitzers came up, went into action and pounded our front line infantry positions, as well as severely punishing our artillery. Early in the action the 71st Field Artillery (PA) was hit. Several guns were destroyed and the Field Artillery suffered numerous casualties. This unit promptly dispersed and ceased to exist as a fighting unit, leaving the brunt of the fighting to be borne by the two Field Artillery (PS) battalions.

These two scout units put up a good fight in the face of tremendous odds. Not only were they outranged by heavier caliber guns, but they were outnumbered five to one. To add to their troubles, Japanese observation planes were flying unmolested continually over their positions and they were forced to change positions often. We had no 155mm-guns within supporting distance of the covering force. By 2:00 PM three out of four guns in one battery of the 23d Field Artillery (PA) had been knocked out. The one remaining gun carried on the fight alone. The other battery was also in difficulty. The ammunition train was hit and blown up. Prime movers were disabled, and the battery suffered severe casualties. The 23d Field Artillery (PS) lost all its guns except one during this engagement. It ceased to exist as a fighting unit on 6 January. The 88th Field Artillery (PS) which was in more covered terrain was badly hammered, but did not suffer as great a loss.

About 2:00 PM, Japanese infantry units were observed crossing the Culo River. Additional units were approaching from the north. At 4:30 PM, a heavy infantry attack was launched against our position with the main blow falling near the junction of the 31st Infantry (US) and the 72d Infantry (PA). The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry was forced back causing a gap. Two companies of the 31st Infantry (US) left the field of battle without orders. These companies were brought back in motors and the Company Commanders relieved. The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) counterattacked and restored the line.

The 71st Infantry (PA) was overextended along the Culis River and a breakthrough there had only a short distance to go in order to cut the East Road and imperil the remainder of the force. No reserves remained.

Japanese troops continued to move south into assembly positions north of the Culis River. It was evident that the enemy was planning another attack against the position. At 8:00 PM, General Selleck informed me that unless he was reinforced by infantry and artillery he could not hold the position. My artillery officer informed me that we could not send more artillery to support a counter-attack at dawn as we could not occupy a position after dark and fire without daylight reconnaissance. At 10:00 PM, 6 January I ordered General Selleck to withdraw the covering force during the night 6-7 January.

Through a failure to decode the message ordering the withdrawal, the 26th Cavalry (PS) was not aware of the withdrawal of the remainder of the covering force. On 7 January this unit was forced to withdraw across country. It joined the I Corps on 9 January after a most difficult march. After the withdrawal the 71st Division was attached to the I Corps and the 31st Infantry (US) withdrew to bivouac area on the Orion-Cut-Off, two kilometers west of Orion.

On withdrawal, contact was lost with the enemy.

The First Battle of Bataan (Abucay - Mt Natib Position)

(See Appendix No. 5)

Change in Designation of Headquarters

On 7 January in accordance with orders from Commanding General USAFFE the Bataan Defense Force was discontinued and the North Luzon Force and South Luzon Force were redesignated the I Philippine Corps and II Philippine Corps respectively.

All troops previously assigned to the West Sector Bataan Defense Force were assigned to I Philippine Corps, Major General J. M. Wainwright commanding.

All troops previously assigned to the East Sector Bataan Defense Force were assigned to II Philippine Corps, Major General George M. Parker Jr., Commanding. The boundary between I Corps and II Corps was the same as the boundary between the East Sector and West Sector Bataan Defense Force.

The I Corps was ordered to maintain contact with the II Corps.

Mission II Philippine Corps

The mission II Philippine Corps was to defend that portion of Bataan previously designated as the East Sector Bataan Defense Force.

General Situation

After the withdrawal of the covering force on the night of 6-7 January, contact with the enemy was lost. On the 7th and 8th of January, the enemy continued its advance to the south, pushed out reconnaissance units, and developed its forces for attack on our Main Battle Position. Japanese infantry cavalry, artillery, and motor units were observed moving to the south on the East Road, between Orani and Samal. Contact was regained on 9 January. Japanese patrols maintained numerous contacts with our outpost on the 9th and 10th of January. The first attack was made on the night 10-11 January against the left of the 57th Infantry (PS) Sector. Thereafter, the Japanese attacks against the II Corps Position were piecemeal and successively progressed to the west in an effort to locate and envelope our left flank. It was soon evident that they preferred to attack over rough terrain and through thick jungles rather than to attack over the narrow strip of good terrain astride

the East Road which was strongly covered by fire. On 7 January I moved my command post to a point on the trail 2 miles west of Limay.

Operations in 57th Infantry Sector

On 8 January the 57th Infantry was occupying the right sector of the Main Battle Position with the 1st and 3d Battalions on the MLR. 3d Battalion on the left, the 2d Battalion on the RRL. The 1st Battalion, 24th Field Artillery (PA) was in direct support. Two battalions, 41st Field Artillery (PA) were in positions to give support on call. Contact was made by reconnaissance patrols on 9 January. On the afternoon of 10 January the OPLR was driven in. On the night 10-11 January a Japanese force estimated as one battalion attacked the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry. The attack was repulsed.

On the night 11-12 January the enemy again attacked the 57th Infantry Sector. Enemy shelling was intense. The enemy attack reached our MLR. On 12 January the 21st Infantry (PA) was attached to the 57th Infantry.

At 4:30 AM, 13 January the Japanese again attacked with great fury. The enemy made a dangerous salient into the left of the 57th Infantry (PS) sector. The 21st Infantry (PA) counterattacked, but made little progress. The morale in the 57th Infantry at this time was very low. Colonel Clarke was relieved and about noon, 13 January, Colonel Arnold J. Funk, was placed in command of the 57th Infantry (PS). Colonel Funk after a personal reconnaissance of his sector, ordered a counterattack by the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) at 3:00 PM. The MLR was restored by dark. The change in regimental commanders did much to raise morale. During the night 13-14 January the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry.

On 14 January the enemy launched an attack against the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry at 10:00 AM. By 12:30 PM, this battalion had been forced out of the MLR. Again the 2d Battalion was used to counterattack and restore the MLR. On 15 January the 22d Infantry was attached to the 57th Infantry and on the night 16-17 January the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry was relieved by the 22d Infantry. About 18 January the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry (PA) was relieved by the 22d Infantry (PA). The enemy pressure against the 57th Infantry Sector had lessened since 15 January and moved to the west. Because of the threat of an envelopment of the left (west) flank of the Main Battle Position, the 1st Battalion, 57th Infantry (PS) was relieved about 20 January.

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by the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry and the 57th Infantry assembled in reserve south-west of Abucay, prepared to move to the left of the battle line to meet a threatened envelopment of the left (west) flank of the Main Battle Position.

Operations in 41st Division (PA) Sector

The 41st Division (PA) held its sector until ordered to withdraw. Brigadier General Vicente Lim, and Colonel Malcolm V. Fortier deserve the highest possible commendation for their superior leadership. The 41st Division's outstanding performance of duty in action, in withstanding continuous assaults by superior forces was largely due to the untiring efforts and superior military knowledge and ability of Colonel Fortier. This officer served with outstanding honor and distinction, and his efforts were reflected in the actions of the 41st Division (PA).

Enemy pressure started against the 41st Infantry (PA) Sector on the night of 10-11 January. Repeated attacks and counter-attacks continued until the 15th of January, with the 41st Infantry (PA) holding its MLR after each counter attack.

By 15 January the Main enemy pressure had reached the 42d Infantry. This unit was forced to the RRL and the 32d Infantry (PA) was ordered to report to the Commanding General, 41st Division on the night 15-16 January as 41st Division Reserve. Counterattacks by the 42d Infantry (PA) and elements of the 32d Infantry (PA) restored the MLR within the 42d Infantry (PA) Sector.

The 43d Infantry (PA) received the heaviest enemy attacks of any regiment in the 41st Division. By 16 January its left was exposed because of the disintegration and rout of the 51st Division (PA). The heavy pressure against this unit had made it necessary to strengthen its sector with the 23d Infantry (PA). During the period 14-24 January all three Battalions, 23d Infantry (PA) were singly committed to the main battle position, supporting the 43d Infantry (PA).

On the 16th January, continued enemy pressure had forced the 43d Infantry to refuse its left flank from the MLR to the RRL. Heavy fighting had forced the battle line within a hundred yards of the Regimental Command Post.

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Lieutenant Colonel E. T. Lewis, Senior Instructor, 43d Infantry, refused to move his Command Post to the rear. By his conspicuous gallantry and calm manner displayed at this critical time, he succeeded in holding his position until the arrival of the Philippine Division for the counter-attack on the 17th of January.

Operations in 51st Division (PA) Sector

Between 8-11 January the 51st Division (PA) strengthened its position, improved dispositions, completed communication installations, and intensified reconnaissance to the front and left flank. Contact with the I Corps on Mt Natib was never established although numerous efforts were made to do so.

At 5:00 PM, 11 January the 52d Infantry (PA) (less 1st Battalion and one company, previously destroyed in South Luzon) rejoined the Division and was assigned to Division Reserve.

On 12 January the enemy attacked and opened a gap on the right of the 51st Infantry (PA) Sector. The 52d Infantry (PA) counter-attacked and regained some ground. Colonel Loren P. Stewart was killed. Colonel Young was assigned to command the 51st Infantry (PA). On 13 January hostile pressure increased on the front of the 51st Infantry (PA), and by noon that unit showed signs of weakening. The Commanding General, 51st Division (PA) ordered the 51st Infantry (PA) to withdraw to the high ground on the north bank of the Lavantan River.

On 14 January, under continued hostile pressure the 51st Infantry (PA) withdrew to the south bank of the Lavantan River. Such elements of the 52d Infantry (PA) as could be released were returned to normal control so as to reconstitute a Division Reserve.

On 15 January all division reserves and all other available troops were committed in order to maintain the new MLR on the south bank of the Lavantan River.

At this time the I Corps was notified of the critical nature of the situation and additional troops for II Corps Reserve were requested of the Commanding General, USAFFE. The 31st Division (PA) was ordered to move to the vicinity of Guitol as II Corps Reserve.

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About midnight 15-16 January I ordered the Commanding General, 51st Division (PA) to again counter-attack at daylight 16 January to reestablish his MLR on the north bank of the Lavantan River. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (PA) was ordered to report to the Commanding General, 51st Division (PA) at 4:00 AM, 16 January to assist in the counter-attack. This battalion never reported.

At daylight, 16 January the attack was launched. By 9:00 AM, some advance had been made, but a dangerous gap had been created between the 51st Infantry (PA) and the left of the 43d Infantry (PA). By 1:00 PM the enemy began infiltrating through the gap and at the same time succeeded in penetrating between the 51st Infantry (PA) and 53d Infantry (PA). Thus the 51st Infantry (PA) was doubly enveloped. All 51st Division (PA) reserves were employed but failed to stop the enemy advance. The entire front of the 51st Infantry (PA) disintegrated and the troops routed. The 53d Infantry (PA) was ordered to fall back to the left rear and protect the right of the I Corps.

By 5:00 PM, the Commanding General, 51st Division (PA) had formed a covering force astride the Guitol Trail near Hill 1620 and started reorganizing his division.

The Counter-Attack by the Philippine Division

The disintegration of the 51st Division (PA) created a critical situation which threatened the Main Battle Position. Unless the 51st Division (PA) Sector could be regained, it was evident that my left flank would be enveloped and the position would be lost. I ordered the Commanding General, Philippine Division to counterattack at daylight 17 January to regain the MLR within the 51st Division (PA) Sector.

On the morning of the 17th, the 31st Infantry (US) moved into position west of the Hacienda and attacked in a northerly direction, with the 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion advanced a short way and was stopped by heavy hostile resistance, leaving a gap between this battalion and the 41st Division (PA) on its right. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) pushed its attack successfully to the Main Line of Resistance, thus leaving a gap between the 1st Battalion and the 2d Battalion on its right rear.

The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry attacked on the left of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US), and also reached the MLR. It was in contact with the 31st Infantry (US), but not in contact with the rest of the 45th Infantry (PS). The country was very broken, and wooded. Contact was extremely difficult to maintain between units as they went forward. The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was attached to the 31st Infantry (US) and was the left element on the Abucay-Mt Natib line. Their left (west) flank was exposed. On the night of 17-18 January, the 45th Infantry (PS) (less 3d Battalion) moved into the gap between the 41st Division (PA) and the 31st Infantry (US). On 18 January the 31st Infantry (US) failed to make any advance. At 4:00 PM, the 1st Battalion 45th Infantry (PS) attacked from a position on the right of the 31st Infantry (US) in a direction slightly west of north and by 6:45 PM reached its objective on the MLR. However when it reached it, it was in contact with neither the 41st Division (PA) on its right nor the 31st Infantry (US) on its left rear. There was a gap of about 1000 yards on its right and one of about 1300 yards on its left. The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was moved into a position in reserve behind the interval between the 31st Infantry (US) and the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS).

On 19th January the 31st Infantry (US) continued its effort to dislodge the enemy from the Hacienda pocket. My request for tank support was refused. Early in the day the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry was withdrawn to regain contact with the 31st Infantry. Later in the day the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (2d Battalion on the left) again attacked to the north and reached the MLR. After this successful attack there still remained a gap of about 750 yards between the 45th Infantry units and the 41st Division. Contact patrols were sent out by the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry to cover this gap and contact was established and maintained thereafter.

On 20 January there was brisk action throughout the day in the Hacienda pocket, but no material change developed. The enemy succeeded in infiltrating about one company through the line and in rear of the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS). This hostile force was encircled by the 31st Infantry (US), 45th Infantry (PS), and some elements of the 41st Division (PA), but managed to escape on the night of the 20-21, leaving behind a large number of dead.

On 21 January the pressure against the 31st Infantry (US) was increased greatly and it was evident that the enemy was preparing to effect a movement around the left flank from the direction of Mt Natib. The 31st Infantry (US) made strong efforts to dislodge the enemy but with no success.

At 3:00 PM, the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was moved to the east so as to make contact with the 41st Division (PA), and the line was refused to the south-west towards the Abucay-Hacienda Road and thus present a uniform front to the threatened attack from the direction of Mt Natib.

The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS) was ordered to conform to this movement and make contact with the 31st Infantry (US) on its left. However it failed to fully complete the movement and make the contemplated change of front and contact. It stopped short of the desired position and left a gap between its left and the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US).

On 22 January the situation on the left flank grew worse. Repeated attacks and counter-attacks took place, but no material gains were made. On the contrary the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) was forced to withdraw from the MLR to a position south of the Abucay-Hacienda road and facing Mt Natib.

X The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) withdrew to the rear and made contact with the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) on its right along the Abucay-Hacienda Road. But there still was a gap between its left flank and the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry (US), which was south of the road. The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS), which was still attached to the 31st Infantry (US) had been on the MLR and on the extreme left and abreast of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US), was withdrawn through the gap between the 3d and 1st Battalions, 31st Infantry (US), and placed in the 31st Infantry (US) reserve. It made several counter attacks to stop the enemy who was making determined efforts to penetrate the gap.

It was now evident that the MLR in the 51st Division (PA) Sector could not be restored by the Philippine Division.

Operations in the Rear Areas

On 15 January the 31st Division, (PA), was attached to II Corps and ordered

to move to Guitol in Corps Reserve. The leading elements arrived at Guitol at 10:00 AM, 15 January, and completed the movement during the night 16-17 January. About midnight 15-16 January the 32d Infantry (PA) was moved to the Abucay-Mt Natib line as 41st Division (PA) reserve.

During the period 17-21 January stragglers of the 51st Division (PA) were assembled north of Guitol and reorganized into three Infantry Regiments at greatly reduced strength. A covering force consisting of the remnants of the 51st Infantry (PA) and the 21st Engineer Battalion (PA) constituted the covering force on Hill 1620. Hostile raiding patrols frequently moved south along the Abo-Abo River Valley and harrassed the 31st Division (PA) in their bivouac area and the 51st Division (PA) in its reorganization area. One Battalion, 31st Infantry (PA) was placed in position to cover this river valley.

On 20 January the 51st Infantry (PA) and 21st Engineer Battalion (PA) (Colonel Young Commanding) were ordered to advance north-west astride the Guitol Trail and seize the junction of the Guitol-Abucay-Hacienda Trails. The advance progressed slowly against little resistance until almost at the junction when strong pressure developed.

On 21 January this force pushed forward against heavy hostile resistance and secured its objectives during the afternoon. About 9:00 PM, 21 January a Japanese force attacked the 31st Division (PA) from the east and north. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (PA) was ordered to counter-attack at 7:00 AM, 22 January. The attack was launched but the enemy had withdrawn during the night.

On 22 January the enemy attacked the front of the covering force, 51st Division (PA) cutting rearward communications and supply. The enemy captured Hill 1620. An attempt was made by the covering force to retake Hill 1620 but was unsuccessful. During the night 22-23 January the covering force withdrew via the heavily jungled slopes of Mt Mataan, and thence generally south to the 51st Division (PA) reorganization area north of Guitol.

On 23d January an attack was launched from the south to retake Hill 1620. The enemy had withdrawn from his position and the attacking force continued its advance until stopped by hostile resistance astride the Guitol Trail about one

kilometer northwest of Hill 1620. A new covering force consisting of the remnants of the 53d Infantry (PA) and a detachment of the 52d Infantry (PA), Colonel Boatwright, Commanding, was put in position near the junction of the Guitol and Balanga Trails, with instructions to hold.

The troops north of Hill 1620 were ordered to withdraw into reserve under cover of darkness the night of 23-24 January. At about 6:00 PM the enemy attacked Colonel Boatwright's force. Finding itself surrounded on three sides it withdrew down the Abo-Abo River Valley. The 52d Infantry (PA) detachment reported to the nearest commander in the I Corps and remained there. The 53d Infantry (PA) was badly scattered. Colonel Young was placed in command of a force which held a position astride the Guitol Trail north of Guitol protecting the 51st Division (PA) reorganization area. The hostile advance was stopped there that evening.

Withdrawal to Reserve Battle Position

(See Appendix No. 6)

The Reasons for Withdrawal

On 22 January Major General Sutherland, Chief of Staff, USAFFE, visited my Command Post west of Limay. After a discussion of the situation General Sutherland decided a withdrawal from the Abucay-Mt Natib Position was essential. The reasons for the withdrawal at this time were apparent:

- (1) Disintegration of the 51st Division (PA), which had left a gap in the Main Battle Position for six (6) days.
- (2) Failure of the counterattack by the Philippine Division to reestablish the MLR within 51st Division (PA) Sector.
- (3) Unknown strength of the enemy that had penetrated into the Abo-Abo River corridor through this gap.
- (4) Loss of contact between I and II Corps.
- (5) All reserves of I and II Corps had been committed except elements of 31st Division (PA).
- (6) Possible envelopment of Abucay-Mt Natib position thus making a later withdrawal impossible.
- (7) The enemy was in the rear of the Main Battle Position in the I Corps Sector.

The Reserve Battle Position

The outstanding terrain feature of the Reserve Battle Position was Mt Samat, with an elevation of 1920 feet, which dominated the position and afforded excellent observation over the entire Corps front.

The Catman River corridor and the Talisay River corridor afforded excellent avenues of approach leading from the north into the position. The area in general was covered with dense jungles and traversed by deep gorges. The right half of the position had excellent fields of fire. The East Road and the Pilar Bagac Road were the only highways leading into the position. Both were on flat terrain and subject to excellent observation. Trails #2 and #4 on the east slope and Trails #29 and #429 on the west slope of Mt Samat were the main

trails leading south into the area. The rivers drained generally to the north east or east. The width of the II Corps Sector along the Reserve Battle Position was approximately 12,000 yards.

Plan of Withdrawal

The salient features of the withdrawal plan were:

(1) The withdrawal to start after dark night 23-24 January and to be completed by daylight 26 January.

(2) Withdrawal of service installations and heavy artillery was to start night 23-24 January, and to be completed by daylight 25 January.

(3) A covering force, Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough, Commanding, to be established along the General Line Wawa-Cupang-Bani-Guitol. Troops in order from left to right one third (1/3) 31st Infantry (US), one-third (1/3) 57th Infantry (PS), 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (PA), 33d Infantry (PA), remnants of 51st Division (PA). Withdrawal to this line to start at 7:00 PM night 24-25 January. Tanks and S.P.M. to support covering force. Withdrawal of covering force to start at 11:30 PM night 25-26 January and to be completed by daylight 26 January.

(4) A shell consisting of one rifle company and a platoon of machine guns for each front line battalion and battery of 75mm guns for each front line regiment was to start withdrawal at 3:00 AM 25 January.

(5) Withdrawal of front line units to start night 24-25 January.

(6) Reserve Battle Position to be divided into four Sub-sectors from right to left.

Sub-sector "A" - Colonel Charles L. Steele, Commanding Troops: 31st Combat Team.

Sub-sector "B" - Colonel Irvin E. Doane, Commanding Troops: Provisional Air Corps Regiment.

Sub-sector "C" - Brigadier General Clifford Bluemel, Commanding Troops: remnants of 51st Division (PA), 31st Division (PA).

Sub-sector "D" - Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough, Commanding Troops: 21st Division (PA), 41st Division (PA), 57th Infantry (PS).

(7) 45th Combat Team to I Corps via Pilar-Bagac Road.

(8) 11th Division (PA), to I Corps via Pilar-Bagac Road.

(9) Command Post II Corps to point on trail two miles west of Lamao.

Changes in Plans of Withdrawal

Late in the afternoon 25 January orders were received from USAFFE that the 31st Infantry (US) and 57th Infantry (PS) would not occupy sectors on the Reserve Battle Position, but would be held in Army Reserve. Since the movement order had been issued, reconnaissance of positions made, supplies and ammunition dumped on positions and movement already started, it was strongly requested that the changes in orders be cancelled. The request was refused.

The 33d Infantry (PA) was assigned the sector previously assigned the 57th Infantry (PS). The 57th Infantry (PS) was ordered to move to bivouac area just north of Limay. The 31st Infantry (PA) was ordered to occupy the section previously assigned to the 31st Infantry (US). The 31st Infantry (US) was ordered to bivouac area west of Limay. Inasmuch as some elements had already started their movement these changes necessitated the crossing of units in motion and resulted in some confusion. However the movement was completed as ordered.

At 2:00 PM 26 January it was learned that through a failure to notify the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" of the change in orders for the 33d Infantry (PA) a gap was left in Sub-sector "C" astride Trail #2. It was urgent that the gap at this important part of the MLR be filled immediately. The covering force had been withdrawn, no out post existed, and the tanks which had delayed an advancing enemy regiment had returned from that action via Orion Cut-off about noon. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" while on a personal reconnaissance of his sector discovered the error and immediately closed the gap with his reserve battalion, (2d Battalion, 32d Infantry (PA)). I ordered the Commanding General Sub-sector "D" to send one regiment (less one battalion) to strengthen Sub-sector "C". The 41st Infantry (PA) (less one battalion) was the unit designated and it arrived in Sub-sector "C" at 4:00 PM 27 January.

Change in Rear Boundaries

Prior to the withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position the rear boundary of the II Corps had been the line Alangan River-Mt Marivales (both inclusive).

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By NARA Date 2/10/12

The withdrawal order of USAFFE removed this boundary, extended the boundary between the II and I Corps to Gorda Point, and relieved Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, Service Command, Philippine Department, from responsibility for defense of the rear area. The 2d Regular Division (PA), Brigadier General Francisco Commanding was assigned to the II Corps.

The units of the 2d Regular Division (PA) at this time were: The 4th Infantry (PC), Lieutenant Colonel Jalandoni, Commanding. This unit was armed with Enfield Rifles, and after its arrival in Bataan was provided with approximately fifty-five (55) Air Corps light air cooled machine-guns, .30 caliber, and four (4) .50 caliber machine guns. The 1st and 2d Infantry Regiments (PC) organic units of the 2d Regular Division (PA) had previously been attached to the I Corps. The 2d Field Artillery (PC) Lieutenant Colonel Alba, Commanding, was organized primarily from Filipino ROTC students (approximate strength 650), was armed with Enfield Rifles and was provided with approximately twenty (20) light, air cooled, machine-guns.

Attached to the 2d Division (PC) was a detachment of the Philippine Off Shore Patrol, (approximate strength 200), and was armed with the Enfield Rifle and seven (7) light air cooled machine guns.

New Beach Defense Sectors were assigned as follows:

RRL to Limay (inclusive) - 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel McKee, Commanding.

Limay (exclusive) to Lucanin River (inclusive) - Provisional Regiment consisting of 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry (PC), the Off Shore Patrol and the 2d Field Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Garcia, Commanding.

Lucanin River (exclusive) to Gorda Point (inclusive) - 4th Infantry (PC) (less 3d Battalion) Lieutenant Colonel Jalandoni, Commanding.

Sub-sector "E" Reserve. The 2d Engineer Battalion, on call. (This unit normally used on various engineer projects within the II Corps area under supervision of my Corps Engineer Officer.)

Supporting troops for Sub-sector "E":

Six (6) Batteries of the 21st Field Artillery (PA)

Six (6) Search light units.

Six (6) Naval guns.

About 10 February arrangements were made with Brigadier General McBride for approximately 600 Service Troops to serve as a reserve for Lieutenant Colonel Garcia's Sector. A similar reserve composed of approximately 500 men of the 5th Interceptor Command, 200 Air Corps Engineers, 200 men from Headquarters Company HPD, and 100 men from the Quartermaster Bakery was organized and assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Jalandoni's Sector. These units were organized into combat units and given considerable combat training.

On 28th January the 192d Tank Battalion was assigned a primary mission along the beach from Pandan Point to Limay (inclusive). This unit had a contingent mission to support Sub-sectors "A" and "B". The 194th Tank Battalion was assigned a primary beach mission from Limay (exclusive) to Cabocabin and a contingent mission to support Sub-sectors "C" and "D".

The Self-Propelled Mounts had similar beach defense missions.

Artillery with II Corps

The artillery with the II Corps at this time was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Mission</u>
21st Field Artillery (PA)	24	75-mm	Sub-sectors A & E
31st Field Artillery (PA)	8	75-mm	Sub-sector C
41st Field Artillery (PA)	16	75-mm	Sub-sector D
41st Field Artillery (PA)	8	2.95 MT	Sub-sector D
51st Field Artillery (PA)	8	75-mm	Sub-sector C
301st Field Artillery (PA)(less 1 Plat 155-mm Howitzers.)	16	155-mm	General Support
Btry "B" 86th Field Artillery (PS)	4	155-mm GAF	General Support
1st Bn., 24th Field Artillery (PS)	8	75-mm GAF	Sub-sectors A & B
1st Bn., 24th Field Artillery (PS)	4	2.95 Mt.G	Sub-sectors A & B
1st Bn., 88th Field Artillery (PS)	8	75-mm	Sub-sectors A & B
Naval Guns	approx - 12	1 pounders	Beach Defense to 3 inch

Operations in Sub-sector "D" 26 January - 21 March

The morning of 26 January found all units assigned to Sub-sector "D" in or entering their assigned Sub-sector and engaged in organizing and strengthening their positions.

The troops garrisoning the Sub-sector were all Philippine Army units and consisted of the 21st Division (PA), Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin, commanding, and the 41st Division (PA), Brigadier General Vicente Lim, Commanding, and the 33d Infantry (PA) (until 3 March) Major Stanley Holmes, Commanding.

Initially the 21st Division (PA) employed two regiments in the defense of its assigned position. The 22d Infantry (PA) was on the right (east) and the 23d Infantry (PA) on the left (west). The 21st Infantry (PA) was designated as Corps Reserve. It remained in position in the 21st Division (PA) position however, to be employed as the reserve of that division on orders from II Philippine Corps.

Brigadier General Max Lough was assigned to command Sub-sector "D" and used the General and Special Staffs of the Philippine Division to perform similar functions in Sub-sector "D" and the Philippine Division Service Units continued to function in those capacities in Sub-sector "D".

Sub-sector "D" was on the extreme west of my Corps. Initially no roads other than Carabou trails led into this sector. It was characterized by very rugged terrain and dense tropical undergrowth. The construction of necessary roads, communication facilities and subsequent supplying of this force of over fourteen thousand men required almost superhuman effort by all concerned. The results accomplished by the Philippine Division General and Special Staffs and of the Service Units were particularly outstanding.

Probably due to the very heavy casualties that he had suffered in overcoming the main battle position, the enemy was slow to follow up the advantage he gained by our withdrawal. He advanced very cautiously and allowed contact with our main forces in this sector to be broken off for two or three days.

The first contact was by small combat patrols and gradually increased to reconnaissance in force. Daily local combat during the early part of

February occurred along the entire front of this Sub-sector. Frequently reconnaissances in force which varied in strength from a company to a battalion were made. In these encounters severe losses were inflicted on the enemy by our troops, and their losses would have been greatly increased had our troops been equipped with modern hand grenades, infantry mortars, and adequate automatic weapons.

The effectiveness of our artillery during this period can hardly be overestimated in breaking up hostile concentrations, destroying formations, and frustrating attacks. It was without doubt the weapon that the enemy feared most.

On 23 February the enemy made a general retirement all along the front of the II Corps and thereafter, except for minor patrol actions and constant aerial reconnaissance, there was little activity in Sub-sector "D" until the latter part of March.

Operations in Sub-sector "C" 26 January - 31 March

About 7:00 PM, 26 January, the advance elements of the enemy reached the MLR, and established a pocket. After dark, 27-28 January, the enemy again attacked the MLR at this point and was again repulsed. The enemy estimated, as an infantry battalion, entrenched in and around a bamboo thicket astride Trail #2 where Trail #2 crosses the Pilar River, about seventy-five yards north of our MLR.

The 41st Infantry (PA)(less one Battalion) relieved the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry (PA)(less Company "H") during the morning of 28 January. The 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry (PA), with Company "H", 32d Infantry (PA) and Battalion Headquarters Battery, 31st Field Artillery (PA) attacked, occupied the MLR, covering a front of 1200 yards east of Trail #2. The 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry (PA)(less Company "F") occupied the RRL.

On the night 28-29 January after a hostile artillery preparation of about one hour, the enemy launched an attack supported by artillery, machine-gun, and mortar fire. The main effort was directed at Trail #2. The fighting was brisk and at close quarters. Every hostile attempt to penetrate our line was

repulsed. Fighting continued throughout the night, along the entire front of Sub-sector "C". This attack was the main effort made by the enemy within the II Philippine Corps prior to their attack on 3 April. Captured documents indicated that the elements of three Japanese Regiments were employed in this attack; that the Japanese were short of artillery; that the direction of their attack was southwest; and that their mission was to drive our troops into Manila Bay near Limay.

On 28 January, I ordered General Bluemel to counterattack, drive the enemy north, and re-establish our original OPLR. A counterattack was launched at 1:00 PM, 29 January, supported by artillery fire. Some advance was made, however the advance was halted by enemy fire from near the junction of Trail #2 and the Orion Cut-Off. Sub-sector "C" artillery could not reach this area. I attached a battery of 2.95's to Sub-sector "C" and ordered another counter-attack. This counter-attack was launched at 8:00 AM, 2 February. It encountered much resistance and progressed slowly. The attack was resumed on the morning of 3 February, and the bamboo thicket was taken. Hundreds of dead Japanese were counted. The enemy withdrew to a position along the Talisay River.

The outpost was still some distance behind the location designated. On 5 February another attempt to advance the outpost gained but little ground. From 6-20 February the enemy in Talisay Valley was harrassed day and night by irregular and intermittent artillery fire, and constant, vigorous patrolling. On 21 February an attempt was made to dislodge the enemy from the valley and on the night 22-23 February, he withdrew from the valley. The designated outpost line was now occupied.

From 23 February until after the middle of March, a comparative quiet period existed in Sub-sector "C". Constant patrolling to maintain contact was carried out.

Operations in Sub-sector "B" 26 January - 21 March

Sub-sector "B" was occuppied by a Provisional Infantry Regiment, strength approximately 1400, made up of Air Corps personnel (american), Colonel I. E. Doane, Infantry, Commanding. Other than intermittent bombing and patrol actions, no enemy contact was made in this sector during this period.

Operations in Sub-sectors "A" and "E" 26 January - 21 March

Sub-sector "A" extended on the right of Sub-sector "B" to the beach and along the beach to Limay. Sub-sector "E" extended from Limay along the beach to Gorda (southern-most point on boundary between II and I Corps). Sub-sector "A" maintained contact by vigorous patrolling in its sub-sector and intermittent bombing occurred in both sub-sectors. The main enemy operation in these sub-sectors during this period, however, was harrassing action from Manila Bay.

During the period 21 January - 2 April, the enemy intermittently shelled the beach positions at night by 75-mm pieces mounted on barges in Manila Bay. G-2 information disclosed that a large number of barges were being constructed in Manila. These activities indicated a probable intention of the enemy to attempt an envelopment of my Corps from Manila Bay.

An off-shore patrol was organized using bancas powered with outboard motors. Acting in conjunction with a small fleet of "mosquito boats", Philippine Army, under USAFFE, this patrol skirmished nightly with the enemy harrassing force. Two enemy barges were sunk.

No material damage was done by this harrassing action other than the demoralizing effect on the green Filipino troops.

Reorganization of Main Battle Position

After the withdrawal of the enemy on 23 February, the Main Battle Position was reorganized and strengthened.

In Sub-sector "D", the 33d Infantry was relieved on 3 March and placed in Corps Reserve along Trail #64 on the left rear of Sub-sector "C". The 41st Infantry was returned to Sub-sector "D", and took up the position formerly occupied by the 33d Infantry. The 21st Infantry was released to the Commanding General Sub-sector "D" and was placed on the left flank of the 21st Division.

In sub-sector "C" the 51st Division had been depleted to about 3500 men and officers. To reduce overhead and make more men available for the front lines, this unit was reorganized into the 51st Combat Team of four Infantry Battalions and two Batteries of Field Artillery. Engineer, Medical and Service Units were reduced and all possible personnel was armed with the rifle for front line duty.

The 1st Battalion of the 33d Infantry was assigned to sub-sector "C" from the Corps Reserve.

No material changes were made in the personnel of the other sub-sectors. The units of the II Philippine Corps finally disposed on 21 March is shown schematically as follows:

	SS "D"						SS "C"	SS "B"	SS "A"	SS "E"	
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	
2d PS:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	
I Corps:	41	42	43	21	23	22	51	32	Prov	31	2d Reg
X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	:
I X II	-	*	-	-	-	-	X CT	-	- AC	- PA	X Div PA
X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	X
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	Regt	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
33d Infantry (PA)(less 3d Battalion) Corps Reserve											

33d Infantry (PA)(less 3d Battalion) Corps Reserve

School for Scouting and Patrolling

During the comparatively quiet period a school for scouting and patrolling was initiated in all Philippine Army Units. Specially selected officers and non-commissioned officers from the 31st Infantry (US) and the 57th and 45th Infantry (PS) were detailed to the front line to conduct this school.

At the same time trained technicians from the 14th Engineers (PS) visited all front line units to instruct and assist in the completion of the defensive position.

Plans for Counter-attack

During the period, comprehensive plans for counter-attack at every conceivable place that the enemy might penetrate were made.

All Service Units of the Service Command (Philippine Department), were organized to take over the beach defenses of Sub-sector "E" so that I might have that unit available in the event of an enemy break-through.

Reconnaissances were made of routes to all Sub-sectors by commanders of the 2d Regular Division (PA) and by officers of the 33d Infantry (PA)(The Corps Reserve).

Headquarters USAFFE ordered thorough reconnaissance by Commanders of the 31st Infantry (US) and the 45th and 57th Infantry (PS) (USAFFE Reserve) of all routes in my corps.

Upon the formation of the Luzon Force on 12 March, the Commanding General ordered practice maneuvers for the actual occupation of the beach defense in Sub-sector "E" by the Service Units, relieving the 2d Regular Division (PA) to be available for counter-attack missions.

Enemy Starts Developing for Attack

From about 13 March, the enemy activity increased daily. Intense Aerial activity commenced on 15 March and grew in intensity both in the front line areas and in the rear installations. Vigorous patrolling by my infantry units continued, but the enemy had established a screen that was difficult to penetrate.

Beginning about 12 March, I had daily information of large enemy truck and materiel movement south from Iyao Junction and west from Abucay. Troops, Artillery, and tanks were observed in these movements. This continued for a period of fourteen days, both day and night.

It was evident that the enemy was massing his infantry, artillery, ammunition, and supplies, in front of Sub-sector "D". Since Mt Samat was the dominating terrain feature within my sector, with excellent corridors leading south, on each side of Mt Samat, it was believed that the enemy would launch his attack with Mt Samat as his initial objective. This opinion was verified by the capture of a detailed order for a reconnaissance in force taken from a dead Japanese officer by personnel of the 43d Infantry (PA) on the night of 24-25 March. From the mass of information available I estimated that an enemy attack could be expected at any time after 26 March and that the main effort would be launched against the front of Sub-sector "D". I so reported to the Commanding General, USFIP on 26th March.

Physical Condition of Personnel

Although this period has been characterized as comparatively quiet, the physical condition of the personnel of my command had deteriorated at an

alarming rate. The ration had continued to be cut so that during the month of March, the troops were barely getting a one-fourth ration. In the terms of calories, they were receiving less than 1000 per day. Medical authorities stated that 1500 were needed to perform the barest functions of life. By 1 March serious muscle wasting was evident and by the latter part of March the combat efficiency was rapidly decreasing.

Bataan is a malarial infested region. Lack of Quinine had brought the hospitalization for malaria to 500 daily by 1 March and 1000 daily by 1 April.

Due to lack of vitamins, Beri-beri was flagrant and increasing. Dysentery and diarrhea were extremely prevalent and due to the weakened condition of the men, the epidemic could not be controlled.

After 15 March the ailment of nerve fatigue due to incessant bombing and the absence of any counter activity, particularly in the air, rapidly increased.

Due to lack of gasoline or transportation, great numbers of the sick could not be evacuated but lay in the forward area and caused a further strain to the Commanders of the fighting troops.

The supply of needed clothing had long been exhausted, and a large part of the troops were barefooted and clad in rags.

I estimated that the combat efficiency of my troops was 20% by 15 March. Each day it was lessening and by 2 April it was materially lowered.

Operations in Sub-sectors 21 March 1942 - 2 April 1942

Sub-sectors "A", "B", and "E" continued fairly quiet as far as operations by ground troops was concerned. Enemy patrol activity had increased however in Sub-sectors "A" and "B".

In Sub-sector "C" three enemy raids were staged in this area on the nights of 21-22 March, 27-28 March, and 30-31 March. The first two raids were repulsed at the OPLR with heavy enemy casualties but the OPLR broke under the force of the third raid, and a section of it retired beyond the MLR. The enemy however failed to come through the gap it created.

In Sub-sector "D" during the day of 28 March, a hostile force of about

a regiment exerted severe pressure against the 42d Infantry in the center of the 41st Division Sector which caused the OPLR to give way in the afternoon. Counter-attacks restored the position by heavy hand-to-hand fighting.

On 30-31 March and 1 April the pressure of the enemy steadily increased. It was apparent that he had returned with a serious offensive purpose and with fresh shock troops, strongly reinforced with artillery, tanks, mortars, automatic weapons, and air support. The 21st Infantry (PA) withdrew its OPLR to a point 150 yards from its MLR to tie in with the 42d Infantry (PA) on its left.

During the night 1-2 April the 21st Division withdrew its OPLR on the right to a point about halfway between New Maluya and the MLR. The 51st Combat Team in Sub-sector "C" accordingly withdrew the left of its MLR to maintain contact.

On April 2, the 42d Infantry's OPLR and MLR broke under a terrific bombing attack but the MLR was restored before nightfall.

The Second Battle of Bataan (Orion - Mt Samat Position) 3 April 1942

To 9 April 1942

(See Appendices No's 6 and 7).

Diagrammatic disposition of II Corps troops on Main Battle Position.

6:00 AM, 3 April:

[illegible]

II Corps Reserve 33d Infantry (PA)(less 1 Battalion)

Chronological Record of Operations 3 - 9 April 1942

3 April. Throughout the night 2-3 April 1942 the enemy continued shelling the Main Battle Position in Sub-sector "D". Starting at 8:00 AM, the enemy concentrated extremely heavy artillery fire (the heaviest by far of any artillery fire in any battle to date in the Philippine Islands - 35 firing positions had been spotted). The shelling lasted until 4:00 PM. Hostile planes were constantly in the air. Intensive aerial bombing continued throughout the day on the MLR and RRL of the 41st Division (PA). The enemy bombed and shelled at will, Sub-sector "D" and that portion of Sub-sector "C" west of Trail #2. Hostile planes hovered over our artillery positions and bombed them whenever we opened fire. About 3:00 PM, a heavy coordinated attack supported by tanks was launched against the 41st Division (PA) front. The main effort of this attack was made against the left (west) flank of the 42d Infantry (PA). The 42d and 43d Infantry Regiments (PA), gave way in complete rout. The 41st Infantry (PA), also withdrew and through some confusion of orders started to withdraw south on Trail #29 towards Trail #8. The artillery of the 41st Division (PA) in direct support of Sub-sector "D", remained in position and fired effectively against the advancing enemy, repeatedly breaking

up his concentrations of troops, and inflicting severe losses. Some of the batteries remained in position and fired until they were charged and captured by the enemy.

The 21st Infantry (PA) was heavily attacked during the day, but managed to hold its position. However, it refused its left flank in order to meet a thrust from the west and to make contact with any friendly troops on that flank.

The sick and wounded were assembled at the junction of Trails #6 and #429, and every effort was made to evacuate them as rapidly and as safely as possible.

The 33d Infantry (PA) (less 1 Battalion) which since the 3d of March had been in II Corps Reserve, was released to the Commanding General of Sub-sector "D", and was ordered into position on the Catman River, west of Mt Samat. This unit took up position astride Trail #429 near the junction of Trails #429 and #6. A defended road block was constructed at the zig-zag on Trail #429 to prevent advance of enemy tanks. The Battalion deployed along the Catman River was attacked during the night 3-4 April.

The Anti-tank Company, 31st Infantry (US) (4-37mm guns) was attached to Sub-sector "C" and took up position astride Trail #21 for anti-tank defense.

The 31st Infantry (US) was notified of the attack on the 41st Division (PA), front, and warned that early movement could be expected.

During the night 3-4 April a hostile landing supported by 75-mm guns on barges was attempted against Sub-sector "A" near Pandan Point. This attempted landing was repulsed by our artillery fire.

In Sub-sector "C", the 51st Combat Team (PA) was ordered to prepare a position facing west. This line extended from the point where the MLR crossed the Pilar River to the RRL. It was west of and covered Trail #2.

4 April. At daylight large flights of low flying enemy bombers, bombed and strafed the front lines. A coordinated attack, supported by heavy artillery fire and tanks was directed against the left (west) flank of the 21st Division (PA). Under pressure of this attack, the 21st Infantry (PA), crumbled and the

23d Infantry (PA) refused its left flank to the RRL to meet the threat on its left and rear.

The Battalion of the 33d Infantry (PA), which was deployed along the Catman River, was withdrawn to the junction of Trails #429 and #6. It received enemy pressure from its front and right (east) flank during the day and night 4-5 April.

The 45th Infantry (PS), less one battalion; the 31st Infantry (US), and the Provisional Tank Group (less two companies supporting the I Corps) were released to the II Corps.

The 31st Infantry (US), was ordered to move to assembly position near junction of Trails #10 and #2. The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion) assembled near Trails #8 and #29.

The 57th Infantry (PS), was ordered by Luzon Force to Lamac.

I released the 31st Infantry (US), the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion), and a company of tanks to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D" and ordered him to counter-attack to reestablish the RRL within the 41st Division Sector.

All engineer troops were ordered to stop engineer work and assemble for combat. An attempt was made to reorganize the scattered elements of the 43d and 42d Infantry Regiments. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis succeeded in assembling about two hundred men of the 43d Infantry (PA) near the junction of Trails #6 and #8. Lieutenant Colonel McDonald was able to assemble only fifty men of the 42d Infantry (PA). The men of the 42d Infantry (PA) were attached to the 43d Infantry (PA).

Elements of the 41st Division Field Artillery remained in action in Sub-sector "D" and remnants of the 41st Infantry now under I Corps were in position on the Pantingan River.

The 61st Combat Team withdrew its OPLR to the Pilar-Bagac Road. Increased artillery fire was received in Sub-sector "C". There was no change in Sub-sectors "A", "B", and "E".

At 4:00 PM, 4 April, the 45th Infantry (PS) then in Army Reserve on Saysayan Ridge, started its movement to assembly position near the junction of Trails #8 and #29.

During the night 4-5 April, the 31st Infantry (US) moved from its bivouac area one and one-half miles west of Lamao to assembly position near the junction of Trails #2 and #10.

5 April. Hostile pressure supported by about thirty tanks continued against the left of the 21st Division (PA). The 23d Infantry (PA), followed by the 22d Infantry (PA), withdrew with some semblance of order during the afternoon to a line 1500 yards north of Trail #429. This exposed the left (west) flank of Sub-sector "C" to attack. Combat Team 51 occupied its previously prepared position facing west and covering Trail #2. The remainder of troops in Sub-sector "C" held on the MLR. The 21st Division (PA) and Combat Team 51 areas were heavily bombed and shelled throughout the day. Contact between the 21st Division (PA) and Combat Team 51 was lost. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" requested permission to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente River. I ordered him to withdraw his left flank and regain contact with the 21st Division (PA). Later in the day the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" again requested to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente. I ordered him to hold his present position.

The 33d Infantry (PA)(less one battalion) was heavily engaged in its position near the junction of Trail #429 and #6. Enemy pressure was being received on its front and both flanks. The 57th Infantry (PS), was released to II Corps and was assigned to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D". The Commanding General, Sub-sector "D" issued orders for the counter-attack, at his command post 500 yards west of Trails #6 and #8. The plan of attack included the following:

- (1) Initial objective: RRL of Sub-sector "D"
- (2) Time of attack: 6:00 AM, 6 April
- (3) 31st Infantry (US), move to assembly position near junction of Trails #429 and #44 and attack North on Trail #4.
- (4) The 33d Infantry (PA), (less one battalion) to attack north on Trail #429.
- (5) The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion) supported by one tank company to attack north on Trail #29.

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- (6) The 21st Division (PA), was to attack between Trails #4 and #429.
- (7) The 57th Infantry (PS), in Sub-sector Reserve.
- (8) A thirty minute artillery barrage to precede the attack.

The Commanding Officer, 31st Infantry (US), issued his attack order at 4:00 PM, 5 April at his Command Post on the Belolo River near Trail #2. He ordered the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) to move at once, 5:00 PM, 5 April, to secure Trails #44 from Trail #2 to #429. Remainder of the 31st Infantry (US) to move after dark to the junction of Trails #44 and #429. The 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) passed through the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (US) at midnight 5-6 April and ran into enemy resistance just west of the junction of Trails #44 and #429. Heavy firing was heard from the 21st Division (PA) area. The enemy had enveloped the remnants of the 21st Division (PA) in a night attack and it had completely disintegrated. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis with the remnants of the 42d Infantry (PA), and the 43d Infantry (PA) (about 250 men) moved north on Trail #6 and attempted to relieve the 41st Field Artillery (PA) troops. This effort was repulsed.

6 April. At 4:45 AM, 6 April, Colonel Uhrig accompanied by two Philippine Army Colonels of the 21st Division (PA) arrived at the Command Post, 31st Infantry (US), and told the Commanding Officer, 31st Infantry (US) (Lieutenant Colonel Brady) that the 21st Division (PA) had completely Disintegrated. Lieutenant Colonel Brady failed to launch his attack as ordered. Communications with Sub-sector "D" were broken. In explaining his action to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C", he stated that he had only 800 men, and if the attack had gained its objective, they were insufficient to hold the RRL of the 21st Division (PA). The artillery barrage supporting the planned attack was fired as scheduled. An enemy force estimated as a regiment advancing east of Mt Samat hit the 31st Infantry (US), while it was still deployed in attack formation. The mission of the 31st Infantry (US) was changed by G-3, Sub-sector "D" to hold junction of Trails #44 and #429 at all cost.

The 33d Infantry (PA) (less one battalion) was forced out of its position near junction of Trails #6 and #429. The remnants of this unit led by Major Holmes, withdrew south-east across country and attempted to rejoin our forces

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east of the San Vicente. They found themselves completely cut off by Japanese troops. They then broke up into small parties, and made their way to the north through the Japanese lines. The 33d Infantry (PA)(less one battalion) ceased to exist after this date. Contact with the 33d Infantry (PA) had been lost on 4 April and was never regained. This unit never received the attack order of the Commanding General, Sub-sector "D". The 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion) supported by one company of tanks attacked north on Trail #29. It was stopped astride Trail #29, about 2500 yards north of Trail 8.

By 2:00 PM, the enemy advancing south on Trail #6 and west thereof, reached Trail #8, and cut off Headquarters Sub-sector "D", the 45th Infantry (PS) and the remnants of the 41st Infantry (PA) from the remainder of the Corps. At 7:00 PM, the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion) was withdrawn south on Trail #29 to Trail #8, and placed in position facing east astride Trail #8, around midnight 6-7 April. This unit was ordered to attack east on Trail #8 early 7 April to reestablish contact. The remnants of Sub-sector "D" east of Trail #6 were placed under the Commanding Officer, 57th Infantry (PS). The Commanding Officer, 57th Infantry (less one battalion) with the remnants of the troops of Sub-sector "D" was ordered to secure the junction of Trails #6 and #8. The 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions (PA) were attached to the 57th Infantry (PS). Communications were frequently disrupted by enemy artillery fire.

The Commanding General Sub-sector "C", asked again for permission to withdraw to the east bank of the San Vicente River. I ordered him to occupy a line on the second ridge west of the San Vicente River. This was the line held by the 31st Infantry (US), Combat Team 51 was ordered to take position on the right of the 31st Infantry (US), and to prolong the line to the North. The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (PA), and the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (PA) were ordered to fan out to the west and extend the line to the north of Combat Team 51. This forced the withdrawal of the outposts of Combat Team 51 and 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (PA), and caused the left portion of the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (PA) to give up its MLR. Enemy tanks on the Pilar-Bagac Road were driven off by the anti-tank weapons of the 31st Infantry (US).

and uncontrollable mob. About 90% of the Philippine Army were without shoes. Their one uniform was worn out. Officers and men were suffering from malnutrition, and the majority of them were ill with malaria and dysentery or both and should have been in the hospital. It was now evident that it was impossible to expect or force any further combat service from these units. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" repeatedly endeavored to organize successive positions astride Trail #2. Each position was shelled, bombed and outflanked by the enemy. The 26th Cavalry (PS) then near the junction of Trails #10 and #2, were attached to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C". The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was ordered to organize and hold a line along the Mamala River.

The 26th Cavalry (PS) was deployed astride Trail #20 on the south bank of the Mamala River. Remnants of the 31st Infantry (US), 57th Infantry (PS), 14th Engineers (PS) and 803d Engineers (US) were in an assembly position near Trail #20 about one and one-half miles south of the Mamala River. The enemy held a portion of Trail #20 between this unit and the 26th Cavalry (PS) under fire. Due to continued hostile pressure by superior enemy forces, and flanking action on the left (west) flank of the Mamala River, the occupation of the position had to be abandoned, and the troops during the hours of darkness 7-8 April occupied the Alangan River Line.

Sub-sectors "A" and "B" were ordered to conform.

Troops of Sub-sector "E" (4th PC) taken from their beach defense and released to Commanding General, Sub-sector "C".

The Command Post, II Corps was moved to KP 167 $\frac{1}{2}$ East Road during the night 7-8 April.

The II Corps artillery was displaced to the rear and was never in Sub-sector "C" action again.

8 April. By 3:00 AM, 8 April, the Alangan River line was occupied by remnants of the following units, from right to left, 4th PC, 31st Infantry (PA), Provisional Air Corps Regiment, 803d Engineers (US), 57th Infantry (PS), 31st Infantry (US), 26th Cavalry (PS) and 14th Engineers (PS). The Commanding General

Sub-sector "C" (Brigadier General Clifford Bluemel) had personally supervised the organization under great difficulties. He had been placed in direct command of all front line troops and deserves the highest possible commendation for his fearless unceasing energy and initiative displayed throughout the operations since 3 April.

All of these units were disorganized and greatly depleted in strength. Control was difficult due to the thick jungle, scarcity of trails, and lack of adequate signal equipment, and personnel. Radio and wire communications were completely out. No organization of the ground was possible. The strength of the entire position did not exceed 2000 men and officers.

During the morning, a Jap observation plane discovered the 57th Infantry (PS) and the 31st Infantry (US) and dropped incendiary bombs on the dry cogan grass and bamboo thickets. A fire ensued and hampered considerably the occupation of the position. During the afternoon a similar incident occurred in the 31st Infantry (PA) sector causing this unit to break and flee.

Self-Propelled-Mounts and Tanks were ordered to cover the avenues of approach. Lieutenant Colonels Ganahl and Smythe reported to the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" and asked what assistance could be given. They were ordered to make a reconnaissance and submit their recommendation for employment of these weapons. The reconnaissance was made, but no Self-Propelled-Mounts or Tanks arrived on the position.

A defended road block on Trail #20 constructed by the 14th Engineers (PS) effectively stopped an enemy tank attack.

By 3:00 PM, the left (west) flank of the position had been enveloped by a strong enemy force. The entire position was at that time subjected to an intense aerial bombardment and artillery concentration under which the hostile attack supported by tanks penetrated the center of the position. Shortly before dark, the 31st Infantry (US) was forced to withdraw and the 57th Infantry (PS) was being enveloped on both flanks. To hold the Alangan River was now an impossibility. The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was ordered to hold the Lamao River line when forced out of the Alangan River position. The 14th Engineers (PS) withdrew south on Trail #20, covered by the 26th Cavalry (PS).

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The 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment was released to II Corps at Cabcaben after dark 8 April. It was ordered to the Lamac River position but never advanced beyond Bataan Air Field.

By 9:00 PM, 8 April, the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" was at the crossing of Trail #20 and the Lamac River with remnants of the 26th Cavalry (PS) 14th Engineers (PS), 57th Infantry (PS), and 31st Infantry (US). The Commanding General, Sub-sector "C" sent out reconnaissance parties who returned with reports that the occupation of the position was not feasible. The Commanding General Sub-sector "C" later informed me that it was impossible for him to occupy the Lamac River position.

9 April. By midnight 8-9 April the enemy had open passage to the south in the path of which was General Hospital No. 2, with thousands of patients. All roads and trails to the south and southwest were jammed with stragglers and refugees, pursued by Japanese columns of infantry and tanks. Bombing and strafing by low flying planes was constant. All men and officers were completely exhausted. All reserves had been employed. All organized resistance had ceased. The II Philippine Corps which had taken the main blow of the Japanese pressure since 6 January ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered the destruction of all artillery, ammunition, radio, engineer, and other equipment, except transportation by 6:00 AM, 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was sent forward on the East Road to the Japanese Command.

Surrender of the Headquarters II Corps took place on the morning of 9 April at Corps Command Post at KP 167 $\frac{1}{2}$ East Road. The troops surrendered piecemeal where found by the enemy.


GEO. M. PARKER JR
Major General, United States Army.

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